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SUMMARY
The Native Territories Penal Code (NTPC) was passed by the Parliament 
of the Cape of Good Hope in 1886. It was part of the admini­
strative machinery of the Cape colonial authorities for the
Xhosa speaking people who occupied the area between the Great 
Kei and the Mtamvuna Rivers. However, it became the criminal 
code applicable to all people living in the Transkeian 
Territories regardless of race or colour. The Code was
enacted ■following the recommendations of the Cape Government 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs (1883).
Quite unexpectedly this Code exerted a great deal of influence 
on South African criminal law especially after union was formed 
in 1910. This was because the code was a document readily
available to judges and magistrates in South Africa, and
when a difficult question of law arose it was all very easy 
to say that the South Africa law on the point was as laid 
down in a particular section of the Code. In this way the
Code also assisted in the importation of English law into 
South African lav;. Text book writers like Gardiner and Lansdown 
also contributed to the influence of the NTPC on South African 
criminal law.
As time went on, however, South African jurists saw the mistake 
of the NTPC being recorded as a correct reflection of South 
African law in particular areas and set out to correct the
position. Prominent among these are De Wet & Swanepoel and
P.M.A. Hunt. They achieved a great measure of success in 
watering down the influence of NTPC on South Africa law ,
although it cannot be said that they eradicated it.
i i
So strong was Che influence of this Code that it was felt 
even as far away as Rhodesia and Bechuanaland (as they then 
w e r e ).
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CHAPTER ONE 
IN LIMINE
1.1. STATUS QUAE5TIONIS
The aim of this study is to investigate the signifi-
1.
cance of the Native Territories Penal Code, more
especially its influence on South African Criminal
law. This inquiry has been prompted primarily
by statements of the judges of the Supreme Court
of South Africa, in certain cases heard in South
Africa, to the effect that in given instances
2
the South African law is as laid down in the Code.
Similar statements were made by judges in Rhodesia
(as it then was) about the relevance of this code 
. 3
to the criminal law of that country. It would
appear that the Native Territories PenaL Code
was such a persuasive document that oven lawyers
in the High Commission Territories looked to it
4
for solutions when difficulties arose.
1 Act 24 of 1886 (Cape)
2 See for example. R v Valachia & Ano. 1945 AD 826 R v Reccia
1946 EDL 1. --------------------- ■■----
3 R v Harlen 1964 (4) SA 44 (SR)
4 See Bagwasi and Louno v Rex HCTLR 1926 - 1953 at 38
It is not difficult to see why judges and lawyers 
in various parts of Southern Africa should from time 
to time have looked to the Penal Code of the Transkeian 
Territories as a guide for the solution of problems
that arose. It will be remembered that when the Union 
of South Africa came Into being this Code was the 
only comprehensive criminal statute In the Southern 
African region. When the Union was formed Transkei
became part of South Africa, and South African judges 
themselves handled and administered and Interpreted 
the Code, and it is not difficult to understand why 
they should readily have regarded It as part of South
African law. In this regard the problem facing the
judges not only in the Eastern Cape, of which Transkei 
was judicially part and parcel, but throughout South
Africa was made more acute by the emergence in 1931 
of the eminent work of Gardiner & Lansdown on South 
African Criminal Law and Procedure. In his thesis 
entitled "Judicial considerations on the imposition 
of punishment: A historic study " (unpublished) Professor 
A J Middleton rightly points out that the learned
authors would, as part of the text and not even as
an annexure, append the relevant sections of the code 
to the discussion of the corresponding aspects of
the general law of the country.1’ Where problems arose
which neither the common law nor the statute law could
solve, the judges and practtoners simply relied on
the Code which, In the words of Middleton,
- 2 -
1 See page 574
1
was "constantly at (their) elbows."
Closely related to my already stated aim in attempting
this study, it is essential to bear in mind that
this Penal Code was enacted by Western lawyers and
meant to be applicable, for the most part at any
rate, to a non-westernised African community which
had always had its life governed by the indigenous
criminal law. This factor would no doubt have exercised
2
the minds of those who drafted the code. It immediately 
becomes important to investigate the extent to which 
they took this into consideration, for in so doing 
they were faced with the problem of the interaction 
between the indigenous law and the received Western 
law. This therefore brings to the fore the question 
of the distinction between the Western concepts of 
criminal law and procedure and their development 
and the indigenous concepts of criminal law and procedure 
A related question is how far, if at all, did the 
code go in effecting a reconciliation between these 
two different approaches.
It is known that in 1976 Transkei became independent
of South Africa and seven years later she passed
3
the Transkei Penal Code Act. It seems to be important 
to inquire into the extent to which the provisions 
of the 1886 code have been retained as well as the
- 3 -
1 Op cit 582
2 See generally chapter 2.2.2.2 infra
3 Act No. 9 of 1983
Aextent to which they have been discarded. This will be
an acid test of the strength and resilience of the
1886 code. Likewise it is intended to investigate to
the extent to which South African law has recommended
itself to the legislative authority of a state which
has attained its independence from South Africa after
a period of sixty six years. It will be found that
there are definite departures from the 1886 code
while in some areas the original provisions have
regrettably been retained especially in controversial
1
areas like the common purpose doctrine.
1.2 BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is no major work that has hitherto been undertaken
in this field. Nevertheless, the influence of the
1886 Code of South African law has from time to time
been spelt out by scholars. In many instances this
influence was not dealt with in isolation. It was
treated as one of several factors which demonstrated
the influence of English law on South African law.
For instance in his article entitled "Some reflections
2
on our criminal law"( Pain discusses at some length 
the influence of English law on South African law.
Ke refers to the Transkei Penal Code merely in passing
- a matter of two lines under the subheading "the 
non-European and the Criminal law" in an article 
that covers over twenty pages.
1 c.f, however, S vSafatsa & Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) for the 
resurgence of this doctrine in South Africa.
2. Acta Juridica 1960 at 289
5In a thesis entitled "Die Leerstuk van verrainderde
i  ---------------------------------------------------- ------—
strafbaarheid" D.P. van der Merwe pays definite,
albeit little, attention to the influence of the
Transkei Penal Code on South African law. He points
out, rather inaccurately in my view, that, following
the code^ drunkenness was accepted by the courts as
a factor for reducing a conviction from assault with
intent to do grievous bodily harm, to one of assault
2
common. He also deals, again in passing, with the
famous section 141 which led the courts to accept
provocation as being sufficient to reduce murder
3
to culpable homicide. The author otherwise does
not express any personal views on the matter. A 
comprehensive exposition of the influence of the 
Transkei Penal Code on South African law is to be 
found in the thesis of Middleton. There, for the
first time, we find a systematic treatment of the 
various fields in which the influence of the code 
is discernible. The treatment is not exhaustive,
but the learned author discusses eight important 
areas: the versari doctrine, the common purpose
doctrine, provocation, ignorance of the law and claim 
of right, the criminal liability of children, acting
upon the orders of another, the concept attempt and 
the liability of accessories after the fact. Judged 
against other performances it must be admitted that 
the treatment here accorded to the code is most generous ,
1 LLD Unisa 1980
2 See page 217. Vide 5.2 .
3 See pages 240-248 of van der Merwe s work, where the Butelezi,
Attwood, Blokland, Thlbani, and Mokonto cases are also discussed.
6and Che ten page commentary is sufficient to attract 
the curiosity of any academic who has particular
interest in legal developments in Transkei and to 
inspire further research in the field.
As far as the writers of the leading textbooks on 
South African law are concerned, it appears that 
at the beginning the tendency was to regard the
Trasnkei Penal Code as correctly reflecting the 
South African Law. I refer here to Cardiner & Lansdown. 
As a result the influence of the Transkei Penal
Code on South African law was accelerated. The 
turning point in the correlation that had existed 
over sixty years between the Penal Code and South 
African Criminal law came after the emergence in 
1949 of an eminent publication by Professors J.C. 
de Wet and H.L. Swanepoel entitled: Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafreg. These authors took a line totally different 
from that of Gardiner & Lansdown and the effect 
of their approach was to water-down the influence 
of the Transkei Penal Code on South African Law. 
They dealt with the Code mainly in respect of each 
of the various specific offences, and in each case 
they showed, sometimes with signs of emotion, how 
it had in the past been regarded
1 First edition 1949. Second edition 1960. Third edition 
1975. Forth edition 1985.
7as correctly reflecting the South African law. Thus
with reference to provocation in relation to the
law of homicide they describe the code as "hierdie
omslagtige en verwarde stukkie wetgewing" - "this
cumbersome and confused bit of legislation (!)".
Otherwise the learned authors did not at all concern
2
themselves with the overall significance of the Code.
3
Hunt deals with the code in much the same way as
De Wet & Swanepoel. Admittedly he is highly scientific
in his analysis of the code and those of its provisions
with which he deals, but again this analysis is confined
to those sections of South African law to which it
is relevant. The learned author is quite critical
of the Code's influence on South African law. For
example he speaks of it as "preserving, like
ugly fossils, several unsatisfactory and illogical
4
ideas".
5
A more recent textbook is Snyman's Criminal Law.
The author's treatment of the Code is, to say the
least, merely cursory. It is significant that
he refers to the Code as having been passed for operation
in Transkei and adjacent areas. This seems to indicate 
how little attention the author has devoted to an understanding
1 2ed at 120 c.f. 4ed 133
2 The reaction of the authors to the Code was of coursé part
of a general objection to the importation of English law into 
South African law.
3 South African Criminal Law & Procedure Vol.2, 2ed by 
J.R. Milton
4 Op cit 246. The remarks made in footnote 2 supra
apply here. ,
5 This is a very straightforward translation of the author s 
work which ^appeared in Afrikaans in 1981 and is 
preferred by many students. (2nd edition 1986).
of the Code. However there is the consolatory reflection
1
that he is not the only perpetrator of such errors.
Apart from that the learned author makes the point
that the Code "in later years" exerted a great deal
of influence on South African law as expounded by
the Courts and gives section 141 (provocation) and
2
section 179 (theft) as examples. When discussing
provocation he sufficiently indicates the impact
3
of section 141 and when discussing theft the impact
L|
of the Code is presented rather mildly and in passing. 
In his 10 page article "Die invloed van die Engelese 
en die Duitse reg op die Suid - Afrikaanse strafreg" 
the author's discussion of the Code is limited to 
less than a page.
At the end of the day it transpires that the role 
played by the Native Territories' Penal Code has 
not yet been examined in detail. It is my object 
in the pages that follow to give it the attention 
it deserves.
1.3 METHOD
Initially I proposed to discuss the twenty chapters
of the Code (two hundred and seventy sections) consecuti-
1 See statement of Huggard CJ in Bagwasi and Louno v Rex
HCTLR 1926 - 1953 —^ ----------------------
2 See page 10
3 See pages 147 - 149
4 See at page 439
5 De lure vol. I 1981 page 68
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9vely, and in so doing indicate the sections which 
had an influence on South African law and lay the necessary 
emphasis on them. I would likewise have stated that 
other sections, as I came across them, did not have 
an influence on South African law. However I decided against 
this method as I felt that it would make my thesis
very long. Certainly, a lot of time and space would
have been spent on irrelevant material. I therefore 
finally decided to discuss general principles and 
specific offences with particular reference to areas 
in which the Code did have or could reasonably have
been expected to have an influence. This must not
at all be taken to mean that I have therefore been 
able to deal exhaustively with those areas in which
the Code had an influence. The point is that a random 
discussion of each and every section of the Code
would have done more harm especially from the point 
of view of relevance.
My research has been confined mainly to case law,
textbook writers, and periodicals. Thus I have departed
from the method I employed during ray research for
the degree of Master of Laws where I conducted some
1
interviews as part of the research. Furthermore
as the study is partly of a historical nature I have
2
to depend also on historical works where relevant.
pages 64 to 66
2 eg. Theal: Records of the Cape Colony
Finally, I have felt constrained to adopt, as much 
as possible, a comparative method. In this regard 
the impact of customary law and related practices 
on the Code will be highlighted. When one recalls
that topics such as witchcraft have exercised the 
minds of the South African legislature just about 
as much as they exercised the minds of the commissioners 
who drafted the Code, the relevance of this method 
of approach becomes undoubtable. The inclusion
of the chapter on the interaction of legal systems
has to be seen against this background.
PRESENTATION
The study will consist of eleven chapters, the first
three being of an introductory nature. Apart from 
what has been said above, chapter two will deal 
with the whole question of the codification of criminal
law in South Africa in particular and Africa in
general, thus placing the birth of the Transkei 
Penal Code in perspective. In chapter three I shall 
deal with the question of the interaction of legal 
systems. English law had itself an influence on
South African Law, while indigenous law was a factor
to be reckoned with at the advent of received Western 
law in Southern Africa. This chapter should therefore 
be important for showing that the influence of the 
Code on South African criminal law took place in the context of the
- 10 -
1 Vide chapter three
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general tendency of legal systems Co Cake friendly 
cognisance of each ocher once Che baccles between 
the conqueror and the indigenous peoples are over.
The rest of the study will consist of four chapters 
on the general principles of criminal responsibility 
and three chapters on several topics relating to 
specific offences. In these chapters the main aspects 
of the influence of the Code on South African criminal 
law will be demonstrated. In chapter 11 I shall 
then consider the successes and failures of the 
Code as well as the extent to which the courts 
and the textbook writers promoted or terminated, 
as the case might be, the influence of the Code on 
South African criminal law.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE CODIFICATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
MEANING AND BASIS OF A CODE
1
According Co Che American writer R Floyd Clarke
a code is a complete enactment, a substitute for
2
all the former law. In his article enticled "Colloquiun
3
on African Law" AllotC Cakes an Interesting look
at the whole quesCion of codification of laws.
He raises the question: "WhaC is a Code?" But
he seems to attempt no straight and clear definicion
as such, and Che most that one geCs is Che explanaCion
Chat English law is uncodified, ChaC law in Che
common law African countries Is uncodified, that
a distinction Chat has been made beCween codification
4
and consolidation has not been useful! The learned
author however does indicate Chat " a code is
a handy and auChoritaCive guide ... to Che applicable
law ... (it) makes the law simpler and more accessible
5
and in the circumstances of Africa, more portable".
It is certainly worthwhile to recall that the 
idea of codification of laws Is noC new. In WesCern 
Europe codes have been enacCed and all along the 
way Chey have been successful. In Greece Chere were Che codes
1 The Science of Law and Law making : Fred B Rothmans &
Co., Litciecon, Colorado, 1982
2 See at page 280
3 1963 Journal of African Law Vol. 7 No. 2 p.75ff
4 See especially ac 76
5 Ibid
of Lycurgus and Solon. In Rome there was Che mighcy 
work of JusCinian which superseded for ordinary use
many written commentaries on the law. In Prussia there 
was the code of Frederick the Great. In France was
the Napoleon Code, and it has even been affirmed Chat
che maritime and commercial Ordinances of Louis XIV
of 1673 and 1681 not only put an end to a vast extent
of litigation in the different maritime provinces of 
France, but also furnished rules so clear and so equitable 
that they were adopted as the basis of much of the 
maritime law of England and other countries^
It is perhaps worth recalling that Hammurabi was one
of the forerunners in the field of codification and
there followed the Germanic Codes. It would appear
Chat there is a disCincC difference between the Germanic
Codes and the Native Territories Penal Code on Che one
hand and the modern European Codes on the other. While
the former sought to bring together Che gap between
an indigenous system and a dominant "imported" system
of law and thus create new law, the latter seek to
simplify and bring certainty to the existing law in
a country. Had codification taken place in South Africa
different reasons would have come into the picture
for that country, inter alia the preservation of Roman
Dutch Law as well as the making of a fresh start politically
2
with the conversion of South Africa into a Republic.
1 See The Golden Age of American Law ed Charles M Haar p.255 George
Braziller Inc. few York 1965. Among the "other countries" referred Co 
by the learned auchor one must include South Africa, Transkei and all 
the Roman Dutch Law countries of Southern Africa. This was made 
clear in Mutual and Federal Insurance v Oudtsho o m  Municipality 1985 
(1) SA 41V where tat page 4^/) Joubert J noted Che reliance ot Voet on 
the Edict of Louis XIV of 1681
2 See 2.2.1 infra
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It is indeed interesting to note that no people which
has since departed from the era of unwritten law and
taken to codification has ever regretted it and opted
1
out of it. As D D Field correctly points out even
where the written law has been imposed upon a conquered
people, to whom it must have been at first distasteful
for that reason, it has held its place even after the
foreign domination has departed. The Republic of Transkei
is certainly a case in point. Despite the overwhelming
influence of South African law on Transkei, inevitable
because of South Africa's relationship with Transkei
over a long period dating back from 1910, the idea
of forsaking the Transkei Territories Penal Code never
recommended itself to the Transkeians. Looking specially
2
at African countries, Allott notes that existing laws 
usually lack any adequate general law covering principles 
of interpretation of statutes and choice of law in
internal conflicts. There arises, therefore, a need 
for a preliminary code or law which could be ideally
called the Application of Laws Act.
2.2. CODIFICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND TRANSKEI
2.2.1 Codification in South Africa
South Africa, taking after England, is a living example of 
a country in which there is a triumph of judge- made
law. In both countries the judges have a fairly wide 
latitude when they interpret statutes. They
1 "Reasons for codification" in: The life of the
ed John Honnold, The Free Press of Glencoe 1964.
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law
2 Ibid
overrule or distinguish precedents although of course the 
discretion of the judges is fettered to a large extent by 
the law governing the interpretation of statutes.
The reasons for the triumph of judge-made law in England
and South Africa are exactly the same. They have
been listed with particular reEerence to England by
2
Glanville Williams as follows:
a) Parliament is industrious in multiplying offences
very inartistically drawn but is very slow Co
remedy clear absurdities and deficiencies in 
the law as they come to light.
b) Both Government and Parliament are inadequate 
Co meet all the demands made upon them.
c) In England there is no criminal code superceding
protean rules of common law.
It has been contended that codification is good because 
it is the best way of ensuring that all those who
are required Co obey Che laws have an opportunity 
to know what Chey are. "These laws are now sealed 
in books, and the lawyers object to the opening of 
these books. They can be opened by codification and 
only by codification ... writing... in a book of 
such dimensions and in such language that all can
- 15 -
1
1 See e.g. Harris & Others v Minister of Interior
& Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A). See also Fellner
v Minister of InCerior 1954 (4) SA 523 (A).
2 Textbook of Criminal Law p. 7
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read and comprehend it." 1 Of course the matter is not
quite as simple as the learned author puts it.
The successful consultation of a statute presupposes 
an extensive knowledge of the law of interpretation.
This may involve the consultation of a number of 
divergent statutes and a reconciliation of the 
provisions contained therein and that is no easy 
task for judge and lawyer alike. However it is 
clearly easier for the public to consult a modern 
statute than it is for him to consult a variety 
of more obscure sources. For this reason I am 
in support of the contention that codification 
is good.
It is not surprising that in South Africa the question
of codification has been a subject of debate among
jurists, some being in favour, others being against
2
it. As early as 1930 Sir John Wessels spoke at
length expressing concern about the future of
3
Roman Dutch Law in South Africa. He saw codification 
as a very viable instrument for the preservation 
of Roman Dutch Law. The law is "buried in Latin 
folios" and if there is no reason to codify the 
English law which, it is said, is readily found, 
the same just cannot be said of Roman Dutch Law.
He concludes: "Without a code my fears for Roman
Dutch law are great, mainly because dreary and
1 D Field: "Reasons for Codification" in : The 1 1 fo
of the Law ed John Honnold, The Free Press
ot (Jlencoe 1964.
2 Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division
3 1920 SALJ Vol. 37 p.265
pedantic schoolmasters and professors have conspired 
to rob Latin of its vitality as a language and converted 
it into an examination engine for torturing growing 
boys and girls." Thereafter several South African
jurists came out strongly in favour of codification.
2 '3 4
Prominent among these were Gie and du Plessis. Hamman
and Roberts'* also lent considerable support to the idea
of codification.
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There are also jurists who came out strongly against 
codification in South Africa. These include de Wet 
and Hahlo. Hahlo contended that codification does 
not necessarily bring about legal certainty, and it
succeeded in France, Holland and Germany simply because 
of the diversity of laws and it was the only practical
way of bringing about unity. The overall picture is
that those who oppose codification say it would be 
about just as bad as the disease it sets out to cure, 
at least as far as South Africa is concerned, and the
whole exercise would therefore be a futile one. However 
the reasons given as making codification good for France, 
Germany and Holland should apply equally if one looks 
at South Africa in its real context with Xhosas, Zulus, 
Whites, Coloureds, Indians, Sothos, etc.
1 At 385. It is also averred that the requirement
of Latin is used as a means of limiting entry 
to legal practice.
2 THRHR (Vol. 8) 1944 at 201.
3 THRHR (Vol.18) 1955 at 257. He made the
point that a fresh start was to be made politically
with the conversion of South Africa into a P.epublic 
and it would be fittingco make a break with the 
past in the field of law by codifying the law.
4 KronieW : Kodifikasie van die reg in Suid-Afrika? 1961
THRHR 152 5 Ibid 6 Ibid
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AC this juncture it is perhaps fitting to reflect briefly on
the most recent version of the Natal Code of Zulu Law1
This legislation ofcourse applies specifically to the
Zulu ethnic group in Natal, although the act
constantly refers to blacks instead of Zulus. Like
2
its predecessor it has a few sections which are devoted
3
to offences and a general penalty. Quite strangely 
in my view, the code makes the seduction of an unmarried 
girl one of the offences, punishable by the general
fine of R200.00 or six months imprisonment. This
is a drastic departure from customary law. and it has 
no parallel even in the received western law.
2.2.2 Codification in Transkei
2.2.2.1. Transkei in the Context of Africa
In order to realise how fitting it was that the Transkei 
Penal Code of 1886 should have come Into existence, one has 
first to understand Transkei in the context of Africa.
It is an inevitable result of colonisation that one 
sovereign is replaced by another and the law of the
Colonists assumes dominance and becomes "the law of
the land". It has been rightly pointed out by Mlttlebeeler "*
that when a political power from outside assumes dominance 
over an indigenous population decisions have to be 
made regarding systems of social control. In Zimbabwe, 
for instance, African courts were as from 1891, prohibited
1 Proclamation no R151 of 1987.
2 Law 19 of 1891 (Natal)
3 Sections 115 - 118
4 See Section 115 (e)
5 African custom and Western law 1976 at 9.
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from imposing any sanctions whatsoever and chiefs who 
violated that prohibition and were caught found themselves 
charged with extortion. African criminal law deriving 
from Roman Dutch jurisprudence and enactments of the 
legislature superseded the African law of crimes and 
reached out to all persons except certain statutory 
provisions which, in later years, found application 
in South Africa on a racial basis. There were a few 
exceptions like Nigeria where the customary judicial 
authorities were allowed to prescribe the ultimate 
penalty for serious offences.
In the Ciskei Sir Benjamin D'Urban,. Cape Governor,
concluded a series of treaties or peace agreements
with the Chiefs of various tribes occupying the territory
between the Keiskamma and the Great Kei Rivers in 1835.
A salient aspect of those treaties was the introduction
of Roman Dutch law in the field of criminal law, and
2
the abolition of customary criminal law.
Be all that as it may, the fact of the matter is that 
throughout Africa English criminal law appears in different 
disguises and these disguises are all in the form of 
codes. The codes are named after the countries to 
which they apply. The force and power of English law
1 See Mittlebeer: Ibid 205
2 See Mqeke: The History of Recognition and Application
of indigenous law in the Ciskei. Transkei Law Journal 
1986 at page 77
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in Che English-speaking territories north of the Zambesi 
has grown from strength to strength because unlike Southern Africa,
the strong voice of Roman Dutch law is not heard in
those areas. In penal codes certain offences such
as treason and piracy are defined merely by reference
1
to the law "for the time being in force" in England.
The result is that the laws of those countries change 
automatically when the law in England changes, a danger 
to which the Transkei Territories Penal Code of 1886
was never exposed.
The provisions for the interpretation of several of
these codes also demonstrate the force and power of
English law in the countries concerned. Section A
of the Penal Code of Tanganyika (as it then was) provided:
"This code shall be interpreted in accordance with
the principles of legal interpretation obtaining in
England, and expressions used in it shall be presumed
so far as is consistent with their context, and except
as may be otherwise provided, to be used with the meaning
attaching to them in English criminal law and shall
be construed in accordance therewith". In Uganda,
Kenya, Zanzibar, the Gambia and Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland (as they then were) provisions in terms identical
2
to this were to be found. The result is that even
if the various codes are amended here and there by
1 Read op cit p.7
2 Read : ibid
Che respective governments, English decisions would 
be and no doubt are even now piously quoted in the 
courts, and a close eye is likewise kept on developments 
in English law.
I now consider the position in Southern Africa, a region 
in which legal development has been made more fascinating 
by the predominance of Roman Dutch Law as the basic 
law. Here one is faced with three parallel streams 
of legal philosophy : the indigenous law, the Roman
Dutch law and the English law. The latter found its 
way into the region through two main doors : the British
occupations of 1795 and 1806 and the Transkei Territories 
Penal Code. Over the many years of co-existence these 
legal systems have exerted influence on each other 
in one way or another. ^
The only areas in which codification has taken place
in this whole region are Transkei, Natal and Botswana.
2
The Botswana Penal Code is by far the youngest of the 
Codes. It is essentially of English orientation and 
was enacted by the legislature of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
shortly before independence. The code abrogated Roman 
Dutch Law by stipulating that the unwritten substantive
criminal law in force in the colony of the Cape of
1 As to the influence of English rules on Roman Dutch
law and vice versa see Reid : Criminal Law in the
Africa of Today and Tomorrow" : Journal of African
Law Volume 7 (1963) pages 1 and 14 respectively.
For the influence of Roman Dutch Law rules on Customary
Law see Koyana : Customary Law in a Changing Society
pp 26 and 75.
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2 Law No. 2 of 1964
Good Hope on 10 June 1891 shall no longer be of force 
in the Territory.1 It further lays down that the rules
of construction of the Code shall be those of English
law. The code further uses the familiar English expression 
of manslaughter, malice aforethought etc.
The Natal Code of Zulu law is unique in that it includes 
both criminal law and private law. The first code
was proclaimed in 1878 and applied to the Natal of
that time: the area between the Umzimkulu and
Tugela Rivers. In 1887 the operation of this code
was extended to Zululand, this being the area between 
the Tugela River and the then Portuguese Territory of 
Mozambique. The second code was contained in the schedule 
to Law 19 of 1891 and it replaced the 1878 code in
Natal only, and thus two codes remained in operation, 
one in Natal and one in Zululand, The first Code was repealed 
in 1929 and by Proclamation N o .. 168 of 1932 a new schedule 
to the law 19 of 1891 was substituted. The operation 
of the new code was extended to Zululand so that there
remained one code in operation. It is now known as 
the Natal Code of Zulu law. More recently the KwaZulu 
legislature has passed a new act dealing with the code 
of Zulu law,^ operative in KwaZulu only, so that there
are now two codes of Zulu law. The latest development 
in this regard is the passing of Proclamation No. R151
Lf
of 1987 being the new Natal Code of Zulu law.
1 Section 2
2 Section 4
3 KwaZulu Act No.6 of 1981. KwaZulu Government notice No.47 of 
of 1982; replaced by KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu law,
No.16 of 1985; KwaZulu Government notice 105 of 1986.
4 See 2.2.1 supra
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the: aim of Che Natal Code of Zulu law was "to have some uniform system 
of civil jurisdiction right throughout the country1' 
because there was "considerable variety in the practice 
of magistrates in different districts, and indeed, 
in the custom of the Natives themselves, occupying 
- ” 1 
different districts in Natal...
The oldest criminal code in Southern Africa, and indeed
the oldest type of criminal Code of English law origin
in the whole of the African continent, is the Transkei
2
Territories Penal Code of 1886. As indicated above
it is essential that one looks at Transkei not in isolation
but in the context of Colonial Africa as a whole and
that is why it was necessary to look closely at the
question of the codification of laws in African countries.
Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the people
of Transkei lived as totally independent chiefdoms
with their own legal system and constitutional and
social organisation in the area between the Kei and
Mtamvuma Rivers, between Lesotho and the South-East
3
coast of Africa bordering the Indian ocean. This independence 
was enjoyed despite the arrival of the white people
in South Africa in 1652. It was for the first time
in 1854 that Sir George Grey, a senior British Civil
Servant who was Governor and High Commissioner of the
1 Per Mr Justice Beaumont, quoted by A J Kerr in "The
Reception and Codification of Systems of Law in
Southern Africa" : Journal of African Law (vol 2)
1958 p.92
2 See page 16
3 See Saunders : "The Annexation of the Transkei"
in Beyond the Cape Frontier ed. Saunders and Derricourt:
Longman at p.To:>
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Cape Province, urged that this area should be brought
1
under British rule. But nothing happened until the 
granting of responsible government to the Cape Colony 
when the British took positive steps to bring Transkei 
under British rule. This was effected by a series 
of annexations which took place during the period 1879 
to 1894.2
-The annexation took a period of about 20 years because
the Cape Government was dealing not with one tribe
but with several nations each with its own legal system
and political organisation and military structure.
Thus Saunders says: "When the Cape's first responsible
ministry decided in 1873 that the self-governing colony
should expand across the Kei there were a considerable
number of important independent African states within
what was in 1910 to become United South Africa; by
1894 Pondoland was the only such state in that area
3
to have survived." The independent states were Fingoland 
annexed in 1879, Griqualand East (the Bacas) annexed 
in 1879, Western Pondoland annexed in 1884, Thembuland 
annexed in 1885, Gcalekaland (Xhosas proper) annexed 
in 1885, Bomvanaland annexed in 1885, Xesibe annexed
in 1886, Rhode annexed in 1887 and Eastern Pondoland
annexed in 1894.^
1 op cit
2 Ibid
3 Ibid 186
4 Ibid
A significant consequence of the annexation of Transkei
was its retention of a separate status. The various
Territories were not incorporated into the Cape's political
legal and administrative systems as had been done with
the Ciskei (British Kaffraria) in 1866^. They were
governed in a distinct way. Saunders explains that
the basic reason for this special status was that "the
great bulk of the Transkeian population was black
and these blacks lived not on white farms but on their
own land". The interminable delay in the annexation
of Pondoland was due to fear by the Imperial Government.
"It feared that the Mpondo might resist with arms any
attempt to end their independence and that a Mpondo
2
war might set the rest of the Transkei aflame". There
were yet more fears: "The white governing class came
to fear that the Africans of the Transkei, instead
of becoming 'civilised' by being brought within the
3
colony, might barbarise the Colony.1’ Yet another consequence 
of colonisation was that the various independent nations 
of Transkei were given the vague and nebulous appellation 
"Territories" and the Kings of the Pondo, the Xhosa 
and the Thembu nations were demoted to the title of 
Paramount Chiefs - obviously because there could be
no three or four bulls in the same kraal. The king 
could only be the one at Buckingham Palace in London 
and that was that.
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1 op cit 193
2 Ibid
3 Ibid 195
Be all that as it may, the point is that there existed
several distinct nations that were brought together
for the first time under one administration. If anyone
feels that Saunders is overly liberal or generous in
regarding them as nations then even the most conservative
among us will at least be prepared to say that these
were the principalities of Transkei, or if one likes,
these were the counties of Transkei, just like those
principalities and counties that were In Western Europe.
I
So if, as urged by De Wet, it was desirable that codification
should take place in Germany and Holland, the same
applied here. All the more so here, in view oE the
fact that there was also the white population, as well
as the inevitable emergence of a coloured population
which takes place automatically when Black and White
live together. A code that would cater for all the
2
people oE the new Transkei was plainly desirable.
2.2.2.2 The Birth of the Transkei Penal Code
The birth of the code for the Transkeian Territries
was closely linked to the colonisation process. It 
was as part of that process that various facets of 
life of the colonised were looked into and changes 
introduced so as to facilitate understanding and peaceful 
coexistence between the colonists and the colonised.
1 1961 THRHR 152
2 For a "statement of the Transkeian system oE Administration 
up to the time oE Union" see W J C Hears : A study
in Native Administration: The Transkeian Territories
1894 - 1943. (Doctoral Thesis, Unisa, 1947. unpublished) 
The author mentions the Code, albeit in passing, 
as one of twelve leading features oE the Transkeian 
system oE administration.
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In this regard the role oE the missionaries in the
spheres of religion and education is well known. In
the field of law it was at first attempted to modify 
the indigenous law.
The first attempts were made by Sir Benjamin D'Urban,
Cape Governor. This was in the area between the Kelskamma
and the Great Kei Rivers, when the settlers had clashed
with the Xhosas in the Frontier War of 1835 in the
course of the Xhosas' steady but certain moves to the
west. It would appear that a simple code was then
contemplated for this area, but the British reversed
the policy initiated by Sir Benjamin D'Urban and receded
from the conquered territory, the area east of the
1
Great Fish River. The authorities relied on the missionaries 
during the ten years following the Frontier War of
1835, to proceed with the education and conversion
of the people so as to create a climate for the introduction 
of changes in the legal system. Having achieved a
measure of stability with the Xhosas that side of the
Kei, the colonial authorities took time to deliberate
on the major question presented by the Xhosa-speaking 
people across the Kei, a large population made up of 
several tribes, each under its own chief, with Kings 
(so called Paramount Chiefs) in the larger areas of
Pondoland, Thembuland and Gcalekaland, and in each 
case with a well established and vibrant legal system
1 See Report & Proceedings of the Government Commission 
on Native Laws and Customs. Government Printer
Cape Town 1883 at page 15.
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catering sufficiently for the needs of the people.
The task ahead was not an easy one and they thus gave 
the missionaries, and traders and magistrates a period 
of thirty years within which to assume positions all 
over Transkei and proceed with the spade work in the
task of acclimatising the people to the western way
of living.1 The missionaries have indeed pLayed a very 
prominent role in the shaping of events in Colonial 
Africa as a whole. It is noteworthy that the missionaries 
from England, for example, were the agents of powerful
political groups in England, representing the Industrial
, . , , 2 ' 
and mercantile class.
The leader of the groups and founder of the London
Missionary Society was Wilberforce, who is reported
to have once said: "Christianity ... teaches the
poor to be diligent, humble, patient and obedient and
to accept their lowly position in life. It makes the
inequalities between themselves and the rich less galling
because under the influence of religious instruction,
they endure the injustices of this world with the hope
3
of a reward in the next". The missionaries have been 
blamed for having facilitated the conquest and dispossession
1 In the meantime the process of westernisation under
direct rule was gaining momentum in the Ciskei area
and this is how the gap between these two areas
began.
2 See W M Tsotsi: From Chattel to Wage Slavery. Lesotho
Printing & Publishing Co. 1 yíiI at p . ST~.
3 G R Mellor : British Imperial Trusteeship, quoted
by W M Tsotsi ~"op ci t . ibid\
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of Africans and advancing the interests of imperialism 
while posing as the friend of the African. In
this regard Dr Phillip, a superintendent of the 
London Missionary Society, is recorded as having 
said : "while our missionaries are everywhere
scattering the seeds of civilisation... they
are extending British interests, British influences 
and the British Empire. Wherever the missionary 
places his standard among a savage tribe, their
prejudices against the Colonial Government give 
way, their dependence upon the colony is increased 
by the creation of artificial wants... Industry 
trade and agriculture spring up".
The missionaries met with much success in Transkei.
By 1879 the time was seen to be ripe for the Colonial
authorities to march in and annex the Transkeian
Territories to the Cape and thus to Great Britain.
This process was relatively peaceful but there
were skirmishes whereby the colonial authorities
had to make a show of strength and break the grip
of the traditional rulers. For instance in Gcalekaland
the Xhosa king Hintsa was summarily arrested and
a ransom of 50 000 cattle was demanded. He tried
to escape and was shot dead by the British soldiers
on the banks of the Vqabara River in the Willowvale
2
District of Transkei. "Then followed the wholesale
1 See W M Tsotsi op. cit 31
2 See W M Tsotsi : op. cit at p . 33
expropriation of Che land of the Xhosa by the Colonial 
administration. These events make this period
one of the darkest in the history of the black
man in South Africa".^ By the time colonisation 
began the impact of the missionaries had become 
so telling that a prominent member of the Cape 
Parliament felt that the converted class could 
pose a threat to white interests. That was none
other than Cecil Rhodes who. while piloting the 
Glen Grey Bill through the Cape Parliament, declared:
"I have travelled through the Transkei and 
have found some excellent establishments 
where the natives are taught Latin and 
Greek. They are turning out Kaffir parsons, 
most excellent individuals, but the thing is 
overdone ... There are Kaffir parsons every­
where - these institutions are turning them out 
by the dozen. They are turning out a dangerous 
class. They are excellent so long as the supply 
is limited, but the country is over-stocked with 
them. These people will not go back and work 
and that is why I say that the regulations of 
these industrial schools should be framed by the 
Government; otherwise these Kaffir parsons would
2
develop into agitators against the Government... "
As soon as annexation took place, the people of Transkei 
were automatically brought within the pale of Colonial
1 op. cit. ibid
2 W M Tsotsi, op.cit. 113, quoting Vindex: Cecil
Rhodes - Political Life and Speeches 1881 - 1900 
Chafman and Hall Limited London 900 p.382.
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law. Roman-Dutch law penetrated Transkei, and 
the question of codifying the law in Transkeian 
Territories immediately occupied the minds of the
authorities. This was quite contrary to what happened 
in the conquered area of the Ciskei. On the 24th 
January 1880 a Ministerial Minute signed by Mr 
Sprigg, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, read 
as follows:
"With respect to the laws to be administered 
in the annexed territories, in the opinion
of the ministers it is expedient in the 
interests of the natives that the Colonial
laws should be modified... and ministers 
will be prepared to submit a special code
for approval of the Colonial legislature'.1
The sequel to this was a minute from the Colonial
office in London under the signature of Sir Hicks
Beach to the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Bartle 
Frere, dated 24th March 1880. In that minute ministers 
were called upon to submit a special code which 
was "indispensibie for the Government of the Native 
Territories."
Everything had now to be done at once and on the 
6th July 1880 the Parliament of the Cape of Good
Hope passed a motion calling upon the Governor
to appoint a commission to look into the following 
questions:
32
1. Native laws and customs.
2. Land tenure.
3. The advisability of introducing some system of local 
self-government in the Native Territories.
On the 15th September 1880 the Governor then appointed 
the Commission. The members were notably all whites, being:
1. Sir Jacob Dirk Barry, Chairman, then recently appointed 
as first Judge President of the Eastern Districts
Courts;
2. The Hon. Charles Brownlee
3. Mr William Burchanan Chalmers
4. The Rev. James Stewart
5. Mr Walter Earvest Stanford
6. The Hon. Thomas Upington
7. Mr Jonathan Ayliff
8. Dr William Bisset Berry
9. Mr Emile Samuel Rolland
10. Advocate Richard Solomon.
The commission undertook its task with much enthusiasm, 
and enquired into the laws which were already being 
administered by the resident magistrates. They 
examined witnesses of an expert nature and sent 
out numerous circulars to people who were in a 
position to give useful information on the points 
at issue. Enquiring as it was on the wide topic 
of "Native Laws and Customs" it would have been
1 For biographical information about the members of the
Commission see A.J. Kerr's article, Transkei Law Journal 1986 
p.11 at p.18 f.f.
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strange if Che commissioners had not seen fit Co 
consult the indigenous population. Thac consulCation
had also been insisted upon by the Imperial authoricies 
for in February 1880 Che British Secretary of State 
for the Colonies wrote and said thac the authorities 
wer e :
"not only entitled but bound to satisfy
themselves that the laws under which
the native districts will be administered
1
are such as they can approve".
The crucial quesCion is the nature and extent of the 
consultation of the people with special reference to the 
contemplated code.
The Commissioners took the wise step of consulting all 
classes of the indigenous people, i.e. those who had 
acquired education and a measure of westernisation, 
as well as those who had not become detribalised 
and still responded positively to customary law.
The outcome was not surprising. The former group
responded in a manner which reflected their enchantment 
with their newly acquired Christian faith and western
way of life, while the latter's responses were,
on the whole, indicative of their committment to 
customary law and the solutions that it offered 
Co problems in contrast with the received western
1 See Saunders: The annexation of the Transkeian
Territories, quoted by A.J. Kerr in his article 
"The Cape Government commission on Native Laws and 
Customs (1883) ". Transkei Law Journal 1986 page 18.
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law. A few examples will suffice.
In the first category there was the Reverand Gway 
Tyamzashe of Ciskeian origin but ministering tc> 
the Congregational Church in Kimberley at the time. 
Responding to the questions of the commissioners, 
he came out strongly against circumcision, intonjane 
and ukulobola custom which he said, should be "put 
down" by moral teaching. He referred to polygamy
and lobola custom as "evils" which the Government
' 2
should abate and remove by refusing them recognition.
In the second category there were traditional leaders
and their followers consulted simultaneously with
westernised and semi-westernised Transkeians in
3
the Idutywa district. One Maki, "on behalf of 
the heathen headmen and natives present", said 
in answer to the question on circumcision and intonjane :
" The customs of circumcision and intonjane are
very ancient among us, and hitherto we have
always practised them. We wish to say that
we are being killed in reference to these customs,
as we are being prevented from practising them.
We ask you what we ever did to the Government
that these customs of ours should be interfered
4
with as they are at present."
1 See Appendix C, pages 152 - replies to general circular. 
See discussion on intonjane and circumcision at 3.4.4
2 Ibid 153. By striking contrast the Rev. W. Beste 
Lutheran Minister at Stutterheim was at least prepared 
to say that the lobola custom was a good institution 
although he was also unduly critical of it.
3 See page 464
4 Ibid
One Tanti rose to say Chat what had just been said was "in Che 
hearts of everyone here", but no sooner had he said so
than Smith Poswa, "on behalf of the ChrisCian NaCives",
stood up and said:
" These are customs to which we object. All these
customs and dances are to us abominable. We Che
children of Che GovernmenC, must abide by the laws
1
of the Government".
To this Maki retorted that the customs are "part
of our creation and enjoyment of life".
As far as the relevant subject of customary law in general 
and criminal law in particular is concerned, the findings 
of the Commission were, broadly speaking, that many of
the existing laws and customs were inter-woven with the social 
conditions and ordinary institutions of the population. 
That finding was of course as it should have been, and
had it been otherwise Chen the people of Transkei would 
have been a sCrange excepCion to all humanity.
The necessity for a code was attested to by the three chief 
magistrates of Transkei, namely the Chief Magistrates 
of Transkei proper, Thembuland and Griqualand East, although 
the Commissioners recorded that they differed on the actual 
nature that the code should assume. Positive reactions
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1 Ibid
were also made by Sir Theophilus ShepsCone in Natal, 
the Resident magistrates in the various districts, 
and most o£ the missionaries who were by that time 
firmly established in various parts of Transkei.
As against a civil code, a criminal code was urgent 
in Transkei for two reasons, namely that the magistrates 
for their part did not know which law to apply 
while the people on the other hand did not know 
which law they had to obey. The issue was between 
the Colonial criminal law and the customary criminal 
law. In this regard the commission reported as 
folows:
" Some Magistrates inform us that they 
administer the Kafir law; others that they 
administer the Colonial law, some that they 
apply the Kafir mode of procedure by calling 
to the aid of assessors, and allowing the 
examination of prisoners, others that they 
adopt the colonial mode of procedure; some 
that they apply Kafir law and procedure in 
some cases, and the Colonial law and 
procedure in others. All are agreed that 
a criminal code is desirable in order to give 
certainty to the law that they are called upon 
to administer......
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See section 35 of the Caimission's report.
As to the actual rock on which this code was to be
firmly based, great differences of opinion manifested
themselves. Brownlee, later acting Chief Magistrate,
urged that the code should be based on colonial law
with modifications here and there. Blyth contended
that the code should be framed entirely upon colonial
law and special provisions should be merely added 
' ' 2 
relating to the spoor law and to witchcraft. Elliot
said the code should out-and-out be based on customary
criminal law.^
The difficulty with Elliot's recommendation was of
course that customary law had some but not very detailed
provisions of criminal law. This was recognised by
the Commission which made the crucial point that
the customary law distinction between crimes and
delicts was built upon the theory that ail members
4
of the tribe belonged to the chief. Any injury to 
any member of the tribe was an injury to the Chief. 
Injury to property only gave rise to claims o£ compensation 
by the owner of the property. And fraudulent misappropri­
ation of property was looked upon as only giving
rise to a civil remedy. As a natural consequence
the parties could, by mutual arrangement, settle 
what would be serious crimes in terms of western
law. The Commission concluded as follows:
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2 Ibid
3 Ibid
4 Ibid 22
5 Ibid
38
"If, therefore, we had discovered among the 
natives a complete system of Criminal Law,
1
we should not have hesitated to adopt it."
The lack of any detailed provisions of customary criminal law
had been pointed out already some years before the Commission
was instituted by Colonel Maclean who had in fact compiled
2
a Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs. The Commission
had recourse to Colonel Maclean's compilation and summarised
3
it in their Appendix B.
Objections to the idea of colonial law being the basis
of the code were strong and varied. Firstly, colonial
law itself was uncodified, so it would be necessary to
go to the old authorities. Some of these were in Latin
and were scattered in many volumes. Also, many punishments
known to Roman-Dutch law were too cruel to be enforced,
4
so it was argued. Roman-Dutch law gave no maximum penalties,
and the discretion of the judge was a decisive factor.
This meant that there would be no uniformity in the sentencing
5
process. Likewise some Roma n - D u t c h  law offences were
unknown to indigenous law while by the same token some
indigenous law offences like witchcraft were unknown
6
to Roman- Dutch law. Another important objection was
1 Ibid
2 J Slater, Grahamstown 1906; Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1968: first pablished
1858
3 See Appendix B p.17 relating to criminal law
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
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also made regarding procedure, whereby it was contended 
that the western law of procedure should not be preferred 
to the customary law of procedure as the latter recommend 
itself better for the constituency in question.
"The adoption of the colonial criminal law in its 
entirety would perpetuate these eveils and it is 
chiefly to avoid them that we have suggested a penal 
code." The final resolution was therefore that the 
code would adopt the principles of the existing colonial 
law but try by all means to remedy its defects.
That the birth of the Transkei Penal Code was accompanied
by much pain is evident from the uncompromising stance
adopted by Commissioner Ayliff. He was so unbending
Chat he went to Che length of filing a minority report
which was dated at Grahamstown on 29th December 1882.
In it he made the point that the whole report and
draft code were largely Che product of the President,
4
Sir J D Barry's "facile pen ". He also said that 
what the draft code represented was actually everything 
Chat English lawyers had for a long time been clamouring 
for for England herself; .all in vain. The Cape 
would soon codify and they would now find the work
&
already done for them. This was an experiment and 
it should rather be tried in the colony first before
1 Ibid
2 Ibid
3 See pp. 45 - 50 of the Report
4 Burehe11 & Hunt : South African Criminal Law & Procedure
Vol.lp.26, record this complaint.
5 Quite a misjudgment of the issue of the time Co come 
because Che Cape never codified!
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It was essayed "among these suspicious and exitable people
1
who form the population of our dependencies." The 
people were very conservative and regarded suspiciously 
any new proposals brought by the government. This 
therefore meant that the code might be rejected by 
the people j and the whole exercise would be a futile 
on e !
All these inaccurate forecasts and insinuations of
suspicion apart, Mr Ayliff made out a strong case
against a special "hybrid" code and In favour of a
code of customary criminal law out and out. The
"Kafir law” did exist after all he urged, so why
not codify it? The power of the chiefs was subject
to checks and balances, and councillors maintained
an equipoise between the authority of the chiefs and
3
the rights of the tribesmen. Lawsuits were conducted
under the supervision of the chiefs assisted by their
councillors "as decorously as any I have seen In
4
our courts, and disturbances are not tolerated".
The President should therefore have used his skill 
to bring about what had really been wanted by the 
colonial office in London, namely " a code of Native 
Law". He said that the path would have been easy 
because the various magistrates in the districts were
£
actually busy administering customary criminal law
1 Commission's Report : Ibid. Strangely enough, Mr Ayliff
was in a committee of four - the Chairman, Upington, 
Stanford and himself - which drafted the Native Territories 
Penal Code, a draft which was enacted with very few 
changes as Act No.24 of 1886 (Cape).
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
5 c.f quotation at page 34 supra.
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and were carrying out their task with much skill 
and success, so why complicate issues by designing
a special code? "These are some of the considerations 
that have induced roe to decline the responsibility 
of commending that this admirable specimen of high 
class law should be applied to a state of native society 
just emerging from barbarism."^
Quite ironically in view of present day circumstances,
the British Government in those days gave full recognition
to the soveriegnty of the Transkei Chiefdoms or
Principalities and entered into formal international
treaties with them. When the code was being drafted
a clear endeavour was made to give effect to those
treaty obligations e.g. the treaty entered into by
the Cape Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, with Paramount
Chief Faku of Pondoland in 1844 whereby the colonial
authorities bound themselves to punish refugee thieves
who had escaped from Pondoland after committing crimes 
2
there. It was felt that without such legislation 
the treaties would be of no effect. Section 3 of 
the Draft Penal Code gave effect to the treaty.
It made everyone liable to punishment under the code 
for an act or omission of which he was guilty under 
any Native Chief by virtue of the treaty entered
1 Ibid
2 See section 3 of the Draft Penal Code.
into between such chief and the Governor of the Cape.
This draft section was enacted word for word by the
Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope as section 3 
of the Penal Code.
The Code was truly a search for a modus vivendi.
A feature of it which demonstrated beyond doubt the 
sincerity of the commission and the authorities in 
seeking .to use it as an instrument for creating 
and/or strengthening bridges between the mixed communities 
of the new Transkei was that it was made applicable 
to all persons regardless of class or colour - a 
horizon which could not at all have been reached 
by the codification of indigenous criminal law in 
Transkei.
The draft Penal Code made interesting suggestions 
regarding punishment. Provision was made for the 
imposition of the death sentence which, however, 
could be commuted to a life sentence by the Governor. 
The commissioners also reasoned that the effect of 
the death sentence is short-lived and for that reason 
murder was an offence punishable by a fine in indigenous 
law. They therefore recommended transportation to 
a different part of the country as a punishment which 
would be an effective deterrent to the crime of murder. 
This is commonly known as banishment and although
the Cape Parliament did not accept the recommendation,
the measure is often used to-date administratively
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by Che authorities in dealing with those regarded
as political agitators.* It appears that this Eorm
oE punishment was not previously unknown in Transkei
because the commission recorded that "it inspires
2
great terror in the natives." It was certainly used
3
in the Sudan in respect of offences relating to witchcraft.
It is interesting to note the position among the Tswana
in this connection. Even there the punishment of
4
restriction to a distant part of the realm was common.
Another form of punishment was destruction of the
, 5
culprit s dwellings and everything in them by fire.
A culprit could also be bound and dragged from the
village, clubbed to death on the back of the head,
6
and left to the vultures and hyenas. For a mere imputation 
of witchcraft there was also the punishment of cutting 
off the culprit's tongue.7 In Che face of these 
alternatives it is submitted that banishment was 
unnecessary as a form of punishment.
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The noble intentions of the Commission for the establish­
ment of a sound Transkeian judicial system became
more clear when they recommended the establishment
of a High Court. This Court was to be presided over
1 See e.g. Saliwa v Minister of Native Affairs 1956 (2) 
SA 310 (AT
2 Ibid 23 • '
3 Vasdev: The Law of Homicide in the Sudan p.142 ff.
4 See Indigenous Criminal Law in Bonhuthatswana p 50
ed A.C.Myburgh J.L. van Schaik 1980
5 Op cit 50
6 Op cit 100
7 Myburgh : Papers on Indigenous Law in Southern Africa
at page 41 J~L Van Schaik 1985
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by an official called "The Recorder of Che Native
Territories", having jurisdiction concurrent with
that of the Cape Supreme Court. It would follow
the Rules of Procedure applicable in the latter Court}
It is a matter of great regret that this idea was
not taken up by the Cape Parliament. Legal development
was greatly thwarted in the field of criminal law
which bad to be seen as a matter for the Supreme
Court of the Cape until 1910, and for the Supreme
Court of South Africa as respresented by the Eastern
Districts Local Division of the Supreme Court of
South Africa after 1910. By contrast, the Transkei
Native Appeal Court was established at that time
already in respect of civil cases. It was established
in 1894 and was simply termed the "Native Appeal
Court". The law reports of this Court were compiled
by officials acting on the advise of the Chief Magistrate
2
and the Assistant Chief Magistrate. The Law Reports
of the Native Appeal Court of Transkei were maintained
3
as such until the Black Administration Act was passed.
Those reports are an important source of legal reference.
Another inCeresting feature of the Draft Penal Code
4
was the use of illustrations. The commission explained
that Che aim of these Illustrations, which method
1 See Section 264 of the Draft Penal Code
2 See, for example, preface to volume one of the Native 
Appeal Court Reports (1894 - 1909) containing as many 
as 253 cases where "B.H." acknowledges invaluable 
advice given to him (and his team) by A H Stanford, Chief 
Magistrate and W T Brownlee Assistant Chief Magistrate
in the preparation of the reports. The reports were 
compiled at the Chief Magistrates'office, Umtata.
3 Act 38 of 1927 •
4 Ibid 23
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they had copied from Che Indian Penal Code, was to
facilitate understanding of Che law. The effect
of these illustrations is ChaC each definition of
an offence is followed by a case or cases which illusCrate 
Che intention of the legislature. The Draft Penal 
Code was full of such illustrations and however helpful 
they might be, they did make the code look clumsy 
and cumbersome. Thus Section 4 of the Draft Penal 
Code laid down that theft would be regarded as a
delictum continuum, a continuous offence. This might 
not mean much to the layman, and the illustration 
which followed in italics immediately below the section 
read as follows in order to clarify:
Illustration:
A stole from B caCCle in Kimberley and broughC Chem 
with him to Transkei. He was in possession of them 
until he was apprehended. A is subject to punishment 
under this code.
It transpires, however, ChaC the idea of the illustration 
did not meet with the approval of the Cape Legislature 
and its legal draughtsmen, and those numerous illustrations 
on the draft formed no part of the final statute* 
Yet the Barry Commission had taken the trouble to 
place on record the good reason given by the Indian 
Law Commission for including these illustrations, 
a reason which by inference had motivated this commission
1 Act 24 of 1886
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Co employ Chem. ThaC reason was the Indian Commission's 
wish to prevent the courts from usurping the power
of making law by construing it - construction should
come from the legislature and not from the judge
they said!
It is submitted that the Cape Parliament acted wisely
by rejecting the idea of the illustrations. The
examples would have led to interpretation problems. 
The cases coming before the courts would not all 
be "on all fours" with the examples in the Code.
There would, therefore, always be the necessity for 
the judge and jury of those days to exercise a discretion. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the rules against 
analogous interpretation - Onius incluslo est alterius 
exclusio - would have been affected by the examples. 
The use of illustrations could therefore constiCute 
the greatest real threat to that body of law known 
as judge-made law.
The commissioners suggested a mode of revision for
the code, with a view to rectifying defects or omissions.
The suggestion was that magistrates should report
problems to the Government from time Co time as they
came across them in their day-to-day application 
c 2
of the code. The result is that indeed the code
was amended from time to cime over the years and
1 See at page 21
2 Ibid 21
the danger of the code becoming a monument of stagnation
was averted. The commission also recorded that it
had been asked to make suggestions regarding a civil
code but they confessed that they thought that would
be a very arduous task and they saw fit not to undertake
1
i t .
The commission took very much into account the interests 
of those who were going to be affected by the code.
Proof of this is seen in its recommendation that
I I
the code should be translated into Xhosa ( s o  as)
to enable those who are subiect to the laws to know 
„ '2
them. The Xhosa version could be learnt from the
missionaries and the educated natives. Had this 
recommendation been accepted, this could well have 
been the beginning of the recognition of Xhosa as 
an official language in Transkei. However the Cape
Parliament did not implement the recommendation, 
quite regrettably in the writer's view. The Sudanese
Penal Code was translated into the vernacular only 
in 1964 and that would have been after Transkei's
example.
It is submitted that the commission acted wisely 
in rejecting the idea of an out-and-out codification 
of indigenous law and the received Western law. 
The code would have remained largely an isolated 
entity in the legal fabric of the new Southern Africa.
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Of course had the commission entirely turned its 
back to indigenous criminal law they would have been 
unrealistic. However to pretend that English Law
and Roman-Dutch law were of no relevance to Transkei 
would have been an exercise in self-deception.
When the Penal Code Bill was passed in the 1386 Cape
Parliamentary session it contained 270 clauses.
(From time to time some clauses were repealed). The
Bill received a wide measure of support from the
1
members of Parliament, albeit for different reasons.
Some supported it because it was based on colonial
law, others because it applied to all people east
of the Kei River regardless of race and others because
2
it was a measure ■ of differentiation! In the result 
the Transkei Penal Code came into force on 1 January
1887.3
It is submitted that without an examination of the
nature and extent of the interaction of the three
legal systems that existed at the time when the Transkei
Penal Code came to being, this study would be incomplete.
For in that case the impression would perhaps be created
that the great influence which the Transkei Penal Code 
exerted on South African law was "a bolt from the
blue." But in fact that influence itself took place
1 C C Saunders. TJie_Anm^aiinn_ol_Ch.e_Tlransk.eiarLjT.er.riCories 
Government Printer, Pretoria 1978
2 Op cit 128
3 See U.D Hammond - Tooke : Command or consensus: The
Development of Transkeian Local Government-. David Philip. 
Cape town 1975. The only point that the learned author 
makes about the Code, apart from the date it came into force^, 
is that it provided, inter alia for the payment of fines 
in cattle, grain or other produce in lieu or cash, at
at the discretaion of the judges.
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in the context of the general tendency of legal systems 
to take friendly cognisance of each other once fate 
juxtaposes them.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTERACTION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
3.1 THE IMPACT OF ENGLISH LAW ON SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
Drafted as it was by South African jurists, it is
understandable that the Transkei Penal Code could 
to a large extent have been a codified restatement 
of the criminal common law of South Africa. I shall
try to demonstrate, however, that the Transkei Penal 
Code, itself an English-law orientated document,
exerted a great deal of influence on South African 
law. In so doing it merely became one of several 
forces which were responsible for the importation
of English law notions into South African law. In
order to understand the influence of the Transkei 
Penal Code on South African law, we must therefore
first understand the English law influence on South
African law to which it was largely complimentary
in its effects.
During the period 1652 to 1795 Roman-Dutch Law took
root in South Africa, when the early life of the
legal system at the Cape bore a distinctly Dutch
stamp because the inhabitants were of Dutch origin. 
In 1795 British forces occupied the Cape and in 1814
the Cape was formally ceded to Great Britain. Now
it is an established rule of International law that
in conquered territories the existing law of the
inhabitants shall continue to be in force until it
1is expressly replaced. The law of Che conqueror 
does not therefore automatically substitute the law
of the conquered. Furthermore, Article 8 of the
capitulation stated that the burgers would continue 
to enjoy the rights that they previously enjoyed.
This certainly included the legal system.
However, the English conqueror soon evinced a settled
determination to import English law into South Africa.
Thus V iscount Goderich is on record as saying in
a letter written in August 1827 to General Bourke,
Governor of the Cape : " I am fully prepared
to admit the propriety and importance of gradually
assimilating the law of the Colony to the Law of
England. The judges of the Supreme Court will be
more compentent than any other local authorities
to consider by what steps this change could be most
conveniently introduced. It will be their duty as
opportunity may offer to transmit to yourself the
Drafts of such laws as they may think best adapted for the
amendment of the Civil and Criminal Code. In the
execution of this task it should be their constant
aim to adhere as far as practicable to the spirit
2
of the Law of England".
In the field of Criminal Procedure the anglicisation 
process was accellerated by the report of the commissioners
1 See Hosten, Edwards, Nathan &  Bosman p.601
2 See Burchell and Hunt p.21
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Bigge and Colebrooke to Earl Bathurst who said in so many 
words that the system of criminal procedure at the 
Cape should be more closely assimilated to that 
of England.
It is therefore not surprising that already by 1908
2
the lone voice of Wessels protested: "The history
of Roman-Dutch law has been sadly neglected in South
Africa, so that the ideas which prevail in the profession
as to the origin and development of the Roman-Dutch
3
law are very crude. The learned author went on:
"English law has exerted a very strong influence
upon the law of South Africa, and that influence
is steadily growing stronger in every department
of law. In some respects the introduction of English
law into South Africa has been slow and insidious,
4
in other respects it has been rapid and overwhelming". 
He then lashed out at "lazy and ignorant draughtsmen" 
who had copied passages from English statutes and 
incorporated them into South African legislation 
without giving thought to the implications of such 
action as far as Roman-Dutch law was concerned, regard 
being had to the difference between the common law 
of the two countries.
1 See : Theal : Records of the Cape Colony vol.xxxiii P-87 ff.
2 Judge of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal Republic 
as it then was.
3 See Wessels : History of the Roman Dutch Law page 3.
African Book Company Ltd. lirahamstown iyu«
4 Ibid
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Twelve years later there was apparently no sign of improve­
ment and the learned judge President of the Transvaal 
Provincial Division (as he then already was) used 
the occasion of a lecture he presented in Pretoria 
Co reiterate the view he had expressed in 1908 about 
the need for properly trained legal draughtsmen. 
Ke showed great concern for the survival of Roman - 
Dutch law and was now urging codification as a means 
that would guarantee the preservation of Roman - Dutch 
law. In his paper which is aptly entitled "The Future 
of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa" the learned Judge 
President concludes that if a code is established 
in South Africa, "we will embody in it the Roman-Dutch
law as it is found in Grotius, Voet and the other
2
great Dutch jurists."
Despite this timely warning by Sir John Wessels, the
agencies for the reception of English law into South
Africa had gone very far with their work and the growth
of the influence of English law had become irreversible.
In the field of criminal law it is in R v Seane &
3
Another that we get a clear indication of the manner 
in which the English law continued to exert its Influence 
on South African law. In that case, as in numerous 
others, the Attorney-General presented before the 
court the full history of the decisions of the English 
courts on the point at issue. This was duly appreciated
1 See 1920 SALJ Vol. 37 p . 265
2 At p.283
3 1924 TPD 668 at pp 675 - 676
by Che presiding judge who in turn discussed those cases
especially the leading one of Reg v Ring which seemed to
have brought English Law into line with American
Law on the question of attempting to commit the impossible
The learned judge then observed: "The decision in
Reg v Ring has been referred to in several judgments
of the courts of South Africa, and with tacit, if
not express, approval; the correctness of the decision
. .1
does not appear to have been questioned or urged."
Tindall J was clear in his mind that the convictions
in the case under review were bad "but a difficulty
is caused by the English case of Regina v Ring.
If a case on all fours with Reg v Ring has been decided
in our courts it would have been necessary to decided
in this case whether Ring's case can be distinguished
2
in principle.."
3.2 The Impact of English Law on the Transkei Penal Code
When one looks generally at the Transkei Penal Code,
one finds from some sections that there is as it
were, a "foreign element" about the code, a clear
indication that the code was based on existing legislation
3
This is seen in sections like 101 and 102 relating 
to seamen, ships' stores and ships' boats, which 
indicates legislation for countries in which shipping 
was far advanced. Accordingly I am in full agreement
- 54 -
1 At p.675 - 676
2 At 684
3 See Annexure A
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with the assertion that the great majority of sections
of the Transkei Penal Code was lifted word for word
from che Indictable Offences Bill which had been drafted
by Sir James Stephen as a code of English Criminal
1
Law and introduced in the House of Commons in 1872.
The impact oE English law rules on the Code is seen
in the provisions relating to bigamy whereby a spouse
is absolved from liability if at the time of the
subsequent marriage the first partner has been "continually
absent from such person for the space of seven years
and shall not have been heard of by such person as
2
being alive within that time." On the contrary Roman-
Dutch ].aw lays down no fixed period, and in order 
to give an order of presumption of death the court
merely takes into account the surrounding circumstances 
at the time the person was last seen, such as where
he was last seen swimming in troubled waters, his 
state of health, etc. The rule of customary law, 
on the other hand, is that where the husband is away
from the wife for an inordinately long period, the 
latter can issue summons and state the length of
time that he has been away at an unknown address
without any news of him or her being heard, and allege 
abandonment which, of course, is a ground for dissolution 
of a customary marriage. There is no fixed time
1 Burchell and Hunt vol 1 p.39, also referred to 
by Kerr: Transkei Law Journal 1986 p . 30
2 Section 168
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limit and to arrive at a conclusion whether the case
is or is not one of abandonment each matter is ltooked
at on its own merits. Not surprisingly, the Indian
Code also contains the seven year rule of English
2 .
Law.
In the field of homicide the English Law provides 
that "if the death does not ensue until after the 
expiration of a year and a day from the date when 
the injury was inflicted, it is an irrebuttable presumption 
of law that the death is attributable to some other 
cause, and the person who inflicted th -2 injury is 
not punishable for either murder or manslaughter".
T h e  Transkeian Territories Penal Code followed the
English Law and laid down that no one is criminally
responsible for the killing of another unless the
4
death takes place within a year of the cause of death.
This is the same as the law in New South Wales where
the year and a day rule applies. Commenting on this
5
Roulston opines that the rule originated in the earlier 
uncertainties of medical science when after the lapse 
of such a period of time the cause of death could 
not be shown with any degree of exactitude. "In 
the light of modern medical knowledge it may be questioned
1 See Koyana : Customary Law in a Chanflinf; Snrtpfv at 
p. 34
2 Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code
3 Halsbury : Criminal Law Section 1352
4 Section 136 of Act 24 of 1886
5 Introduction, to Criminal In New Smith Malpg : 
Butterworth 1975
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whether the rule has any utility in the present day,
although in the only relatively modern decision, Dyson
1
1908 2 KB 454, it was held that the rule still applies."
In South African law on the other hand there is no 
statutory provision on this question.
So astute was the Barry Commission in the execution 
of its mandate that it even reached the often overlooked 
conclusion that the customary law of procedure recommends 
itself better than does the received English procedural 
law here in Southern Africa. It said: "The Western
law of procedure also offends the native conception
of justice by failing to exhaust every source of information 
including the examination of the accused or persons 
who are able to throw light upon the subject matter
under investigation." This was a veiled rejection
of the hearsay rule, the exclusionary rules as well
as the "hands off" treatment accorded to an accused 
person by the rule that his innocence is presumed 
until the contrary has been proved. It often led
to the acquittal of an accused person at the close
of the state case when it was said that there was no
prima facie case against him. This was so even in
numerous circumstances where, had the accused been 
interrogated and thus made to take an active part
in the trial which might not have come about but for 
his own wrongful act, he would have assisted the cause
1 Page 72 para. 406
2 Ibid 23
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of justice by admitting his guilt and explaining fully the
commission of the wrongful act by him and all the
surrounding circumstances. This continued adherence
to the English orientated rules of procedure and
evidence instead of the customary law rules has not
1'
been left unchallenged. But the well-motivated recommenda­
tions of the Commission fell on deaf ears as far
as this important matter is concerned and when the
2
legislation was finally passed the implementation 
of these particular recommendations was nowhere to 
be seen. Instead of the Commission's (draft) section 
276 which took these matters into account the Cape 
Parliament in its wisdom merely passed a chapter 
dealing with procedure and jurisdiction. This chapter 
was complimentary to the English spirit of criminal 
procedure at the Cape and did not represent a swing 
even towards the Roman-Dutch law.
1 See Koyana : Customary Law in a Changing Society
Juta 1980 at páges 1 3 6 - 1 3 8  ------^ --------
2 Act 24 of 1886
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3.3 The Impact of Roman-Dutch Law (South African Law) 
on the Transkei Penal Code.
The Transkei Penal Code was drafted by English speaking 
lawyers and the Bill was piloted in a Parliament 
of English speaking members. The legally trained 
among them were under the influence of English law. 
In short, the code came into being at a time when 
the anglicisation process was well on its way in 
the Cape. It is therefore to be expected that 
the impact of Roman -Dutch law on the new code would 
not be nearly as much as the impact of English 
law. The very institutions were English-orientated
- the courts of Landdrost and Heemraden never saw 
the light of day in the Transkeian Territories. 
And in the debating chambers of those who were 
drafting the code, Roman-Dutch law was at a distinct 
disadvantage if one looks at some of the conclusions 
that were reached' for not introducing it into the 
Territories.
All that notwithstanding the strong voice of Roman- 
Dutch law was still able to make itself felt in 
the distant Transkei Territories that were overwhelmed 
by the protagonists of the English law approach. 
The commission said that it would adopt the general 
principles of the "existing" colonial law but remedy 
the "defects". There is evidence of such adoption 
of Roman-Dutch law principles in Section 4 of the 
draft Penal Code. By that section the commission
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declared theft to te a delictum continuum, "thus following
the Roman-Dutch law and departing from English law. English
Courts have refused to treat the thief as continuing the
1
theft at whatever spot he takes the property to." The
position remained unchanged in Transkei and South Africa
2 , 
throughout the years. The only contrary view that emerged
is that of de Wet and Swanepoel who say that the concept
3
of theft as a continous offence merely creates confusion.
An interesting provision of the final act was section
269 which provided that crimes and offences not specially 
provided for in the Code would be tried as if committed
in the colony and the laws and punishments applicable
to such cases would be those in force in the colony.
This provision certainly opened the door for the application 
of colonial law outside the Code and unmodified, in the
Territories. Experience has shown that even as recently
as the 1960's and the 1970's, prosecutors were wont to 
frame their charges under the Code and, quite often, alternatively, 
for the same offence under the common law as allowed
by the section.
The formation of the Union in 1910, with Transkei being 
made part of South Africa, also created a suitable climate
for the influence of Roman-Dutch law in Transkei. The 
noble idea of the creation of a High Court for criminal
1 See at page 24
2 See R v Dzwaka 1950 (3) SA 870 (E); See R v Attia 1937
TPD 1Ú 2; R v v~5n Elllng 1945 AD 2 34 -----------
3 Suid-Afrikaanse Strafree 2 ed 367 c.f.4 ed 349 et. seq.
cases in Transkei had been ignored by the Cape
1
Parliament. Criminal appeals from the twenty-eight
Transkeian Districts thus lay to the Eastern Districts
Local Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa
2
seated at Grahamstown and from there further to
the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein. It was
only human for the judges to act under the influence
of the common law of South Africa and its interpretation
in previous decisions when dealing with appeals
3
from Transkeian Districts involving the Code.
1 See 2.2.2.2 supra '
2 Later named the Eastern Cape Division
3 See, for example, R v Zonele and Others 1959
(3) SA 319 (A), where the automatic extension of 
Union legislation to Transkei was discussed.
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3.4 The Impact of Indigenous Law Practices on the Code
3.4.1 Impact on the 1883 Commission
Judging by the commission's rejection of Mr Ayliff's
strongly worded recommendations for an outright
codification of the indigenous criminal law, one
would be led to think that the commissioners had
not understood it well enough or were not sufficiently
impressed with it to be prepared to let it play
any significant role. On the contrary, however,
that law created such a positive impression on
the minds of commissioners that they were prepared
to let it play quite an important role in the proposed
code. At the outset the commission reported positively
on the characteristics of customary law namely
that although it is unwritten, its principles
and practice are widely understood, being founded
mainly on customary precedent, embodyirg the decisions
of chiefs and councillors of olden days, ■ handed
down by oral tradition and treasured in the memories
of the people.^ This law took cognisance of certain
crimes and offences. The system was created by
and adopted to the conditions of "a primitive,
barbaric life, and in some respects not unlike
that which prevailed among our Saxon ancestors
2
in the early days of civilisation". The commission 
then declared the result of their enquiry to have
1 See at p.12 of the Commission's Report
2 Ibid
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demonstrated clearly that much of the existing
customary law was so interwoven with the social
conditions and ordinary institutions of the people
that "any premature or violent attempt to break
them down or sweep them away would be mischievous
and dangerous in the highest degree .....(and)
.....defeating the object in view..." It would
be inexpedient to wholly supersede the "native
system" by applying the colonial law in its entirety,
and the commission had directed its attention to
the subject of suggesting and drafting a special
code which, for the present, "would leave such
of their customary laws as are not opposed Co universal
principles of morality and humanity substantially
unaltered, and at the same time secure a uniform
and equitable administration of justice in accordance
1
with civilised usage and practice." Some members 
of the commission were of the view that by defining 
indigenous criminal law it would be perpetuated, 
and the laws of growth should therefore be applied 
to operate so as to gradually extinguish it. This 
would thus be obliterating the customary law through 
a policy of gradual strangulation or suffocation. 
This was certainly the extreme opposite of the 
view taken by Mr Ayliff favouring an actual codification 
of the customary criminal law. The voice of the 
middle-man carried the day and the final view of 
the commission was also against the "strangulation"
1 Ibid p. 20.
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and "suffocation". It was accordingly decided
to introduce a brief statement of the customary
criminal law in regard to offences as notes to
several chapters and sections of the code, "not
for enactment but for purposes of comparison."
This recommendation was consistent with yet another
major finding of the commission, namely that to
a large extent the customary criminal law "could
be defined by definitions from the colonial law.
We have thought that in legislating for natives
we should not innovate unless innovation was a
necessity ... to sweep away ancient native usages
would be to deprive the law of the strong support
1
which sympathy with national feeling always creates." 
Finally the commission emphasised that if they 
had discovered a "complete" system of criminal 
law in the Territories, they would not have hesitated 
to adopt it. It is submitted here that the incomplete­
ness existed more in the eyes of the commissioners 
whose base lay in a different legal system than 
in the reality of the indigenous setting of which 
the commissioners were aware. The fact of the matter is 
that the existing system made provision for most continge­
ncies even before the advent of the Code.
1 Ibid 21
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Before the advent of received Western Law each person
was regarded as the "child of the chief" (Umntana
wenkosl). Consequently an injury to the individual
was regarded as a crime and was punishable by the
chief. The overriding principle was that a man cannot
eat his own blood. That this principle was accepted
by the Courts from the outset is born out by the
1
case of Nkwana v Nonqanaba where Stanford P declared: 
"according to native custom as in force in the Thembu 
and Gcaleka Government, the person of each individual 
of a tribe was the property of the chief and any
injury to the person or character of such individual 
was an offence against the chief punishable as a
crime by fine. The chief of grace could award a 
portion of the fine to the injured person who, however, 
had no right of civil action for damages."
The corresponding position in India is described 
by Retanlal and Dhiraljal who say: "The germs of
criminal jurisprudence came into existence in India 
from the time of Manu. In the category of crimes 
Manu has recognized assault, theft, robbery, false 
evidence, slander, criminal breach of trust, cheating, 
adultery and rape. The king protected his
subjects and the subjects in return owed him
3.4.2 Assault
1 1 NAC 79 (1904) Mqanduli
2 The Indian Fenal Code
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allegiance and paid him revenue. The king administered 
justice himself, and, if busy, the matter was entrusted 
to a Judge. If a criminal was fined, the fine 
went to the king's treasury, and was not given 
as a compensation to the injured party." The position 
obtaining in the Transkeian Territories should 
therefore be seen in the wider context of traditionalist 
societies throughout the world.
It is interesting to see how Transkeian law has 
developed in this connection. It will be noted 
that section 17 of the Transkei Penal Code made 
it possible for magistrates trying criminal cases
to give liberal compensation to the complainants
out of the fines payable as sentences by convicted
persons. It is clear that this section was enacted 
in response to the prevailing legal position and 
was an entrenchment thereof. It therefore became 
a regular feature in assault cases that a magistrate 
would sentence an accused person to pay a fine 
of say R40,00 and order that R20,00 thereof should 
be paid to the victim as would do the "chief of 
grace".
It was not an easy matter for the white magistrates 
to grasp the customary law aspect of section 17 
and in several cases they acted in the spirit of 
the common law and sentenced convicted persons
1 See page 1 24th edition by Bipinchandra and 
Manharlal.
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to pay a fine of say R20,00 or 40 days, together 
with a compensatory fine of say R20,00 payable
to complainant. In those cases that went on appeal 
the court had no hesitation in returning the records
to the magistrates concerned for a correct application
of Section 17.^
It is interesting to see how section 17 of the
code gradually fell into disuse. The victims of
assaults soon realised that in. civil claims for
damages for assault under the common law the matter
was looked at anew, and some proceeded to sue for
and obtain damages regardless of what they had
been awarded by the Magistrates at the close of
2
the criminal trials.
1 See for example R v Sinayile - 1910 EDL 58,
R v Nqweniso - 1910 EDL 68, R v Xhalemkomo
1911 EDL 387
2 See, for example, Gagela v Ganca 21EDC 351;
Mfeketo v Madondile 1NAC 130; Zanghuza v Honelo 
and others 3 NAC 30
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3.4.3 Witchcraft
3.4.3.1 Introduction
It has for all tiroes been the effort of legislators in
various parts of the world to suppress witchcraft.
In England witchcraft was once so rife that it was
made a capital offence. The last execution for
witchcraft was in 1776 in England and in 1772 in
1
Scotland.
As far as Africa is concerned, witchcraft is still
rife in many parts of the continent from Cape to Cairo.
For Instance, the problem hitherto exercises the
minds of jurists in the Sudan where, according to
a leading Sudanese lawyer, people are even now still
soaked in witchcraft and imbued with a firm belief
2
In evil spirits. The Sudanese Penal Code lays down 
the severest penalties and differences of opinion 
on what the real answer to the problem is are endless. 
Earlier the tendency in the Sudan was to adopt the 
line of leniency but lately, the penalties have 
been made so severe as to include even the death 
sentence
1 See Jowitt (Earl), The dictionary of English L a w :
London 1959. 1665
2 See Vasdev : The Law of Homicide in the Sudan : at 
42. Butterworths (London) 1978.
3 op cit. 148
Of all the problems that confronted the 1883 commis­
sion, witchcraft was easily one of the most 
v e x i n g .* In the height of their admiration for 
the main characteristics of customary criminal 
law including its sources and its precedent
system, they could not help noting that mixed 
with the system were a number of "pernicious
and degrading usages and superstitious beliefs, 
as well as a course of judicial procedure In 
cases of the alleged offence of sorcery or witchcraft
utterly subversive to justice and repugnant
2
to the general principles of humanity." The
commission was determined to recommend that
the PenaL Code should be applicable to all persons 
irrespective of class or colour. From the evidence 
they had collected they were also satisfied
of the desirability of making stringent provisions 
for the suppression of Uir. procl.icc of w i l.olicral't. 
which had earned the sympathy of not even a 
single member of the black community to say 
nothing of the whites. The question that immediately 
faced the commission was: how does one make
the C o d e  applicable to all irrespective of race,
colour or class if one is going to provide Eor
1 As appears from Kerr's article on the 1383 commission 
in the 1986 Transkei Law Journal .(p. 30) the 
commissioners responsible for the provisions on 
witchcraft were Barry and StanEord.
2 At page 17 of the Report
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the suppression of witchcraft which Is prevalent
only among the members of a specific race or class? 
The answer to this was rather astounding : If thieves
exist only among natives, you would be constrained 
to pass legislation directed at them with a view
to suppressing theft among them! The next argument 
that was raised was that the spoor law was after 
all and in any event also legislation for a class, 
and this was answered by those who objected to the 
class legislation in the form of the suppression 
of witchcraft, with the further argument Chat the
spoor law was "different" because It brought about 
communal responsibility! However, in the final 
analysis the view In favour of Eirm proposals for 
the suppression of witchcraft got the upper hand 
and the Cape Parliament also did not hesitate to 
accept these proposals. It would have Indeed been 
regrettable if the opposite view had prevaLled. 
Plausible as Is the caution that was exercised against 
Introducing class legislation, the blame that the 
government oE the day would have had to accept for 
turning a blind eye to such a state of affatrs is 
Immesurable.
It is not surprising that Chapter 11 of the 18 8 & 
Code was devoted to the suppression of witchcraft. 
Section 171 prohibited the imputation of witchcraft, 
whereby a person names or indicates another to be 
a wizard or a witch - unithakathl, igqwlra. The
maximum penalty was forty shillings (approximately
R4,00). Where such imputation was made by a witch-doctor
the maximum penalty was two years imprisonment or
1
a fine or flogging or any two or all three of these. 
Section 173 made it an offence punishable by a fine 
of five pounds to employ a witch-doctor to name 
a person as a wizard or witch. Section 174 laid 
down a maximum penalty of up to twelve months imprison­
ment with the option of a fine for witch-doctors 
who professed knowledge of witchcraft and supplied 
advice on how to bewitch or injure persons or property 
or cattle, or supplied by witchcraft material with 
intent that injury be caused thereby. Finally in 
terms of Section 175, those who used witch-medicines 
with the intention of injuring any person or property 
were liable to periods of imprisonment of up to 
twelve months , with the option of a fine.
-  71 -
1 Section 172
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3.4.3.3 Belief in Witchcraft as an Extenuating circumstance
The necessity of recognising a belief in witchcraft
as a mitigating circumstance in the general African
context is well illustrated by the judicial experience
in the Sudan. Witchcraft is rife in the Sudan.
Earlier the tendency there was to adopt the line
of leniency. In Sudan Government v Killo Buti and
another decided in 1928 the Acting Chief Justice
1
declared: "I think these witchcraft cases are difficult
Backward people are, of course, in deadly fear of
wizardry, and I submit that it is impossible to
apply Penal Code standards to offences where that
fear plays so great a part, or to educate or deter
the people by means of severe punishment." But
as time went on the sympathy of the bench seemed
to be exhausted as a result of the continued deaths
and in 1943 C G Davies, in Government v Bath Met
said: "There is, nevertheless, an under-current
of influence on the mind of the killer of the activities
of a "spirit" of witchcraft of some sort. It is
vague. It seems to lead nowhere but it is there.
Can one say that, with these supersitition-haunted
people, its influence was sufficiently active and
real to justify the modification of the age old
2
law of a life for a life?” This "hardline" approach 
continued to be the preponderant judicial view 
and in Sudan Government v Thumba Tia decided
1 See Vasdev: op cit p.144
2 Vasdev : op cit p.150
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in 1949 Maclagan C J remarked : "He may Chink
he was justified and many of his fellow Nuba may
Chink so too, but in the eyes of the law what he
1
did was very wrong". As in numerous similar cases 
the accused was found guilty of murder, the victims 
being in all cases Ku jurs or witch— doctors who 
were killed under the belief that they were responsible 
for causing the death or deaths in the family of 
the accused. Quite often the convicted persons 
are sentenced to death.
When the accused kills the deceased under the belief
that the deceased has bewitched him, the courts
in the Sudan adopt the same approach as where a
Kujur has been killed- The Acting Governor declared
as early as 1928 : "I should have recommended
that the sentence be reduced.. . my reason being
that sorcery is to these savages a very real and
fearsome thing, and when they believe a case to
have occured, age long custom makes them kill the
suspected person. I do not recommend a lighter
sentence as it is our duty to impress on these
people that such killings are not looked upon lightly
2
by the Government". As recently as 1961 Abu Ranat C J
said in Sudan Government v Muyang Lohuyuk : "Whatever
effect such a belief would have on the accused
3
it would not constitute a defence for murder .
1 Ibid
2 Ibid 145
3 Ibid 144
In the Republic of South Africa the courts have
consistently taken the view that intentional killing
because of beliefs in witchcraft is murder but
the beliefs have been taken into account as extenuating
circumstances and the judges have therefore always
used their discretion in favour of the accused
and have avoided execution. This is in terms of
1
the Criminal Procedure Act which provides that 
if the Court, on convicting a person of murder 
is of opinion that there are extenuating circumstances 
it may impose any sentence.
In Transkei the position was the same as in South
Africa by reason of the provisions of Section 330
2
of the Criminal Procedure Act. However in 1977
Section 330 was amended by the General Law Amendment
3
Act which precluded the Court from accepting a 
belief in witchcraft as an extenuating circumstance, 
as had been practice prior to the amendment.
There has of late been a spate of executions following
4
convictions in witchcraft cases. These executions 
are accompanied by mounting rumblings among members 
of the legal profession who are unanimous in their 
view that the time has come for the legislation
to be changed so that the beliefs in witchcraft 
can be accepted as extenuating circumstances.
1 Section 277 of Act 51 of 1977
2 Act No. 56 of 1955
3 Act 27 of 1977 (Transkei)
4 E.g. S v Tshitshi & 4 others (unreported), all
sentenced to death on /th March 1988
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A crucial test oE how far courts could go in adhering to
the strict letter of the provisions of the General
1
Law Amendment Act was presented as recently as 1982
by a case that came to the supreme court from the
2
Gatyana District (formerly Hillowvale). Apart from 
the medical evidence which related to the wounds 
inflicted upon the deceased, the only witness was 
the young son of the deceased. He told the Court 
that appellant No. 9 came to call his mother to 
the subheadman. When she refused to go, she was
grabbed by the appellants and assaulted by them 
with sticks and bushknives. Later a knife was forced 
into his hand and he was, on threat of death, compelled 
to stab his mother.
According to this boy, his mother was called upon
to go to the subheadman because she had said that
the boys were going to die. There were also very 
brief confessions by the appellants, one of which
only said : "I think I killed my enemy". That was
appellant No. 12. Several others added that they
killed her because she was going to kill them. 
In the court a quo Davies J said of No. 12 : "We
consider that it is fair to assume that he also,
by inference, claims to have acted because of a
threat against his life by the deceased". In respect 
of all the appellants : "The motive with which they acted 
does not tend to show in any way that they acted
1 Act 27 of 1977
2 S v Thembinkosi Tefu and 11 others case No. 178 
oï T957 : unreported
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from inner vice. In fact the contrary appears to be the case.,
more precisely, we find that the fact that the accused
are teenagers and did not act from the inner vice is an 
extenuating circumstance". The fact that they had also 
acted as members of a group, the older and more stronger
minded more than likely having influenced the younger ones,
was also taken as an extenuating circumstance. They were 
all sentenced to life imprisonment because "the Legislature
has shown that it takes a very serious view of killings
motivated by a belief in witchcraft".
When the matter came before the Appellate Division Van
Reenen C J said:
"It is clear that the conclusion that such extenuation
existed could only have resulted from the assumption made 
that the Appellants killed the deceased in their fear of 
her witchcraft. If this were not so, the vicious attack
upon the deceased could only have been born from inherent
vice in the Appellants.
"Youth is generally accepted as a fact upon which a finding
of extenuation may be based, unless the Court comes to
the conclusion that the issue was the result of inner vice.
In considering this aspect, the motive behind the deed
must be of great importance and it can hardly be said that
a common belief, however contrary to the official view,
1
is an indication of inner vice". The Chief Justice then
1 Transkei A.D. decision, unreported
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reasoned that a life sentence was too severe in the 
circumstances and a sentence of 15 years imprisonment 
was substituted in respect of all except the apparent 
ringleader who was given a sentence of 20 years 
imprisonment.
1
In S v Vela Bambi, Lombard J accepted as an extenuating 
circumstance the fact that the deceased, an old 
lady, had walked from her homestead to that of the 
accused in broad day-light stood in front of him 
and his mother, took off her dresses and, when naked, 
declared; "I am responsible for your long illness, 
you will never be able to go to work or to raise 
a family". At night on the same day the accused 
had gone to deceased's hut and hacked her to death. 
He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The
core of the defence of course was inspiration of
fear and the threats contained in deceased's statement, 
on which the court relied as extenuating circumstances.
In the final analysis, therefore, Transkei has become, 
probably unwittingly, the same as the Sudan in its
attitude to the question of punishment for witchcraft. 
Representations are ceaselessly being made for a 
repeal of Act 27 of 1977 and it is hoped that the
authorities will eventually respond positively.
1 Decided at Butterworth Circuit Court - August 
1986 (unreported)
78
3.4.4 Circumcision
Those charged with the difficult task of drafting
the Code were also faced with problems relating
to circumcision for boys and the intonjane ceremony
which Indicates the attainment of mature age by
girls. While these educational customs were not
declared unlawful, the Code penalised those who
forced or aided or procured the enforcement of circura-
1
cision or intonjane■ It also penalised whoever
aided or procured the circumcision of any youth
without the consent of his parent or the person
2
having the lawful custody of such youth. These
provisions were retained in the Penal Code Act No. 9
3
of 1983.
Those who have practised law in the courts in Transkei 
and South Africa over the last twenty years will
agree that the enforcement of circumcision and intonjane 
have not been in issue in the courts throughout 
this period. However these practices may well have
been rife in Transkei during the last century thereby 
justifying the enactment of section 153 of the original 
act. Contrary to the position in Transkei, in Kenya 
there is the customary practice of forced circumcision 
for girls and it is still rife in that country. 
(Among the Xhosa-speaking peoples girls are not circumcised.)
1 Section 153
2 Section 154. For a full discussion of these two education customs
see Koyana: Customary Law in a Changing Society p.60 cf Hammond-
TookeT: Bhaca Society pp. /9-82
3 As Section 103 & 104
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In an article entitled "A plunge into the dark wjrld of custom"
John Warral commends Kenya's President Daniel Moi
for the bold step of placing a general ban on the
customary practice of female circumcision. "He
took the step in anger after the deaths of fourteen
young girls after being forcibly circumcised by
village midwives who take on themselves the practice
with the authority of village elders. Often they
are armed with primitive knives, or even old razor
blades not suspected of even being remotely aseptic.
Girls bleed to death and often midwives are afraid
2
to take them to hospital". John Warral indicates
that many years ago missionaries tried without 
success to ban it, and that it is still practised 
among the Kikuyu, the Masaai and many other tribes, 
while the Luo tribe practises neither male nor 
female circumcision.
The evil of forced circumcision for girls is that 
where a case has not gone well there are other
painful complications quite apart from the ultimate 
one of bleeding to death. These include shock 
which can -in itself be fatal, dispareunia (painful
intercourse) as well as scarring which can cause
extreme child-birth problems. And according to
John Warral the custom is practised in more than
1
1 See Daily Dispatch 20th September 1985
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
80
26 African countries and also in the Middle East, 
and it is estimated that more than 25 million 
women have under—gone circumcision in those countries.
It is self-evident that Kenya and these numerous countries 
in which this custom is still practised did not 
have the benefit of an enactment such as section 
153 of the Penal Code of 1886. This is clear 
from the fact that on banning the practise, President 
Moi "forced" the police to charge with murder 
those who carried out the fatal operations, and 
yet one would imagine that this should have been 
the legal position from the advent of western 
civilization and government during the last century.
At the same time it must be conceded that various 
efforts must have been made over the last one 
hundred years to curb this pra'ctice but without 
the success that has been achieved in Transkei. 
Indeed there is even a measure of resistance
which accounts for the staying power of the custom.
1
This is brought out by John Warral when he says: 
"The campaign against female circumcision is an 
extremely sensitive one, and many advanced African 
women believe it must be left to Africa to solve 
the problem, not hindered by western feminists 
and liberals who campaign hysterically against 
a problem they know nothing about". In all the circum­
stances it is submitted that the success of section 153 
of the NTPC is remarkable.
1 Ibid
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3.4.5 The Spoor Law
3.4.5-1 The Spoor Law in Customary Law
The spoor system played an important part in customary 
criminal law among the Xhosa. Although it 
enjoyed prominence in its own right, it of 
course was a manifestation of the substantive 
customary law principle of collective liability.
It gained distinction it is submitted, because 
it was employed In relation to the very sensitive 
field of stock theft in the criminal law.
It is clear that the spoor system was employed 
generally among the Xhosa not only when they
were still all in Transkei but also by those 
who later settled in Ciskei. In 1378 a group 
of peasant farmers from the Idutywa District 
gave evidence before the Government Commission
on Native laws and customs as follows:
Is the spoor law practised among you? Yes.
Are you satisfied with it? Yes, because no 
man would say he is on the side of the thief
and refuse to follow the spoor.
Before the same Commission G C Brisley, a leading 
member of the community, gave evidence In respect
of the East Griqualand area and said that the
spoor law was a custom having the force of law
1 Minutes of evidence page 510
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" among the Kafirs ... but not among the Griquas."
The practical application of the spoor law was quite
interesting when stock was lost and its "spoor" followed.
When such spoor was traced to within a short distance
of a homestead, say 500 or 600 yards, the occupants
thereof were informed of the spoor and they were
obliged to assist in passing it on beyond their own
homestead for a similar distance whereupon they could
then be released from the tracing party. IE anyone
refused to assist he was considered to be the guilty
party and the charge of stock theft was laid against
him. However, It is not at all necessary that the
actual thief be identiEied or even known. A case
had to be established against a homestead, and the
onus was on the head thereof to show what had happened
to the stock after it had reached the area which
2
is under his care.
There were practical difficulties in the operation
of the spoor law and these were realised by the commission 
It therefore went so far as to consider the adviseabiiity 
or otherwise of abolishing the spoor law in which
case it would have formed no part of the code. This 
appears from the evidence that was given by Brownlee, 
Chief Magistrate at the office of the chief Magistrate 
of Griqualand East at Kokstad. In wet weather the 
tracing process was quite easy, but otherwise it
could be lengthy and frustrating because other animals
1
X Op cit
7  Commission's report, appendix B on page 18
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would cross the spoors of the stolen one and this
would lead to protracted arguments. "Nevertheless
I think we cannot abandon the system of holding communities
or individuals responsible for stolen property already
1
traced to them though the property may not be found'.'
Initially the authorities saw it as their duty to
discourage the spoor law as part of the process of
eliminating "backward" practices among the Xhosas.
2
Brownlee himself complained that the system of collective
responsibility was on the wane in consequence of
magistrates adopting coLonial law and requiring more
proof against a man than the mere tracing of stolen
property to his neighbourhood. The result had been
that stock and other thefts had greatly increased.
Among the Ciskei Xhosa the spoor system was dealt
an even more severe blow by the rapid process oE
detribalisation that followed military conquest.
Thus J Liefeldt, special magistrate of Cathcart sitting
with Chief Sandile and An.ta of the Gaikas, declared:
"(The spoor law Is) on the wane only in so far as
we have discountenanced it. Whenever Kafir Law has
been suspended the results are that stock thefts
are vastly increased, conviction being difficult."
J.M. Stevenson, Inspector of Native Locations in
the King Williamstown District, expressed himself
4
in similar terms. Rev. B.L. Key at St. Angustine's Mission
1
2
3
4
At page 60 
Ibid
Op cit 126 
Ibid
8.1
In the Tsolo - Qumbu area (FondomlseLand) also 
complained of Che decline of Che spoor system which 
decline was caused by it being "in opposition Co 
European ideas of justice" and said he regarded 
it as a mosC importanC means of protection to property. 
However the impact of this indigenous practice 
was of far reaching significance when the chips 
were down and the representations in favour of 
its retention were successful.
The spoor law was employed by Che Griquas along
similar lines in Che olden days, buC by the time
they were ruled by Adam Kok It had gone out of
2
use. Yet among the Sotho if a spoor Is traced
to a village and some trace of the stolen property
Is found at the village but the thief cannot be
discovered then the village is held responsible
and is liable to pay a fine. This appears to be
something midway between the received western law
rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the rule of indigenous law that "there is no
3
smoke without a fire."
1 Ibid 185
2 Brisley: op cit 514
2 op cit appendix B at p.22
3 See Koyana's Customary L aw In a C h anging society
p. 129. Signi t icant ly , tfie rule among the liosuto Is
that stray cattle are kept by the finder until 
claimed. They are however, immediately reported to 
the principal chief. There is no advertisement about 
the cattle, and when they have been unclaimed for a 
long time they become the property of the prLnctpal 
chle f!
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3.4.5.2 The Spoor Lav in the Code of 1886
Owing largely to the weight of evidence and recommenda­
tion in favour of the retention of the spoor law,
the drafters of the code saw fit to make the spoor
law a part of the Transkei Penal Code.
The relevant provisions were contained in section
1
200, 201 and 202 of the code.
It will be observed that the provisions of the
code relating to the spoor law contain a mixture
of civil lau and criminal law. As to the criminal
law aspects thereof there is the interesting case
2
of R v M t s i . In that case the accused pleaded 
guilty to the theft of a goat. The only evidence
against him was that the spoor of the thieves
had been traced to his homestead. The defence
proved that he had driven the thieves away from
his home and had not partaken of the meat. It
was held on review that the plea of guilty was
made under the influence of "native custom" as 
to the spoor law and the conviction and sentence 
were quashed. This decision was similar to R v Qubula 
where the admission and offer to pay for four goats
were made in similar circumstances.
1 See appendix A
2 1908 EDL 24
3 1907 EDL 289. See also Queen v Mbalo (1892) 
discussed in 10 Juta 380
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Because of Che civil law provisions of the code there
came before the courts several civil cases relating
1
to the spoor law.
The impact of the Transkei Penal code on South African
law with reference to the spoor law is immediately
2
seen in Act 41 of 1898. This influence is recognised
3
by Brookes who demonstrates accordingly by quoting
4
the whole of the section of the cape statute in question.
The difference is indeed very slight between this 
and section 200 of the Transkei Penal Code. The lear­
ned author addresses .the question that to the westerner
provisions like these probably savour of injustice.
To that he replies: "It is a mistake to read our own
5
legal and ethical ideals into the minds of other people."
1 See, for example, Umhluzi v The Messenger of the
Magistrate's Court, Tsomo, discussed tn the Cape Law
Journal 1890 page 180; Nqakiswa and nine others v 
Magwetyana 4 NAC (1918) p . 341; Lebitsa Nkhuade v Samson 
Maïunda 'i NAC 266 (Mt Fletcher)"! The last case reflects 
the extension of the application of the spoor law to 
ordinary articles quite apart from livestock - a good 
example of Judge-made law.
2 Section 1
3 The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830
to the Present D a y . Nasionale Pers Beperk, Cape Town 1924
4 See at page 188
5 Op cit 190
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNLAWFULNESS
4.1 COMPULS LON/NECESSITY
4.1.1 Introduction
At the outset it must be pointed out that the 
defence of necessity is a facet of the defence 
of compulsion.2 The distinguishing feature Is 
that In the case of the former the dilemma situation 
is brought about by a human agency while in the 
latter case it is brought about by the force 
of surrounding circumstances. In the result
the two defences have been treated as being governed 
by the same rules.
The question as to whether compulsion is a defcnce 
to a charge of murder is fraught with much difficulty 
The difficulty arises from the fact that there 
are two parallel schools of thought regarding 
the matter. Both schools appear to lie reasonable 
and It Is thus difficult for jurists at any given 
time to reject the one school and permanently 
adhere to the doctrines of the other. This has 
naturally led to considerable uncertainty on 
the law relating to compulsion. In both schools 
the prominent feature is the assessment of the 
relative value of human life.
1 As to the material content of unlawfulness see Snymin: 
Criminal Law p.68.
2 Thus Snyman (Criminal Law p.86) says that necessity 
may arise from compulsion or inevitable evil.
I
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On the one hard it is the principle of seL E-preserva­
tion which places the liEe of the accused person
higher than that of the deceased and consequently
1
excuses his conduct in killing him. Cranville Williams 
refers to Kant, Bentham, Austin and Holmes who propound 
the doctrine of self-preservation. It is certainly 
a plausible doctrine, and there can be no doubt that 
the average man in the street would be favourably
disposed to it, and compulsion would therefore stand 
as a complete defence to murder. At first, however, 
this doctrine did not recommend itself with any success 
in Transkei and South Africa.
On the other hand there has always been the question
of a balancing of the interests of the innocent deceased
with the preservation of the life of the accused
who was subjected to compulsion. It has then been
boldly suggested that the accused person should sacrifice
his own life rather than take or assist in taking
the life of an innocent person. In this connection
it is noteworthy Chat Grotius himself did not recognise
the principle that one may lawfully kill another
2
person merely for self-preservation.
4.1.2 English Law and the 1886 Code
In English law it has been held that necessity is 
no defence to murder. In this connection the leading
1 Crimminal Law p.738
2 Crotius : De lure 2.2.8
case of R v Dudley &  Stephens assumes relevance.
There the accused, along with a third man called
Brooks and 2 seventeen year old boy called Parker
were cast adrift in an open boat after their yacht
went down in a storm 1 600 miles from the Cape of
Good Hope. On the twentieth day after the shipwreck,
when they had been for eight days without food and
for six without water, the accused killed the boy.
The latter did not consent to their act, but did not
offer any resistance, being already too ill to do
so. The accused and Brooks fed on the flesh and
blood of the boy until they were picked up four days
later. Giving the judgment of the Court Lord Coleridge C J
said "... this is clear, that the prisoners put to death a
weak and unoffending boy upon the chance of perserving
their own lives by feeding upon his flesh and blood
after he was killed, and with the certainty of depriving
him of any possible chance of survival .....To preserve
one's life is generally speaking a duty, but it may
be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it.
It is not correct, therefore, to say that there is
any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve
one's life...... We are often compelled to set up
standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down
2
rules which we could not ourselves satisfy". Sir 
J F Stephen^ upholds the same view. The position
1 1884 14 QBD
2 The accused - called Defendants in English Law - were 
sentenced to death. This sentence was afterward commuted 
to six months' imprisonment.
3 A History of the Criminal Law of England (1886) Vol 11
---
- 89 ~
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is the same in the United States of America.
In the light of what has been said above, it is
not surprising that the idea of self-sacrifice should
have been predominant in the minds of those who drafted
the 1886 Code for the Transkeian Territories as
they then were. Section 29 thereof shows signs of
2
that.
4.1.3 The defence of necessity in South African Law
In present day South African Law, an act will be justified
on the ground of necessity in the following instances’.
(a) A legal interest endangered
According to Burchell and Hunt, danger of death 
or serious bodily injury may justify an act 
done in circumstances of necessity, and "despite 
occasional reluctance to go beyond this, it
is clear that fear of injury to the person and
3
a threat of damage to property will also suffice". 
As to the "occasional reluctance to go beyond
this" the learned author is referring, as shown
in his footnote, to section 29 of the Transkei 
Penal Code as well as the Zimbabwe case of R
v Damascus 1965 (4) SA 589 (SR). This case
shows once again, significantly as recentely 
as 1965, the impact of the Transkei Penal Code
of 1886 on South African law with special reference 
to Gardiner and Lansdown, and on Zimbabwe via
1
Law : 2 ed p 438
2 See Appendix A
3 Vol 1 p.338 Juta 1983
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Gardiner and Lansdown. For it is the first
part of section 29 that limits the matter to
compulsion by threats of immediate death or
grievous bodily harm. Gardiner and Lansdown
say the same thing save for saying "serious"
1
instead o£ "grievous". The approving reference
2
to the said code comes as no surprise. In the
Damscus case McDonald J appreciated that the
limitations to immediate death or serious bodily 
harm were controversial, and acknowledged the 
firm view of Glanville Williams to the effect 
that threats against property should also be
included. In this case the threat was that 
the huts of the accused would be set alight.
The learned judge however decided that the limitation
to death or serious bodily harm should be accepted
3 4
as correctly reflecting the law. In R v Werner
Watermeyer C J declined to define the limits
within which the plea of compulsion or necessity
would exclude criminal conduct. He went further
than Gardiner and Lansdown who say "save probably
5
in murder" and said: "I am inclined to the
view that the killing of an innocent person 
is never legally justifiable by compulsion or 
necessity". As if this was not sufficient indication 
of the influence of section 29 of the Transkei
1 See Vol 1 6ed p . 108
2 See at p . 109
3 See at p. 603
4 1947 (2) SA 828 (A)
5 op cit 108
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Penal Code the learned Chief Justice went on to say : 
"The Native Territories Penal Code Act 24 of 1886
contains the following provision: .........." - and
he quoted the whole of section 29 with provis os 
as part of his judgment and without any comment whatsoever 
beyond that. This case was applied in R v Mneke 
where the Court said that in the light of the authorities 
the law does not countenance a plea of compulsion 
in the case of murder but again said that even IE 
such killing was legally justifiable the fear in 
casu was not a justification.
By 1953 there were judicial pronouncements which
indicated a departure from the stringency of the
rule as laid down in section 29 of the Transkei Code
2
and as followed by earlier cases. Thus in R v Koning
the accused deemed that it was necessary to shoot
the deceased (convict) to prevent him from escaping.
A verdict of guilty of culpable homicide was returned. 
The court did say here that the shooting of an escaping 
convict was also tantamount to self-defence.
3
In the following year Van Den Heever J A said that 
the law recognises "a hybrid or middle situation
where there is an intention to kill, but where that 
intention is not entirely but to some extent excusable".
1 1961 (2) SA 240 (N)
2 1953 (3) SA 220
3 In R v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 832
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The Court held that in such cases a verdict of culpable 
homicide should be returned. The learned judge relied 
on the general principle laid down by Voet that whereas 
fear of death is no complete excuse, it operates 
in mitigation of punishment. He also had regard 
to Matthaeus who lays down the general principle 
that while a good man must be prepared to be crucified
rather than agree to commit a crime, he, however,
is not liable to the normal penalty for that crime 
since he did not do so with unqualified intent but 
partim voluntaria, partim involuntaria. This "middle 
situation" applies to a killing in circumstances 
of compulsion;
(a) in which the accused was compelled by threats 
of immediate death or serious injury to himself 
or to thos whom he was legally obliged to protect 
or
(b) where the killing was not immoderately dispropotionate
to the harm threatened to the accused. Where
such killing is immoderately disaproportionate 
to the threatened harm, a verdict of murder 
would then be justified.
It was in 1972 that South African law came out fully
in support of compulsion as a defence to a charge
2
of murder. In S v Goliath Rumpff J A held that
1 Proleg 1.13
2 1972 (3) SA 1 (A)
on a charge of murder compulsion can constitute a 
complete defence. As to when a compulsion will afford 
a ground of acquittal on the ground of compulsion 
will depend, however^ on the particular circumstances 
of each case and the whole factual complex would 
have to be carefully examined and adjudicated upon 
with the greatest care. The learned judge paid due 
attention to the large volume of English and South 
African precedent that had given supremacy to the 
doctrine of sacrifice and overcame the difficulties 
thus placed in his way in an admirable manner. As 
far as the Dudley case is concerned, he said that 
Lord Coleridge had been carried by a wave of emotion 
when he relied on the pre-Christian and Christian 
teachings in support of the doctrine of sacrifice.
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The move away by the Appellate Division of South 
Africa from the doctrine of sacrifice and in favour 
of self-preservation is all the more welcome because 
of the absurd results which can flow Erom the exclusion 
of murder Erom the defence of necessity. Take the 
case of a person who, under compulsion, kills one 
innocent person in order to save the lives of, say 
eight others. Such person must still be found guilty 
of murder. Take also the case of a person who, under 
compulsion, kills an innocent person whose death
95 -
is, in any event.,inevitable. Such person must still 
be be found guilty of murder.
(b) Threat Commenced or Imminent
1
According to Burchell & Hunt the threat of harm
must have commenced or must be imminent and
it will not avail the accused if the threat
is only to be implemented at some time in the
future. This is in sharp contest with the view
of Glanville Williams : that the defence ought
not to be limited to threats compelling in their
effect and should always be considered as possibly
2
founding a defence. In this regard the two
3 4
Zimbabwe cases of Damascus and R v Chipesa were
decided in accordance with the South African
law as stated by Burchell and Hunt, and they
all follow Section 29 of the Transkei Penal
Code of 1886. The Penal Code is in accordance
with the traditional view which requires an
objective approach. This in turn, is in accordance
with the view that necessity is a defence which
excludes the unlawfulness of the offender's
conduct.
{c ) Threat Not Caused By Accused's Fault
The Second part of Section 29 of the Transkei 
Penal Code of 1886 is the central pivot of the
1 op cit 340
2 Ibid
3 1965 (4) SA 598 <SR)
4 1964 (4) SA 472 (SRAD)
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requirement that the threat will be executed and, 
more pertinently, that the accused was not a 
party to any association or conspiracy, the 
being party to which rendered him subject to 
such compulsion. The leading case in this connection 
is S v Bradbury. In that case a junior member 
of a dangerous gang of criminals had reluctantly 
played a minor role in the planned murder oE 
an erstwhile benefactor of his, being influenced 
thereto by fear of reprisals of a serious nature 
being perpetrated by the gang on himselE or 
his family should he refuse. The two assessors 
constituting the majority of the trial court 
had found extenuating circumstances to exist, 
but the trial judge had nevertheless, in exercising 
his discretion, imposed the death sentence. 
In his reasons for dissenting from the assessors 
he said that the accused had exaggerated his 
fears and furthermore had ample and repeated 
opportunities to escape or to seek protection.
On appeal Steyn C J was ad idem with the judge 
in the court a quo and stated that a murderer 
who shrinks from Inflicting death on a benefactor 
by his own hand and performs a Lesser part, 
leaving the act of killing to a fellow murderer 
would not on that account be less blameworthy
1 1967 (1) SA 387 (A)
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for the part he does perform, even if also that 
part is performed with distaste. The influence 
of fear had to be weighed against the need for 
a deterrent to that kind of gangsterdom. The 
trial judge's discretion to impose the death 
sentence thus stood as having been judicially 
exercised. Van Blerk J A concurred. Holmes J A 
dlsented, and reasoned that a sentence of imprisonment 
for 20 years was appropriate.
There is much merit in the down-to-earth approach
adopted by Holmes J A. The Utopian approach
of the majority of the court is manifest in
their support of the judge a quo who virtually
sets standards which the average man cannot
uphold. The view that the threat must not have
been caused by the accused's own fault is firmly
2
propounded by Burchell & Hunt. The learned 
authors obviously have no quarrel, therefore, 
with the second part of section 29. Indeed
they quote this second part with implicit approval 
in the course of their discussion of this requirement. 
On the ocher hand Snyman does not share the 
view Chat the threat must not have been caused
by the accused's own fault, and urges that the^ 
matter must rather be regarded as being controversial 
The learned author acknowledges that the view
1 See p. 406 - 408
2 op cit 340
3 See footnote 169 at page 340
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is held in Bradbury's case but he argues that
the statement was an obiter dictum, the point
at issue in the case having been extenuating
circumstance- not Bradbury's liability for murder.
There is some merit in this contention. He
1
further acknowledges that S v Kibi is a direct 
authority for the proposition. In that case
Howie A J acknowledged the controversy on the 
question, but raised the interesting point that
the onus rests on the state to exclude the operation 
of compulsion. It would be illogical of our 
criminal law to grant the defence of necessity 
where the imperilling factor is lawful action, 
in this case making a (false) statement, the 
necessity being (lawful) detention and fear of 
continued, indefinite detention and interrogation.
He therefore held that the requirement (my underlining) 
that the threat to the accused was not caused
by his own fault had not been fulfilled.
2
Snyman further acknowledges that Burchell and
Hunt support this view, as well as does the
3
American model Penal Code. Strangely enough, 
the learned author is silent on section 29 of
the Transkei Penal Code.
The author bases his contrary opinion on the 
example if, because of X's carelessness, his
baby swallows an overdose of medicine, X should
1 1978 (4) S.A. 173 (E)
2 See Criminal Law p.83
3 See footnote 25 at p.88
still be allowed (and will in fact be allowed) 
to exceed the speed limit while rushing the 
baby to the hospital instead of resigning himself 
to the child dying. This example stems from 
the case of S v Pretorius where the act comitted 
out of necessity was aimed at protecting X's 
child. He therefore says two acts: the creation
of the danger and the rescue from it, should 
be kept apart, for "to project the reprehensibility 
of the former on to the latter is strongly reminis­
cent of the discarded doctrine of versari__ in
" 2
re illicita. I respectfully submit that the
conflict of views on this question is more apparent
than real, but if it is not, had the learned
author considered section 29 of the Transkei
Penal Code he might well have expressed himself
differently. An overdose of medicine to a child
is casus fortuitus - matter of mere misfortune,
and has no relation to being party to an association
or conspiracy. In those circumstances the giving
of an overdose is not a res illicita (an unlawful
conduct) in which X engages himself (versatur)
3
and that is why the court in the Pretorius
case correctly set aside the conviction of Pretorius 
who had been in a speed trap when rushing the 
child to hospital.
“ 99 - .
1 1975 (2) SA 85 (SWA) 90
2 At page 89
3 Supra
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(d) Necessary for the Accused to Avert the Danger
It is clear from section 29 of the Transkei
Penal Code that it must have been necessary
for Che accused to avert the danger. All that
is required under this element, say Burchell
1
and Hunt, is that the harm would not probably
have followed if the accused had not acted
as he did. The question that arises is : does
the harm have to be inevitable and irreparable?
It is submitted that it does not have to be.
The Penal Code makes the position reasonably
clear when it merely speaks of threats of harm
which the person under compulsion believes
2
will be executed. Now in S v Adams King J
found the accused (Indian) guilty of contravening
the Group Areas Act when he moved to a white
area pleading necessity because of acute shortage
of housing. The other group Areas Act case
3
is S v Werner. Le Roux J recalled R v Canestra 
1951 (2) SA 317 AD where it was said that the 
defence of necessity must be confined within
the strictest and narrowest limits but if an 
accused is compelled only by economic necessity 
to contravene a regulation that is not a form 
of necessity that the law recognises. The 
learned judge therefore ruled that a state
1 O p c i t
2 1979 (4) SA 793 (T)
^ 1980 (2) SA 313 (W)
of necessity is a situation in which an acccused
Einds himself where there is no alternative
in order to prevent irreparable damage (onberoeplike
skade) as far as he or his family is concerned.
These two Group Areas cases came together before
2
the Appellate Division in 1981 and there Rumpff C J  
said that there was no evidence of an absolute 
shortage of houses and the state of necessity 
could not therefore be invoked. It is submitted 
that had the appeals been allowed the defence 
would indeed have been stretched too far especially 
having regard to the provisions of section 
29 of the Transkei Penal Code. The accused 
should certainly flee if the harm can reasonably 
be avoided by flight.
To sum up the aforegoing, one can say that 
the Transkei Penal Code fell strongly under 
the influence of English law in the field of 
necessity. Gardiner and Lansdown served as
a vehicle for the acceptance of the code's 
influence in South African law, and the courts 
both in South Africa and Zimbabwe followed 
the view that compulsion or necessity cannot 
legally justify the killing of an innocent 
person. The turning point came with the Goliath 
case, a development which was much to be welcomed.
1 See at 329
2 S v Adams, S v Herner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A)
3 Supra
- 101 -
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Despite the somewhat half hearted difference 
of opinion expressed by Snyman, one can also 
say that to a large extent the provisions of
the code in this respect also found acceptability 
among writers such as Burchell and Hunt.
(e ) Marital Coercion
Until as recently as 1925 English law upheld
and enforced the rule that a wife who committed
certain classes of crimes in the presence of
her husband was presumed to have committed them
under his coercion unless the contrary was proved.
The wife was therefore legally excused for her
actions. Burchell & Hunt state that this rule
1
was received in South African law. While English
law and South African law were still under the
grip of this rule, the Transkei Penal code took
the lead in 1886 and specifically excluded the
rule so that it never formed part of the received
criminal law of Transkei. It had never formed
part of the customary criminal law and that
position obtains tD date. The express exclusion
of this rule by section 29 of the Penal Code
2
is acknowledged by Burchell and Hunt as well
3
as Gardiner & Lansdown. It was only in 1925
4
that English law abolished this rule by legislation.
1 Op cit 350 footnote 249
2 Ibid .
3 Op cit 111
4 S.47 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1925
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At some stage South African law followed the
lead of the Transkei Penal code, but it is
not quite clear whether that was before or
after the change in England was effected in
1925. At the beginning Lord de Villiers.
who was famous for importing the principles
of English law into South African law declared
1
in R v Albert : "i am not prepared to adopt
the English rule that a wife who commits an
offence in the presence of her husband must
2
be presumed to have acted under coercion.
3
In Bosch v R , a few years later,
the judgment of Lord de Villiers was followed
in the Transvaal. Significantly Gardiner and
4
Lansdown mention these cases simultaneously 
with section 29 of Act 24 of 1886 when making 
the point that the rule has been discarded
in South African law.
5
On the other hand Snyman says this presumption 
was applied "in some early South African cases"
- and quotes R v Chansie 1925 OPD 74, R v Mofokeng 
1941 OPD 233, R v Motaung 1942 OPD 233 , R v 
Mosenane 1943 OPD 222, and R v Mokhlyane 1946 
OPD 140. He then refers to R v Koale 1950
(3) SA 705 (0) 711 and R v Medley 1951 Í4)
SA 241 (C) as authority for the view that the
 1 -T W 5 T T 7 S C T 7 2
2 See page 274
3 1904 TS. 55
4 Op c i t 111
5 Op cit 94
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rule is no longer part of our law. Burchell 
nnd Hunt also state that the Koale and Medley 
cases were the turning point as far as South 
African law is concerned.
1
A close reading of R v Koale shows the far-reaching
nature of the controversy and confusion on this
question. For in that case Horwitz J discovers
Barry J P as saying In Rex v Adams (3 EDC 216)
that the English law presumption is consistent
with the principles of Roman Dutch law based 
2
on the civil law. This view Is apparently based
on Mascardus who says "Etiam in poenalibus locum
3
habere ut mulier sedncta praesumatur a vlro..."
For his part, however, the learned Judge sees 
no wisdom In delving deep Into the Roman Dutch 
Law or the civil law in order to find a solution
It
to the problem in view of the totally different
social and political status of the modern woman
4
from that of the Roman wife." (le observes that 
the servility of the modern wLfe towards her 
husband cannot be taken for granted, and recalls 
Plutarch's remarks in " The life of Cato the 
censor" when he says, through Themlstocles.
"The Athenians govern the Greeks, I govern 
the Athenians; you my wife, govern me."
1 1950 (3) SA 705(0)
2 See at p.708
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
He concludes that although In some cases the
wife may stand in fear of physical violence 
from her husband should she disobey his behest, 
where the spouses are "cultured, civilised and 
advanced, mentally and morally, that fear is
virtually non-existent }  The presumption should 
therefore not be applied indiscriminately to
all married women and in each case the question 
of coercion should be decided in accordance 
with the established facts if real and substantial 
justice is to be ensured. It is submitted that 
the degree of civilisation has nothing to do 
with the legal sphere. Regrettably, Burrhell 
& Hunt appear to endorse the view that the degree 
of civilisation of the parties should have a 
role to play in the determination of liability. 
Yet I make bold to say that in various customary 
communities situated in remote rural areas where 
there are no schools and which are in all ways
divorced from western civilisation there are
countless instances where men are renowned for 
being under the apron strings of their wives 
and this is expressed by the derogatory term
that the wife "generally pulls the husband along
by the nose" (uthiwe nqo ngempumlo). Such 
women rule their husbands as did Plutarch's 
wife and in fact some chiefs also fall into
this misfortune so that as much as Madame Plutarch
-  105 -
1 page 711
ruled Athens and Greece, that much do these 
"uncultured, uncivilised and backward" women 
also rule their husbands' subjects.
The conclusion at which one must arrive is therefore 
that in the field of mental coercion the Penal 
Code took a line different Erom the English
law and excluded the presumption while South
African law followed English law. However the 
code would not allow itself to be ignored Eor
all time and it did exert some influence on
South African law. That influence was of short 
duration and was soon terminated. It is submitted 
that there was and there is little justification
for the presumptions.
The second part of section 29 certainly exerted
a discernible influence on South African law. The
echoes of the 1886 code and of South African
law as laid down in the Bradbury case ^ are heard
2
in the Transkei Penal Code Act of 1983 section 
1 0  (a) (iii) whereof contains the proviso that
in the case of necessity arising from human 
agency the situation that the person pleading 
necessity found himself in must not have been 
due to his own fault. This still leaves the
scales heavily loaded against an appellant who
will again and again be told that he should 
have escaped. This is in effect a reflection
- 106 -
1 Supra
2 Act No.9 of 1983
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of the versari in re illicita doctrine. The overall 
picture, however is that the new Code has been 
drawn in a manner reflecting the advantage gained 
from legal developments and court decisions in 
South Africa over the century.
4.2 Obedience To Orders-----------------------  1
Section 59 and 60 of the Transkei Penal Code deal
with obedience to orders, and South African law
is well in harmony with these provisions. Gardiner
2
and Lansdown state that a soldier is not criminally 
responsible for acts of violence done under the 
orders of his officer if such orders are not manifestly
illegal, and they quote the leading case of R__v
Smith 17 S.C. 561 and Section 60 of the Transkei
Penal code as authority for the view. Burchell
3
and Hunt also reEer to Smith's case as well as
R v Vllliers 1903 ORC 1, followed by a footnote:
"The same principle appears in sections 59 and
60 of the Transkei Penal Code, in cases of obedience
4
to orders for the suppression of a riot."
4.3 Consent '
Consent is dealt with in Sections 73, 74, 75 and
76 of the Transkei Penal Code"! The harmony between 
the Code and South African Law on the question
of consent is apparent from Gardiner & Lansdown 
who refer specifically to Sections 73-76 as part
6 7
or the text. Likewise Burchell & Hunt reiterate
the rule that a person's consent to being killed
cannot purge the homicide of its unlawfulness.
. 8 
In this connection they recall section 76, and
9
after Gardiner and Lansdown, give the valid reason
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1 See Appendix A
2 See voll 6 ed 118
3 Op cit 357
4 See footnote 306
5 See Appendix A
6 See vol 1 6ed 118
7 Op cit 370
8 See footnote 429 on page 370
9 Ibid
for this rule namely that it is beyond the power 
of an individual person to consent to being killed, 
the state having as it does an interest in the preser­
vation of human life.
_  L09 -
1
It now remains for us to consider cases of euthanasia.
2
The leading cases in this regard are S v Hartmann,
3 4
S v De Bellocq and S v Dawidow. These cases are
discussed by Andrian Rail in a unique article entitled : 
_ 5
The Doctor's dilemma: Relieve suffering or prolong life?
The learned author defines euthanasia as the ending
as painlessly as possible of the life of a person
who is fatally ill and suffering from pain/’
In the Hartmann case the killing of the 87 year old
man by his doctor (own son) was with his consent.
He was very ill indeed. He had been suffering from
cancer for many years and the disease had spread
to various parts of his body. He was plainly incurable, 
completely bedridden and suffering severe pain which
necessitated the most potent pain-killing drugs.
His son injected him with a dose of penthol sufficient
to kill him. In line with section 76 of the Transkei
Penal Code, the Court found Hartmann guilty of murder. 
Rail is unhappy about this and feels that euthanasia
1 The word is derived from the Greek eu meaning good, and thanatos 
meaning death. It is defined as gentle and easy death, bringing 
about this, especially in the case of incurable and painful disease.
2 1975 (3) SA 532 (c)
3 TPD i-!ay 1968, unreported
4 TPD May 1968, unreported
5 (1977) 94 SALJ 40 c.f. Strauss: (1964 ) 81 S A U  179
6 Op cit p.42
1 10
as defined by him should be justified, and this should
be done without the law having to be altered by legislation 
or the creation of new defences. The court should 
bring this about by simply applying the criterion 
of boni mores. He concedes, however, that it will 
take a very long time before the courts will consider 
that the bonl mores of South African Law permit
them' to legalise euthanasia. Let us suppose that 
the deceased in the Hartmann case did not conscnt 
and Dr Hartmann was charged under the Transkei Penal 
Code. Could he have successfully raised the defence 
oEfered by section 74? It is clear from the decision 
in the Hartmann case that the requirement oE "the 
benefit of the complainant" would not be met and 
the accused's case would in Eact be even less arguable 
than the Hartmann one.
In the Bel locq case the child was an idiot, and was 
certain to die of the desease that caused it to be 
an idiot within a short time. The parent, a former 
medical student, killed the child by drowning it.
De wet J P said "The law does not allow any person 
to be , killed whether that person is an imbecile or
is very ill. The killing of such person is an unlawful
- Ill
act and it amounts to murder". Rail is as critical
of the De Bellocq decision as he is of the Hartmann 
one. He complains that Che murder conviction is 
a perpertual stigma and a doctor can get struck 
off the roll as happened with Dr Hartmann.
1
It is noteworthy that de Wet & Swanepoel, when dealing
with negotiorum gestio (saakwaarneming) refer expressly
to section 74 of the NTPC. It is submitted that
section 74 is a statutory recognition of the Roman-Dutch
concept of negotiorum gestio, and thus once again
the impact of Roman-Dutch law on the NTPC is
2
demonstrated.
It can be safely concluded that in the fields of
consent and obedience to orders the Transkei Penal 
Code exerted a distinct influence on South African 
law. Neither the courts nor the textbook writers 
made even the slightest effort to resist this influence.
1 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg. 4 ed 97
2 cf 3.3 supra
CHAPTER 5 
MENS REA
5 . 1  THE LIABILITY OF CHILDREN
The liability of children is dealt with in Section
1
25 of the Transkei Penal Code. Among the Roman-Dutch
writers there is a great deal of dispute as to the
age at which a child is doll Incapax. In this connection 
2
Burchell and Hunt say "the formulation, hallowed
by frequent use in the judgements of our courts,
that there is a conclusive presumption that such
a child (i.e. a child under seven years) is doli
incapax is not strictly accurate....." Among the
judgements of courts referred to, the Appellate Division
case of Attorney General, Transvaal v Additional
3
Magistrate for Johannesburg is but one, in which Kotze 
J A stated the South African law as being that a 
child under the age of seven years is conclusively 
held to be doli incapax. The learned judge of appeal 
went on to say that this presumption is itself rebuttable 
in respect of children seven to fourteen years of 
age on proof of a malicious mind on the part of the 
child in accordance with the maxim of the canonists
1 See appendix A
2 South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol.l 242
3 1924 AD 421
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malitia supplet aetatem. It emerges from this judgement 
that in the Netherlands the age of ten years is taken 
Instead of seven, and this is in accordance with 
the rule of the civil law and of majority of the 
commentators (my own underlining). Below that age,
say the majority, there can be no capacity whatsoever 
on the part of a child to commit a crime. It is 
clear therefore that the rule laid down in section 
25 of the code is not derived from Roman-Dutch law.
Likewise the English law takes a different line from
the Transkei Penal code on this question. Smith
and Hogan state: "Even though there may be the clearest
evidence that the child caused an actus reus with
mens rea, he cannot be convicted once it appears
that he had not, at the time he did the act, attained
1
the age of ten. Nor Is this a mere procedural bar...."
This position obtained only after 1933, when the
age was raised by statute from 7 to 8 and later from
2
8 to 10 by statute in 1963. Before these statutory
increases that operative age was seven, but the Law
1 Criminal I .aw : llut,t,erworths 1965 p. 79'
2 Burchell and Hunt op cit 241 footnote 43
was Che same as that propounded by the majority of 
the Dutch commentators, namely that the maxim ma 111 ia 
supplet aetatem (malice supplements the age) applied. 
It is therefore clear that the Transkei Penal code 
is not based on Engish law in this regard as malice 
is a relevant feature therein.
The rule that the presumption is rebuttable In respect
of children between the ages of seven and fourteen
1
was applied In R v K and the maxim mailt la supplet 
aetatem was upheld. Now at that time the presumption
that every person is presumed to intend the reasonable 
and probable consequences of his act was applicable 
in South African law, and the question that Ccntlivrcs 
C J had to decide was whether this presumption automati­
cally outweighed the presumption that a child of 
this age group is doll incapax. He ruled that it 
did not, and the crown had to show affirmatively 
that the child knew what the reasonable and probable 
consequences of his act would be. In this case the 
point was also made that the presumption of doll 
incapax weakens with the advance of the child's age 
towards fourteen although of course the onus still
rests on the crown to prove that the child Is doli
2 - --
Incapax■
-  I I  <1 -
1 1956 (3) SA 353 (A)
2 Per Centlivres C J at 385
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The Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana has also accepted
the presumptions regarding the liability of children.
1 2 
In S v M Hiemstra C J applied R v K regarding the
rule that the presumption weakens with the advance
of the child's age towards 14. In casu the boy was
13 years of age. Furthermore, the learned Chief
Justice applied the case of R v Kaffir 1923 CPD 261
and reiterated that criminal capacity is more readily
accepted in regard to theft than in regard to a lesser
known statutory offence. The rules applied by the
Supreme Court of Bophuthatswana are quite in harmony
with the spirit of section 25 of the Transkei Penal
Code.
The court in Zimbabwe has dealt with the presumption
in relation to statutory offence and has repeatedly
said that it is undesirable for youths of about 13
years of age to be presecuted for statutory offences'
which might often be no more that boyish pranks.
In R v Mahwahwa  ^ Beadle J (as he then was) repeated
what he had said in the previous case of R v Kondora
1953 SR 216 about the undesirability of presecutions
in these circumstances. The findings in these cases
are in accordance with section 25 of the Transkei
4
Penal Code._______________________________________________________
1 1974 (4) SA 564 (BSC)
2 Supra
3 1956 (1) SA 250 (SR)
4 For a Zimbabwe case in which the court may perhaps have 
taken the presumption too far and ignored the maxim 
malitia supplet aetatem see R v Tsutso 1962 (2) SA
6 6 6 SR.---- ------------
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The legal certainty provided by the Transkei Penal
Code in relation to the liability of children is
to be seen even in connection with the crime of rape.
In terms of section 159 a boy below the age oE 14
is conclusively presumed to be incapable o£ committing
rape and semble, of sodomy and bestiality. It would
appear that the English law was similar on this point.
In Roman-Dutch law there was once again a difference
of opinion among the jurists. This is clear from
2
Gardiner & Lansdown. South African law has followed
3
the English law and, by necessary implication, the 
Transkei Penal Code of 1886.
4
Snyman re-iterates the rebuttable and irrebuttable
presumptions exactly as laid down in the Transkei
Penal Code. However he criticises the test laid
down by the courts viz. whether the child knew what
it was doing was wrong, and calls it "a gross simplifica-
6
tion of the test for criminal responsibility". The
learned author draws attention to and upholds the 
cognitive and the conative aspects of the test for 
criminal responsibility. The learned author goes
on to acknowledge indirectly but quite plainly the 
influence of the Transkei Penal Code on South African
law in this regard when he says that section 25 of
the code embodies a test for the liability of children
1 See R v Williams (1893) I.Q.8 . 320, quoted by
Gardiner & Lansdown op. cit. 86
2 See Vol. 2 6 ed 1622
3 Gardiner & Lansdown op. cit. ibid
4 Crim inal law
5 At page 131
6 Ibid
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"very similar Co thac of South African law". He further
1
acknowledges ChaC R v Kenene does in face reflect
2
that influence.
The Transkeian legislature abolished the 14 year
3
rule in 1983 and in the light of objections to it
4
by scholars like Snyman it was to be expected that 
South Africa would follow suit. That was achieved 
by the Law of Evidence and the Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act 1987 which provides thus:
"no presumption or rule of law to the effect
that such a boy is incapable of sexual intercourse
5
shall come into operation".
This development has understandably been welcomed
5
by Professor Milton. Me says the amendment brings
the law of rape into line with the general principles 
governing the liability of children, because the
youth of Che offender wiLl be relevant only if 
it establishes a lack of criminal capacity. The
author rejoices at the overthrow of the Justinian 
rule and its English connection.
1 1946 EDL 18
2 See also R v M & others 1978 (3) SA557 (TKSC).
This is a Transkeian case in which Rose-frines j c f
of South Africa, seconded to the Transkei Supreme Court, 
dealt with section 25 and said that it embodies the 
common law, meaning of course Che common law of South 
Africa. '
3 Section 96 of Act 9 of 1983
4 Supra
5 Section 1 of Act 103 of 1987
6 Law Reform: The demise of the impunity of ore-pubescent
rapists. South African Journal ot Criminal '
Justice (SACJ) 1988:1
It is now clear that infants are exempt from criminal
liability because they are incapable of mens rea.
But are their acts themselves regarded as unlawful?
The view of Burchell and Hunt is categorically that
they are not to be so regarded. This view is strongly
2
criticised by Strauss. He says this is based upon
the outdated notion that the precepts of law are
directed only to responsible human beings and yet 
the law directs its norms to all people, and in effect 
the insane (and infants) can act contrary to the
law, with punishment being excluded by the application 
of the principle of nulla poena sine culpa.
To sum up the position, it can be said that there
was a great deal of uncertainty as regards the law
relating to the liability of children. The Transkei
Penal Code took a line different from both the Roman-Dutch
law and the English law and by providing certainty
on this question, was able to exert influence in
South Africa, Zimbabwe and more recently, even Bophuthatswana.
3
The new Transkei Penal Code improves on the wording 
of the old section 25 and effectively substitutes 
rules of substantive law for the old evidentiary 
presumptions.
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1 See at pp. 181 and 186
2 87 SALJ 1970 at page 476
3 Act no.9 of 1983
-  11«)
5.2 Intoxication
Section 28 oE the Transkei Penal Code deals with
intoxication. At one stage these provisions promised
to exert a direct and somewhat applauded inEluence
1
on South African law. This came via R v Bulanl. 
In that ease Lansdown J P said:
"Where to establish any charge it is necessary
to prove that the conduct complained of was
accompanied by any particular intention,
the fact that the accused was intoxicated
at the time is relevant to the question
whether he did have the intention. That
is a provision oE the common Law as well
as a provision of section 28 o£ the Transkeian
2
Territories Penal Code act 2h of 1886.”
In his concurring judgment Cane J made a more satisfac­
tory exposition oE the matter. lie said:
” I agree that if the drinking was not such as
to cause intoxication, sec. 28 of the Native
Territories Penal Code would not come into opera-
3
tion."
1 1938 EDL 205
2 Page 209
3 Page 210
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The fact of the matter is that B u l a n i  is a Transkeian
case from the Engcobo district and section 28 oE
the Code was therefore applicable. The two judges
were certainly aware of this, and what could probably
cloud issues was the Eormulation of Lansdown J 1’
when he, rather unnecessarily, brought the South
African common law Into the picture. It seems to
1
be this formulation that led D.P. van der Merwe to 
assert the view that section 28 o£ the Code exerted 
direct influence on South African law. He says:
"R v Bulani toon die invloed wat die sogcnanmde 
N.T.P.C. verorden vir die Transkei ook in ander 
dele van Suid-Afrika gehad het, met bo trekking 
tot toerekeningsvatbaarheid”
Obviously taking Bulani to be a South African case, 
the learned author then logically sees the specific 
reference of Cane J to section 28 as showing beyond 
doubt the impact of: the Code on South African law.
In effect, therefore, no direct influence of section 
28 on South African law was ever alluded to by the 
judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa. It 
is significant that Gardiner and Lansdown, who took 
the slightest available opportunity to lean on the
1 Unpublished Thesis: Die Leerstuk van verminderde
strafbaarheld, LLD Unisa 1980. c.E. 1.2 supra
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relevant section o£ the Code and applaud it as represe­
nting the South African law on the point have nothing 
whatsoever to say about section 28 which deals with 
intoxication. Hunt is very vigilant regarding the 
influence of the Transkei Penal Code and hastens
to point out whenever he feels that it is making
2
inroads into South African law. When dealing with
intoxication Hunt must be seen as adequate proof
that it has not projected itself in any significant
manner. It is true, however, that section 28 has
overtones of the doctrine versanti in re illicita
omnia imputantur quae ex delicto sequuntur. It makes 
a person
"...liable to be dealt with as if he had 
the same knowledge as he would have
had if he had not been intoxicated...'.'
This doctrine became part of the South African law
of intoxication and the Appellate Division expressed
3
awareness of this in S v Johnson.
The overall position is therefore that the Transkei 
Penal Code failed to exert any noticeable influence
on South African law. A suggestion that it did was 
the result of an oversight on the part of the court 
and the jurist concerned. The new Transkei Penal
1 South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol.2
2 See especially discussions on assault : J.O.2.2. infra, where he
comes out very strongly against the Code's influence.
3 1969 (1) SA 201 (A), c.f. J R du Plessis: Dronkenskap as verweer-
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Raneins - Hollands - Reg 1944 at 104
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Code Cakes no cognisance of recent developments 
in South African case law and abides by the old principles.
These recent developments centre around the well-known
2
case of S v Chretien. In the light of that case the
South African legislature has passed section 1 of the
3
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1988.
1
1 Section 15 of Act 9 of 1983
2 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A)
3 Act No. 1 of 1988
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This subject is dealt with in Section 141 of the
. 1  
Transkei Penal Code. Initially South African law
accepted that provocation was a circumstance which
served to reduce murder to culpable homicide. This
approach was plainly influenced by the provisions
of this section.
In their sixth edition which appeared in 1957, Gardiner
2
and Lansdown quote this section in full and then
declare; "This section may be regarded as expressing 
what is the common law of South Africa on the subject
of provocation - see R v Buthelezi 1925 A.D 160".
, 3
A perusal of Buthelezi s case, however, shows that
the proposition that this section is a true reflection
of South African Law is based on the authority of
Gardiner & Lansdown. It follows therefore that the
learned authors expressed the view in their first
edition which appeared in 1919 six years before Buthelezi's
case was decided.
4
Be all that as it may, it was in R v Buthelezi that 
this approach for the first time received the imprimatur 
of the Appellate Division. In that case, which came 
from the Natal Native High Court, a constable had 
grounds for suspecting that his wife had misconducted
1 See appendix A
2 Vol 2 page 1555
3 At page 162
4 1925 AD 160
5. 3 Provocation
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herself with another man during his absence from
home, and stabbed her with a long knife, causing
her to bleed to death within a few minutes. Solomon JA
said that on the question of what provocation would
be sufficient to justify a court in coming to the
conclusion that there was no intention to kill, no
hard and fast rule can be laid down. The question
was one of fact to be deduced from the circumstances
1
of the particular case under investigation. This
of course is in accordance with section 140. However
the learned judge went further to place matters beyond
all doubt and said: "Our law on the subject is,
as pointed out by Gardiner and Lansdown in their
treatise on criminal law, well expressed in section
141 of the Transkeian Penal Code of 1886... It would
be difficult, I think, to improve upon that statement
of the law, which may be regarded as correctly laying
2 ■ 
down our law upon this subject".
In a concurring judgement, Kotze J A reiterated these
3
sentiments as follows: "The contention in the present
case... is that provocation was of a nature to reduce 
the crime committed by the applicant to manslaughter... 
Now, although the Transkeian Code applies merely 
to the Native Territories beyond the Kei, it has 
frequently been resorted to with approval by our
1 At page 162
2 Ibid
3 At page 170
courts. I think the provisions of section 141, to 
which I have referred, correctly state the law."
The stage was then set for a full-scale application
of section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code in the
i
South African courts. In R v Attwood Che accused 
had been convicted of murder by a jury in the PreCoria 
Criminal Sessions and the question arose as to whether 
the presiding judge had accurately or adequately 
explained Che law in regard Co provocaCion as a defence 
to a charge of murder.
WaCermeyer CJ reviewed the old authorities such as
Carpzovius, Matthaeus, Moorman, and Huber and Chen
said: "IC is however, unnecessary for the purpose
of this case to examine in any detail the principles
which they lay down, because in R v Buthelezi (1925
AD 160) this court adopted the provisions of section
141 of the Transkei Penal code as a correct staCemenC
2
of our law”. He gave leave to appeal in respect 
of the killing of Genis who, he found, had indulged 
in wrongful conduct immediately before the shooting, 
of such a nature as to deprive an ordinary man of 
his power of self-control.
In a dissenting judgement Tindall JA said it was 
unfortunate that the learned judge a quo had expressed 
himself "in these inaccurate terms. He could have
-  1 25  -
1 1946 AD 331
2 At page 339
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stated the law simply by quoting the exposition oE 
the law in section 141 of the Cape Act 24 oE 1886
(Set out in volume 2 of Gardiner and Lansdown).
This exposition of the law relating to provocation
was held by this court in Rex v Buthelezi (1925 AD
160) to express correctly our law in regard to this 
defence".*
2
In R v Blokland Davis A J A repeated the statement
that it was unnecessary to consider the old Roman
and Roman-Dutch authorities in the subject of the
killing by a husband of his wife's paramour, or of
the wife taken in adultery. He went back to Rex
v Buthelezi and section 141 as setting out the law
correctly. He reiterated the sentiments of Watermeyer CJ 
3’
in R v Attwood. The Blockland case emanated from 
the Aliwal North Circuit Local Division.
4 5
In a case that came from Standerton, Transvaal Watermeyer CJ 
reiterated the sentiments he had expressed in Rex 
v Attwood. And in R v Reccia the familiar formula 
" I always understood Chat section 141 of the Native 
Territories Penal code correctly stated the common 
law" was employed in a case heard at the Aliwal North
1 At page 344
2 1946 AD 940
3 Supra see at 944
4 R v Tshabalala 1946 AD 106
5 At 1062
6 1946 EDL page 1
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Circuit Local Division. For killing deceased allegedly 
because he said "You were better in using human balls 
than wooden bowls" the verdict was one of guilty 
of culpable homicide instead of murder with or without 
extenuating circumstances.
The first signs of apparent suspicion that the line
followed on this question was probably not correct
appeared in 1949 in a case that had originated from
2
Winburg, Orange Free State. There Schreiner JA saw
the need for a distinction being drawn between English
law and South African Law on the question, but he
still remained overwhelmed by the preponderant judicial
view that section 141 formed part of South African
3
Law. He said "In contrast to the English approach
our law while it has accepted the provision of section
141 as substantially a correct treatment of the subject,
regards the whole question rather as one of fact
than as controlled by legal rules". Significantly
the learned Judge preferred to regard provocation
as "a special kind of material from which, in association
with the rest of the evidence, the dicision must
be reached whether or not the Crown has proved the
4
intent as well as the act beyond reasonable doubt."
1 See page 3
2 R v Thibani 1949 (4) 720 AD
3 At 730-731
4 Ibid
The turning point came after the emergence of an 
eminent publication by Professors J C de Wet and
H L Swanepoel entitled: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg.
Commenting on the Transkeian Penal Code generally, 
the learned authors point out that in actual fact
the code was not inspired by the Roman-Dutch law,
but chiefly by the draft of an English legal work
on criminal law, compiled in 1879. Nowhere in thei.r
work do they follow the courts and refer to the code
as the Transkeian Penal code. They consistently 
apply the official name "Native Territories Penal
code" and refer to it by its abbreviation N.T.P.C.
Opening the debate on the effects of section 141
of the Code on South African Law, the learned authors
observe that the South African practice was itself
2
established under the influence of English law, and
that this was considerably facilitated by the existence
of the Section 141 of Transkei Penal codel They Chen
4
protest and say that in R v Buthelezi this "cumbersome 
and confused bit of legislation" was described
as a correct representation of South African Law,
and the statement was accepted in subsequent decisions 
of the Court of Appeal. The learned authors then
boldly reject this whole approach: " Dat art
1 See footnote 2 on page 7 supra
2 1 ed p.41
3 Ibid pp 120-121
4 Supra
I2y
141 ons reg op hierdíe punt korrek weergee, is net
1
nie waar nie". They then engage in an illuminating 
discussion which includes a review of the cases in 
which it was held by the courts that Section 141 
correctly reflects South African law. They thereupon 
address the question as to what the real position 
is or should be in South African law. They observe
that the state of the judicature does not permit 
a clear answer and the position is extremely confused 
since no distinction is made between anger which
must be considered as a factor in making deductions 
from a m a n’s conduct in view oE his attitude, and 
anger as a circumstance mitigating punishment after 
conviction.
However, they take the view that the position should 
be stated as follows:
(a) that, insomuch as anger is taken into account
when making deductions concerning a person's 
attitude from his conduct, it does not matter 
whether the anger was justified or reasonable, or 
was aroused by impermissible conduct;
(b) that, notwithstanding what "anger" might 
signify for the purpose of making deductions, 
anger (if justified) serves to mitigate punishment;
(c) that circumstances as viewed by the accused
are to be considered in deciding whether anger 
was justified, and that the permissibility 
or impermissibility of the act which caused
1 Ibid. "It is simply not true that Section 141 correctly 
reflects our law at this point"
_  1.10
(c) cont.
anger is irrelevant;
(d) that section 141 should not be adhered to in parts
oE the country where It has not intrinsic
validity, and
(e) that the view that anger (or rather provocation)
"reduces" murder to homicide is native to 
English law and relates to the definitions
of murder and manslaughter In that legaL system.
I am in full agreement with the conclusions reached
by the authors. In spite of what I say elsewhere
in this chapter about the forces that combined to
strengthen the position of F.nglsh , law and certain 
outdated concepts in South African criminal law,
I fall to understand how It could have for so long
escaped the notice of jurists that it was wrong to 
take a section of a statute that was specially designed 
for a particular area In order to meet certain conditions 
alleged to be prevailing in that area and declare
it applicable in South Africa, for which it was never
m e a n t .
The Ideas expressed by de Wet and Swanepoel were 
so welcomed In South African legal circles that they 
seemed to be the voice of reason for which they had
long been waiting. According to Stiyui.-iii1 the first 
craks in the Buthelezl approach appeared In 1949 in
1 Criminal Law - page 14 7
R v Thibani. In that case Che appellate division
described the role and the significance of provocation
correctly by stating that evidence of provocation
was merely factual material that had to be taken
into account in deciding the question of intention
to kill. Provocation was thus not a matter governed
by mechanical rules as suggested by section 141
but merely an aid in determining an accused persons'
s state of mind at the crucial moment. However in
this case the appellate division still held that
provocation reduced the crime from murder to culpable
homicide, but the provoking act here was lawful and
not wrongful as required in section 141. Snyman
states that this decision helped "to loosen the grip
2
which section 141 had on our law".
3
Then came S v Mangondo. The court indicated that, 
since the test of criminal intention is now subjective, 
and since the earlier cases of provocation applied
a degree of objectivity, it may be necessary to consider
afresh the whole question of provocation.
In an appeal from the Zululand and North Coast Circuit
4
Local Division the Appellate Division was gain faced 
with the question as to whether by reason of section 
141 of the Transkei Penal Code it should not return
1 1949 (4) SA 720 (A)
2 Page 148.
3 1963 (4) SA 160 (A)
4 S v Mokonto 1971 (2) SA 319 (A)
-  131 "
1
a verdict of culpable homicide instead of murder 
because of provocation. In this case the deceased, 
a middle-aged female resident of the Ingwavuma district, 
was confronted by appellant who said: "I have come
to face you, let us go and divine She refused
to go and he smote her with a cane-knife saying: 
"You are eating people..."
The appellant, a young Zulu man in his twenties, 
told the court: that he killed her because she was
a witch and on that day she said he would not see 
the setting of the sun. After a review the authorities 
Holmes JA summed up the position as follows:
1. Section 141 of the Transkeian Penal code should
be confined to the territory for which it was
passed.
2. In crimes of which a specific intention is an
element, the question of the existence of such
intention is a subjective one, namely, what 
was going on in the mind of the accused.
3 . Provocation, inter alia, is relevant to the
question of the existence of such intention.
4 . Provocation, subjectively considered, is also 
relevant to extenuation or mitigation.
The learned judge of Appeal confirmed the verdict 
of guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances 
as well as the sentence of five years imprisonment.
-  132 -
The most recent and probably most interesting case
1
in relation to provocation is S v Arnold. An act 
of provocation by deceased (wife) at a time when 
accused (husband) was emotionally extremely upset 
by several prior events relevant to the problems 
of husband and wife led to the fatal shooting of
the deceased by the accused. Burger J held that on 
the facts the State, because of accused's severe 
emotional stress, had not proved that he had acted 
consciously. The state had also not proved that,
if the accused had acted consciously, he could appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his act or if he did, that he 
was able to act in accordance with such appreciation.
If this was a case of provocation without the other 
relevant features then of course one could hasten 
to say that this case goes even further than the
Transkei Penal Code in malting provocation a ground 
for justification.
It thus took the Appellate division more than forty 
years before it changed its direction on the relevance 
of section 141 of the Transkei Penal code to South 
African Common Law. In allowing what would be murder 
to become culpable homicide because of sudden provocation 
section 141 shows an inherent weakness. In many 
instances the provocation, far from negativing an 
intention to kill, actually causes it. This was
1 1985 (3) SA 256 (C). See also S v Campher 1987 (1)
SA 940 (A); S v Laubscher 198B TTT tiA J.b3 (A)
1  2 
realised in R v Krull and S v Mokonto, where the
court said that Ear from negativing intention to
kill provocation contributed to such intention.
There was therefore no room for a verdict of culpable
homicide.
The judges of the Supreme Court of Transkei appeared 
to be painfully aware of the weaknesses discovered
in section 141 of the code. They then endeavoured 
to secure a result which met the justice of a particular 
case by placing a strict interpretation on the provision 
that the wrongful act should be of such a nature 
as to be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person
J
of the power of self-control. In S v Tum-Tum Lel e ,
a witchcraft case from the Xhora (Elliotdale) district
in which the provocative words were fairly similar
4
to those in the Mkonto case, Van Coller J reiterated 
the provisions of section 141 whereby murder can 
be reduced to culpable homicide, but held that the 
provocation was not of such a nature as to be sufficient 
to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control 
A verdict of guilty of murder with extenuating circumsta­
nces was therefore returned and the accused was sentenced
-  134 -
1 1959 (3) SA 392 (A)
2 Supra
3 Heard in the Umtata Criminal Sessions in 1982, unreported
4 Supra
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Co ten years imprisonmentf
There is an important element of section 141 which
de Wet to Swanepoel do not appear to deal with, viz.
the requirement that the offender should have acted
"on the sudden, and before there has been time for
his passion to cool". In this connection Gardiner
2
& Lansdown state one of the , requisites for a plea
of provocation as being that the act of the accused
must have supervened immediately upon the provocation
and must have been the natural reaction to it. In
terms of this requirement the benefit of the doctrine
is excluded where the violence of the accused did
not immediately follow upon the provocation and as
a natural reaction to it but took place after his
3
heated blood had had time to cool. This is in line
with the verba ipsissima of section 141. Furthermore
4
the learned authors discuss the Thibani case, and
thereupon set out, again as part of the text the 
provisions of section 141. In the next line they
then declare that this section may be regarded as
expressing the common law of South Africa on the
1 The extenuating circumstances arose not from the accused's
belief in witchcraft but from the deceased's statement 
that she had indeed been responsible for the accused's 
illness which had lasted for several years and was still 
going to continue for many more years. Admittedly this 
provocation was not as sharp as the threat in Mkonto's 
case where deceased said: "You will not see the setting
of the sun today". For that reason I feel the apparent 
disparity in sentences in the two cases is justified.
2 6 ed Vol 1 p.103
3 At page 104
4 Supra
1
subject of provocation thus being absolutely unmindful of
the real significance of the case as demonstrated
above. The authors also uphold the objective test
as shown by their repeated reference to the "reasonable
2
ma n " .
3
Snyman pays attention to the question of "cooling 
off" between the provocation and the attack. Whether 
or not there was a "cooling of" period between the 
provocation and the attack is not a question asked 
to determine in mechanical fashion whether a crime
is murder or culpable homicide, but is merely a factor 
which is to be considered with others to determine
whether or not there was intention to kill. This 
observation is relevant to section 141 which indeed 
suggests a determination in mechanical fashion whether
a crime is murder or culpable homicide.
Otherwise Snyman appreciates the powerful influence
of the Transkei Penal Code on South African law in
the field of provocation. He refers to the position
 ^ 4
before Mokonto's case as being "the previous law"
which was simply to apply section 141 of the code. 
He makes the valid criticism that the section did
not set out to lay down a test to determine whether
an accused had intent to murder, but merely presupposed
1 Page 102
2 Page 103
3 Criminal Law page 149
4 Supra
_  136 _
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the intention when it talks of homicide "which would
otherwise be murder". "The purpose of the section
was therefore to make sure that persons who in fact
had the intention to murder would not be convicted
1
of murder." The learned author points out that the 
significance of Mokonto' s case is that the test is 
no longer how the ordinary or reasonable person would 
have reacted to the provocation, but how the particular 
accused, given his own personal characteristics such 
as a quick temper, jealousy, superstition etc, in 
fact reacted. Thus the objective test carried by 
section 141 was rightly discarded, because the test 
for mens rea is clearly a subjective one.
Turning to what one may now call "the present law" 
the learned author does not see the influence of the 
Transkei Penal Code as having been necessarily wiped 
out. His fears remain wih reference to the requirement 
that the person must have lost his power of self-control 
as a result of the provocation. The author laments 
the prospect of this requirement's survival, stating 
that it is an English law requirement which is unnecessary 
and confusing in the context of South African Law.
Burchell & Hunt also acknowledge the tremendous influence 
that was exerted by section 141 of the Transkei Penal 
Code on the South African law relating to provocation.
1 Page 147
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They categorise the section 141 approach as reflected
in Buthelezi and the cases that followed suit as
the traditional view and the approach adopted for
1
the first time by Schreiner J A in the Thibani case
as the new approach. They quite rightly point out
that this approach derives strong support from the
movement towards a subjective test of provocation
2
in crimes requiring intention. The objective test
is clear in section 141 which requires an act or
insult sufficient to deprive any ordinary person
of the power of self-control. The authors uphold
the view that Mokonto 's case was the final step in
the direction of a subjective test for provocation,
3
following R v Krull.
The subjective test began to gain wide-ranging acclaim
among South African jurists. J van Z. Steyn sharply
criticised the Federal Supreme Court for its decision
4
in R v Tanganyika and said that it contained a frontal 
assault on the basic tenets of South African Criminal
law. The assault on the objective test was some 
times without mercy. One jurist said of Gardiner
& Lansdown that they evoke a dreary picture of the 
legendary commuter in his grey flannel suit and grey
felt hat on his ten cent bus ride thorugh the trafic 
jams. "He is not easily roused even after a pint 
at the local pub ... he is the ....bonus paterfamilias
1 Supra
2 See pages 307 and 308, and footnote 652 on page
308
3 1959 (3) SA 392 (A)
4 1958 (3) SA 9 (F.Sc.) 5 1958 SALJ 383
- l.i'l
and one may only marvel ...that this paragon of virtue
gives way to provocation at all". The writer - Dugard
- wrote the article under the title "Provocation:
1
No more rides on the Sea Point Bus" and after showing 
that the Transkei Penal Code and the Appellate Division 
were as much to blame as Cardlner & Lansdown, he 
rejoices and says "Gradually our courts have lost
2
respect Eor the reasonable man" and then discusses 
the Krul 1 and DLodlo cases.
In 1972 Mokonto 's case was Immediately hailed by 
Barend van Niekerk as constituting an important rn;!estonc 
in the evolution of the law on provocation. In the 
same year N J Van der Merwe heartily welcome Holmes JA's 
dismissal of provocation in section 141 as being 
"not in harmony with the subjective approach of modern 
judicial thinking in this country."'
Rather strangely in the light of what is said above 
the courts In Zimbabwe have tenaciously clung on 
to the objective test. At first It was the Federal 
Supreme court of Rhodesia in the famous case of 
R v Tenganyika * that-j like Gardiner & Lansdown, ignored 
the new road opened by the ThIbani case. 'lreilgold C.I 
specifically rejected the rule laid down in Th i ba n i . 
that provocation was a special kind of material from
1 1966 S A LJ 261
2 Ibid
3 1972 SALJ 169
4 TMRI1R 1972. 193 at 195
5' 19 58 ( 3) SA 9 (F. -c. )
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which, in association with the rest of the evidence,
proof of the presence or absence of Intent was to
1
be found. He then praised the Transkei Penal Code
as "correctly stating the modern Roman-Dutch law
of provocation as a defence to a charge oE murder.
The relevant portion of that section reads as follows..."
and the section was re-wrltten. Logically, the learned
Chief Justice then praised the objective test. In
cases where provocation fell to be considered, the
reaction oE the accused to that provocation must
be judged by an external standard. No account must
be taken of his personal idiosyncrasies, or of the
2
fact that he was drunk, or in any other way abnormal 
and that provocation was sufficient law to reduce 
murder to culpable homicide.
Only a year after Tenganyika, the important case
of Krul I was decided by Schreiner J A. And then
the following year, 1960, the Federal Supreme Court
was again faced with provocation as a defence. That
3
was in R v Bureke. In this case Briggs F J mentioned
secion 141 and although he did not praise it openly,
he did not say what was wrong with it, and he also
made a vain attempt to show that there was no real
4
conflict between Tenganyika and Krull. Beadle A J  C 
concurred in this judgement. Thereafter the Zimbabwe 
Court, now standing on Its own, drifted further and
1 See at page H
2 Page 9
3 1960 (1 ) SA 49 (F. SCI
4 Page 51
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further away from the healthy influences of the new
generation in South Africa, and sank deep into the
abyss of the objective test. Thus in S v Howard
the court mentioned only Dlodlo among the South Africa
cases, and then supported "the trend of Rhodesian
decisions" which had followed Tanganyika unlike the
2
South African decisions. The learned judge then 
fearlessly revived the discontinued "rides on the 
Sea Point Bus" and painted an illuminating post-1970 
picture of the reasonable man. This is in sharp 
contrast with Dugard's view that "in this age of 
advances in psychology and man's knowledge of mental 
diseases the search for the reasonable man has become 
absurd"?
To date the Zimbabwe court is still caught in the
conflict that Tanganyika caused between the South
African and Zimbabwe approaches. As recently as
A
1982 Fieldsend C J acknowledged the differing approaches.
The court was not bound by the decisions that had
followed Tenganyika (i.e. Bureke in 1960, Maha jye
in 1965) "but unless there is a good reason for departing
from them we would not want to give a new direction
5
to the law at this stage". The learned Chief Justice 
favoured the approach enunciated as a matter of principle 
and expediency. The objective approach was open
1  1972 (3) SA 27TTÏO
2 See at page 230
3 1966 SALJ 261 at 266
4 S v Nangani 1982 (3) SA 800 (ZS)
^ See at page 806
to criticism but "in its favour is that it recognises
that criminal laws must take into account the realities
1
of human reaction to situations of stress." There
could be no more eloquent advocacy for section 141
of the Transkei Penal Code and at that point it was 
only logical for the Chief Justice to conclude: 
"...I see no insuperable objection to allowing provocation 
to operate to reduce murder to culpable homicide..." 
At that time the Orange Free State Provincial Division 
was unshakeably applying the subjective test and
holding that provocation did not exclude the intent
2
to murder but had rather contributed to it.
I fail to understand the firm adherence of the Zimbabwe 
court to the objective test despite the overwhelming 
weight of judicial reasoning. The rule decisis stare
et quieta non movere is well known but, although 
Fieldsend C J disputes this in Nangani's case, it 
is respectfully submitted that good cause did exist 
at that stage for departing from precedent and giving 
new direction to the law in Zimbabwe. For although 
law must be stable it does not stand still and it 
is for the judges to oil the wheels and facilitate 
movement when the time comes. A rigid application
of the stare decisis rule is a feature of English law 
and that is understandable because Englad has the
-  142 -
1 At 807
2 S v Lesch 1983 (1) SA 814 (0)
3 Supra
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House of Lords which regarded itself as being absolutely
bound by its previous decisions. There is nothing
in Roman-Dutch law to justify that practice, and
as a result the Appellate Division in South Africa
has been prepared to depart from its own previous
decisions. In Harris v Minister of the Interior
Centlivres C J said there was nothing binding the
court from changing its previous decisions and concluded
that the court was bound to consider any reason that
might be advanced to show that it's previous decision
2
was wrong. This standpoint was reiterated more firmly
by the learned Chief Justice two years later in Fellner
3
v Minister of Interior. Now Zimbabwe is known to
follow Roman-Dutch law and not English law. Yet
what is more surprising is that Fieldsend C J relied
4
on Practice Direction (precendent) for refusing "to 
give a new direction to the law". On careful examination 
one finds that the Practice Direction was laid down 
by the learned Chief Justice himself. He said "..parti­
cularly in a changing society, it is essential for 
the Court to have some flexibility so as not to restrict 
unduly its power to develop the law in proper cases 
to meet changing conditions ..." He also mentioned 
section 24 (2) of the Supreme Court Act 28 of 1981
(Zimbabwe) which provides: "The Supreme Court shall
1 1952 (2) SA 428 (A)
2 See at 452 - 454
3 1954 (4) SA 524 (A)
4 1981 (4) SA 981 (There is no case reported here,
but merely a direction on practice by the Chief 
Justice )
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not be bound by any of its own judgements, rulings 
or opinions nor by those oE any oE its predecessors".
It must be admitted that South African legal thinking
has not remained unanimous in the rejection of the
objective test espoused by the Transkei Penal Code.
For instance the Tcnganyika approach was much favoured
by E M Burchell in an article entitled "Provocation:
I
Subjective or objective?" He urged the acceptance
' 2
of the views of the Federal Supreme Court in Tanganyika 
so as to end once and for all "the apparent confusion" 
in our case law. The learned author also had much 
praise Eor section 141 of the Transkei Penal code 
and had no quarrel with its whole-hearted acceptance
3
in Buthelezl; Attwood etc. Dean joined the bandwagon
and argued that the Court should always have the
power of distinguishing between complete justification
and partial justification of an intentional act.
4
Likewise in S v Bailey a normative and thus more
objective approach is favoured. Perhaps this in 
itselE is not unhealthy and helps to maintain a balance 
which prevents the subjectivists from going to extremes. 
For instance de Wet & Swanepoel say "die geoorloofd- 
heid of ongeoorloofdheid van die toornwekkende daad 
nie ter sake is nie'^. This would appear to reflect 
the sometimes exaggerated aversion of the learned
1 1958 SALJ 246
2 Supra
3 1964 Responsa Merldiana 36
4 1982 (3) SA 772 (A)
5 "It really does not matter whether the act which caused
the anger is wrongful or not"
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authors towards the versari in re illicita doctrine,
an aversion which was not shared by the Roman- Dutch
writers. The over-all picture therefore is that
the objective test of the Transkei Penal Code is 
a hard nut to crack.
Even in Lesotho the i n n  nonce of the Transkei Penal Code
was folt. in that country matters of criminal
law are generally dealt with under common law (Roman-Dutch
law with traces of English common law) but certain
aspects of criminal law are governed by statute,
and provocation is one of them. The position is
governed by the Criminal Law (Homicide amendment)
1
proclamation of 1959. In terms thereof a person
who pleads provocation must do the act which causes
death "in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation
2
...before there is time for his passion to cool". 
This wording is similar to that of section 141 of 
the Transkei Penal Code.
Not surprisingly, therefore, when applying the provisions
of the Proclamation the courts in Lesotho are guided
to adopt the objective test. In R v Thabiso Lefoetso
3
1971 - 73 L.L.R. this test was applied. The accused was 
charged with the murder of a married woman who had 
been his lover. The accused went to meet her at
1 Proclamation 42 of 1959
2 Section 3 (1) (b) of Proclamation 42 of 1959
3 Discussed by Kiwanuka in 1986 Vol 2 Lesotho 
Law Journal p. 61- C.f footnote 5 p.147 infra
_ I4Í>
her home as arranged but she arrived only after he
had had to wait for a long time. He asked her where
she had been and instead of answering properly and 
even apologising she sang a song which means "I get
tired when a man keeps on asking me where I have
been - leave me alone..." He then assauLted her: 
a scuffle followed and he stabbed her in the chest 
and killed her. He pleaded provocation and the court
held that the teasing song was not of sufficiently 
insulting signification to raise the heat of passion 
comtemplated in section 3 (1) of Proclamation 42
of 1959 in the mind of any reasonable person of the
accused's community. (My emphasis). Likewise in 
witchcraft cases the Lesotho courts treat the issue 
of provocation from the point of view of an ordinary
rural t'osotho who believes in and fears the powers
. 1  
of those who practice witchcraft.
It will be observed that the Lesotho proclamation 
was passed just at the time when the sleeping giant 
of South African law was beginning to flex its muscle 
and to liberate Itself from the three quarter - century
grip of the Transkei Penal Code, as shown by the 
Thlbanl and Krull cases which were decided in 1949 
and 1959 respectively. The Lesotho courts respond 
very positively to the judgements of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa, just as do the courts of other
1 See e.g. the judgement of MapetaLa C J in
R v Lebohang Nathane 1974 LLR 64. C.f footnote 5
p. 147 infra
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Roman-Dutch law countries in Southern Africa, and
the Proclamation will therefore in my submission
hinder a smooth transition from the Transkei Penal
Code approach and the objective test to the subjective
1
test in Lesotho. Thus in R v Makhetang Setai Cotran J
found the accused guilty of murder with extenuating
circumstances and made it clear that he was following
the new approach appearing in the South African cases.
He made no reference whatsoever to the Proclamation,
and employed such terms as "the specific intent to
2
kill". And yet in ft v Molomo (2) the learned chief
justice said: "Killing in the heat of passion which
reduces murder to culpable homicide is available
only to a husband finding his wife in flagrante delicto,
not to a lover finding his lover talking to another
man”. Lesotho may therefore be deprived of legal
certainity for a long time to come on this daily-
bread subject. Fortunately, however, the objective
test has begun to be subjected to harsh criïicism
in Lesotho. Kiwanuka in his article entitled "The
3
plea of Provocation in Lesotho" makes a strong plea
for the repeal of the 1959 proclamation as a step
towards the abolition of the objective test so that 
"the judges in this country (may) follow their South
African brethren".
Unlike the Transkei Penal Code and the Lesotho Proclama­
tion, the Sudanese Penal Code prescribes a purely
1 1980 (2) L.L.R. 359
2 1959 L.L.R. 64
3 Lesotho Law Journal Vol.2 1986 p.45
4 See at page 66
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subjective test'’ and seems to leave no room for the
introduction of the criteria of a reasonable man.
It says: "Culpable homicide is not murder if the
offender, whilst deprived of the power of self control
by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death
of the person who gave the provocation, or causes
2
the death of any other person by mistake or accident."
It is thus broad enough to take into account the 
mental and physical characteristics and abnormalities 
of the accused person, and cuts across the traditionalist 
view that the law is not concerned with the idiosyncra­
sies of finicky individuals.
Even the Sudan soon had to learn, however, that the
objective test is not so easily put off. The courts
simply failed to distance themselves from this ubiquitous
test and this kind of statement was soon made: "Where
the accused travelled a mile before he killed, the
provocation would no longer be sudden because there
had been sufficient time and opportunity to a reasonable
man for reason to resume its seat and for the blood
3
to cool." In the result there is a great deal of 
confusion in the Sudan as the courts apply:
1 Introduced by the British administration into different parts of 
the Sudan in 1899, and amended from time to time until 1974 - 
first Arabic edition
2 Section 2491 of the Sudan Penal Code, discussed by Vasdvev in 
The Law of Homicide in the Sudan page 222
3 Sudan Government v Adam El Bushra (1959) A C 151 51, in Vasdev 
op cit 2 1 T
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a) a purely subjective test in terms of the Code
b) the test of a reasonable man
c) the test of a reasonable man of the same locality as
the accused ^
In applying the subjective test the courts have confined
themselves to the question as to whether the fatal
wound sustained by the deceased was caused by the
accused while smarting under a provocation so recent
and so strong that the accused might not be considered
2
at the moment the master of his understanding. The 
test of a reasonable man of the same locality is
applied not only in the Sudan but also elsewhere in Africa. 
It is expressly provided for in the Penal Codes of 
East African countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and
Malawi, which actually define an ordinary man as
"an ordinary person of the community to which the
3
accused belongs". In India the courts say that the
reasonable man is the normal man of the same class 
or community to which the accused belongs*. In the
Sudan Abu Rannat C J said in Sudan Government v El
Baleilla and others (1958! SLJR 12 that Che reasonable 
man referred to in the text books is the man who 
normally leads such a life in the locality and is
of the same standard as others. "The real test is 
whether an ordinary Arab of the standard of the accused
1 See Vasdev op cit 222
2 Vasdev op cit 223
3 Vasdev op cit 229 footnote 21
4 See e.g. Ghulam Mustata Ghano quoCed by Vasdev 
at page 229
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would be provoked or not." This test is entrenched
in India and has been noticed in Australia as well
where, in applying the law to the numerous social
groups and aboriginal tribes rspectively, the law
of provocation has been modified so as to be made
appropriate to the relevant community. To all this
3
Vasdev protests and says the danger is that "you
give each and every locality its own reasonable man 
and the law will become the subject matter of ridicule- 
This protest is relevant to Southern Africa where 
this locality test has also been applied.
Where and when was this famous man born? He seems
to have made his first appearance in England in 1857
in the case of R v Kirkham before which date the
standard was subjective. From there he flew to various 
parts of the world where he made many friends and 
stood his ground against mighty opponents.
There is certainly a difference between the terms
average or ordinary man and reasonable man which
are applied rather liberally to mean the same thing, 
as if they are synonymous. Since this "man" now
seems to be endowed with everlasting life it is better 
at least to endeavour to describe and identify him 
accurately.
1 Ibid
2 Ibid
3 Ibid 231
4 Ibid
5 See e.g. R v Thabiso Lefoetso 1971-73 L.L.R. (Lesotho) 
See p.143 supra
6 Op cit 224
1
In R v McCarthy. Lord Goddard C J said: "No court
has ever given, nor do we think, can ever give a definition
of what constitutes a reasonable or average man.
That must be left to the good sense of the jury."
Ten years later Pearson L J was quite committal
and helpful about the matter and said: "Normally
in legal mythology the reasonable man is an idealised
average man, behaving always as the average man behaves
in his good moment. The average man may have his
bad moments when, for no sufficient reason, he loses
his temper or suffers from panic, or when he becomes
careless or when he is stupid or biased or hasty
in his judgements. The reasonable man, as normally
2
understood, has no such bad moments". A good tempered 
man will hardly ever lose his temper, and a reasonable 
man will not have bad moments, and it is therefore
all the more appropriate for the reasonable man to 
be divorced from the ordinary or average m a n . Consistent 
as it is with the idea of loss of self-control, it 
is plainly preferable to stick to the term ordinary 
for this man of ours and discard reasonable.
If the life of this "man" is not everlasting, then 
it must at least be conceded that he has lived far
longer than many jurists thought he would and his
life span is now a matter of uncertainty. At times
1 (1954) 2 Q B 105 at 112
2 Hardy v Motor Insurers Bureau (1964) 2 QB 745
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there has been rejoicing bordering on celebration
that he was approaching his way out of the legal
world. * At other times there has been an impatient
outcry bordering on protest at his continued and
almost insolent involvement in legal cricles. And
more recently it has been realised that he is still
there and, with apparent despair as to the prospect
of forcing him out of circulation, it has been thought
that he could be persuaded to accept retirement so
that he can rest quietly in the parks of Clapham,
Cape Town and Harare, and near the stock-kraals in
3
Lethabaneng in Lesotho and Xolobe and Tabase in Transkei. 
However the rejoicing was premature, the protests 
were in vain, and the thinking was wishful.
The inevitable conclusion, therefore., is that section 
141 of the Transkei Penal Code is one of the sections 
that demonstrate the influence of the code. That 
influence was felt even in Zimbabwe and Lesotho.
Resistance to the Code's influence was led by de Wet 
and Swanepoel and the courts responded positively 
to the lead taken by the learned authors. However 
the influence of the code could not be completely 
wiped out and this was realised and regretted by 
the more recent writers. It seems to me that one
1 E.g. Dugard: 1966 SALJ 261; Van Niekerk, 1972 SALJ 169;
Van der Merwe; THR - HR 1972; 193
2 E.g Vasdev: The Law of Homicide in the Sudan page 231
3 Kiwanuka: The Plea of Provocation in Lesotho:
Lesotho Law Journal Vol. 2 1986 45 at 66
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of the main reasons Eor the staying power of the 
Code in this ragard is that the objective test which 
the Code upholds dates back from earlier times and 
is well established not only in Africa but in other 
parts of the world. Looking back at Transkei it 
is significant that the 1983 Penal Code Act omits 
the cumbersome provisions of the original legislation, 
and in its brief definition of homicide in section 
85 it no longer deals with provocation as such.
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CHAPTF.R 6
PARTICIPATION AND ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT
6.1.1 The Impact of Section 78
The doctrine of common purpose is of English case 
law origin. Its earliest appearance is traceable
to the case of Macklin, Murphy and others (1839)
2 Lewin 225 16 ER 1136 where Alderson B stated:
"It is a principle of law, that if several persons
act together in pursuance of a common intent, every 
act done in furtherance of such intent by each of
them is, in law, done by all."
When common purpose is lacking, the conduct of each 
participant is then judged separately in order to 
determine his criminal liability.
1
According to Rabie the common purpose principle was
introduced to South Africa via the Transkei Penal
, 2 
Code's section 78. This provision is in line with
the old doctrine that a person is presumed to know
the reasonable and probable consequences of his act.
For some unknown reason the Code would appear to
3
overstress the common purpose principle. It implicitly 
embodies the well known rule of criminal law: qui
facit per alium facit per se. In 1917 the doctrine 
of common purpose made a strange appearance in a
1 1971 SALJ 227 at 229
2 See Appendix A
3 See section 5 (e), appendix A
J.
civil case. This action was brought by the plaintiff,
a Earmer in the Orange Free State, to recover certain
stock taken and damages Eor injury done to his farm
by the defendant (also a farmer) while in rebellion
in concert with others, against the King and Government
of the Union. It was held that the mere £act oE
being in rebellion did not render defendant liable
Eor the acts oE every other rebel unless he had instigated
or authorised those acts. In a dissenting judgement
Maasdorp JA said that "they are all liable for such
acts of any of their associates as fell within the
2
scope of the objects of the rebellion."
An instance of the early application o£ the Transkeian
3
Penal Code is R v Taylor and Others. In that case 
200 students of the Lovedale Missionary Institution 
resolved to "strike" because of the substitution
oE bread with mealie meal in it Eor wheaten bread. 
Some then smashed windows, wrecked the power station 
and the dining hall and the bookstall. They also 
armed themselves with sticks and some threw stones 
at and injured the principal Dr MacVicar and others.
Others went to the grain store and set it on Eire 
and burnt it. After these events all the various 
groups assembled at the "Black hill" and spent the 
night there.
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1 McKenzie v van der Merwe 1917 AD 41
2 At page 65
' 3 1920 EDL 318
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AC the trial that followed, the students were charged 
with public violence, malicious injury to property, 
arson and assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm. Hutton J said: ^
i r
Then it is argued that the accused have not 
all been satisfactorily identified as having 
taken part in the rioting.
In considering this point it must of course 
be borne in mind that it is not necessary
for the Crown to prove that each one of the
accused had committed some overt act consti­
tuting the offence. For in the circumstances 
of the present case the Crown is entitled to 
rely on the doctrine of common purpose, the 
common law definition of which has never been 
more clearly stated than in Sec. 78 of Act 
24 of 1886 (the Transkeian Penal Code), in 
the following terms...."
The stage was thus set for a full-scale application of the
doctrine of common purpose outside the area of applicability
of the Transkei Penal Code. The first such case
2
was R ,v Garnsworthy and Others. Dove Wilson J P 
declared.:
1 At page 323
2 192 3 WLD 17
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"now the law upon this matter is quite clear 
Where two or more persons combine in an under­
taking for an illegal purpose, each one 
of them is liable for anything done by the 
other or others..."
However, the learned judge did not refer to any authority 
in support of the statement that the law is "quite 
clear" on the point. The doctrine of common purpose 
was thereafter applied in several cases in murder
trials where it was not possible to determine who
1
dealt the lethal blow.
The courts however, went further - quite strangely
in my view - and applied the doctrine even to persons
who did not deliver the lethal blow, despite it being
established who in fact delivered such blow. Thus
2
in R v Nsele two men, the appellant and a companion,
entered a fruit store in Chaka's Kraal, Natal, with
a fixed determination to steal money, the appellant's
companion being armed with a pistol. It was established
that the companion shot the store-owner and the point
at issue was whether the appellant was also guilty
of murder. The appeal was dismissed by the Appellate
Division which confirmed the conviction of murder
in terms of the doctrine of common purpose.
1 E.g. R v Morela 1947 (3) SA 147 (A), R v Sikepe & Others 1946 AD 
745, R v Ndhaiangisa and Ano 1946 AD 1101, R v Ncube & Koza 1950 
(2) PH H 211 (A), R v Matsitwane & Ano 1942 AD 213, S v Nkomo & Ano
1966 (1) SA 831 (A), R v Kubuse & Others 1945 AD 189, GaiUard ancT 
Andere v S 1966 (1) P^TH /4 ÍA), S~v Dambalaza and Others 1964 (zi
SA 783(A); r v Ngcobo 1928 AD 732
2 1955 (2) SA 145 (A)
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Schreiner JA criticised R_ v Garnesworthy and__Others
for its emphasis on "knew or ought to have known" 
and "naturally or ought naturally Co know would be
the obvious and probaDle result of what they were
doing" and relied on the fact that the appellant 
plainly knew that his companion had a revolver.
Reterring to R v Garnswo r thy & Others. R_______y_Diima and
Another, R_ v _Ndlen?isa_ and AnoCher and R_ v Longone , 
Van der Htrever Jn laid dvwn the true basis of Cue
guile of a socius criminis as being his own mens 
are a , not mere vicarious liability, "stupidity, lack
of foresight, negligence - which may consist in non 
intellegere quod omnes intellegent - cannot in my 
minde be a substitute for the Intent, actual or constru­
ctive, which, is requisite Co support a charge of 
murder."
1
Likewise in R v Du Randt and__Another the appellant,
previously convicted by Van Blerk J in Bethlehem, 
Orange Free State, knew that his companion had an
open knife in his hand and "mu=t have realised" that 
the safety of both of them depended on their success 
in overpowering thP deceased. When hi- was examined 
by the District Surgeon three days laCer, bruises 
wero found on him which "were consistenC with his
having taken part in the struggle". His explanation 
of the bruises w=is disbelieved by the trial court.
1954 (1) SA 313 (A)
-  159 -
In Transkei itsetf the doctrine received consideration
by O ’Hagan J at the Kokstad Circuit Local Division
in a case that emanated from the Bizana District?
where the learned judge said that i.£ as the result
of an assault committed by one participant in a fight
a man is killed, not only is that participant guilty
of culpable homicide but all his co-fighters are
equally guilty with him. The court looked at "certain
cases which bear upon this question" and one such
2
case was R v Ceere and others. There Schreiner
JA accepted the doctrine of common purpose as being
fully applicable in South African Law. He argued
that the use of the word "purpose" in the expression
"common purpose" should not suggesl, that, for common
purpose to apply, the death of the deceased must
have been the result aimed at. In line with section
78 of the Transkei Code he went on: "So, in the
case of culpable homicide, it is enough to make alL
responsible for the death, that there was a common
purpose to do the unlawful act or acts which cause
the death, without the elements of contemplation
of the death and recklessness which would make them
' 3
guilty of murder" This case is significant for having
embraced the doctine versanti in re llllclta omnia
imputantur quae ex delicto sequuntur. This line
4
of reasoning was adopted in several other cases.
1 S v  Mnguni 1963 (3) S A 268 (E)
2 T O r r r r s  a  319 a
3 At page 323
4 E.g. R v Essop Mohamed & Others 1940 (1) PH H23 (U), R v
Shezi T94« T2J BA" 119 IAJ, Tessncr v S 1962 (2) PH II "255
(AS, S v MalinojS & Others 196 J (l)sA(i>J2(M S v Hi-utibui-y & Auoi.ln-r
1967 (1 ) SA 387^A), fry tfltliams en 'n ander 1970T2J bA bi4 OT
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Regarding the element of intent in the application 
of the doctrine of common purpose to murder it
would appear that originally this element was obscured by
a partially objective formulation which was clumsy
and unscientific. Such formulation is implicit
in section 78 of the Transkei Penal code and is to
be found in R v Garnsworthy:
" If what was done was what they knew or
ought to have know would be a probable
result of their endeavouring to achieve
2
their object.”
This formulation was applied in many cases but was
3
eventually rejected by the Appellate Division. Apparently
the Roman and Roman-Dutch law regarded intention
as a subjective concept, and the objective intention
was adopted by the courts when they accepted the
English law presumption, conspicuous as it is in
the Transkei Penal Code of 1886, that a man intends
A
the reasonable and probable consequences of his act.
In several cases the formulation of intent was thus 
taken directly from the doctrine of common purpose
as formulated in section 78 of the Transkei Penal
1 See Rabie: 1971 SALJ 227 at 223
2 Supra (at p . 19)
3 Burchell and Hunt: South Africa Criminal and Procedure, Vol, Í
p.120 Juta 1970. The learned authors cite R v Longone 1938 AD 532 
R v Duna 1945 AD and R v Shezi 1948 (2) SA "liy (A) as being the 
pre-1950 cases in which the objective approach was adopted, and 
R v Mkize 1951 (3) SA 28 (A), R v Huebsch 1953 (2) S A 561 (A).
K v du Randt 1954 (1) SA 313 (A), K v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 826 (A), 
as representing the swing towards the subjective test, culminating 
in its adoption in R v Nsele 1955 (2) SA 145 (A).
4 See Burchell and Hunt: ibid, footnote 36
Code. The result was that the culpability of participants
in terms of the doctrine of common purpose turned
out to depend on "Whether the result produced by
the perpetrator of the act falls within the mandate
and is not concerned with the means by which the
2 3
result is produced." In R v Bergstedt Schreiner AJC
insisted that the knowledge of the presence of a
firearm was of decisive importance in determining
whether the result, the killing of a. human being, fell
within the mandate of the participants. An even
more graphic illustration of the formulation of intent
as taken directly from section 78 of the Transkei
4
Penal Code is R v Longone. In that case the appellant, 
an adult male, provided one Chikokonya with poison
to enable him to poison his own wife. Instead of
Chikokonya's wife, the poison was taken by Makachi 
who then died. Longone was found guilty of murder
by the trial court. However the Appellate Division 
upheld Longone's appeal on the ground that he had 
no intent in regard to Makachi's death. Watermeyer CJ 
said that the action which resulted in Makachi's 
death was not assented to or authorised by the appellant, 
the true test for whose liability was not a possibility 
but reasonable probability which should have been
foreseen.
1 Rabie: ibid 234
2 R v Shezi & Others 1948 (2) SA 119 (A) at 128
3 1955 (4) SA 186 (A)
4 1938 AD 532
_  lól _
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6.1.2 Partial Departure from the Doctrine of Common Purpose
A swing away from the doctrine of common purpose
became noticeable in S v Nkombani and Another.
2
Six years later in S v Thomo and Others matters 
seemed to improve even more. Wessels JA said: 
"if an accused person, intending to kill the deceased, 
stabbed him, thereby inflicting injuries which,
together with mortal injuries already inflicted 
by some other person, cause death he is guilty 
of murder by virtue of his own acts and state of 
min d■"
3
The learned judge expressly refused to endorse 
Schreiner JA's theory of ratification. The state 
had failed to prove the necessary causal nexus 
between the acts of accused No.4 and the death,
and the accused was consequently only found guilty 
of attempted murder. It is clear that the court 
was not enthusiastic about the doctrine of common 
purpose and it would have been interesting had
the learned judge cared to say more about it.
4
Shortly thereafter there came S v Madlala . Holmes JA 
said that an accused may be convicted of murder 
if the killing was unlawful and there was proof 
inter alia, that he was a party to a common purpose
1 1963 (4) SA 877 (A)
2 1969 tl) SA 385 A
3 At page 400
4 1969 (2) SA 637 (A)
to commit some other crime, and he foresaw the
possibility of one or both of them causing death
to someone in the execution of the plan, yet he
persisted, reckless of such fatal consequence,
and it occurred. This formulation was welcomed
1
by Hugo as showing increasing recognition and correct
enunciation of the previously much maligned form
1
mens rea known as dolus eventualis. The learned 
author went on and hailed both the Thomo and Madlala 
decisions as having "gone a long way in curing a
position in our criminal law which has for many
years suffered from an overdose of sophistic reasoning 
and severely twisted principles... regardless of 
the fact that the doctrine of common purpose still 
looms large in the back-ground, the Appellate Division 
has in these two decisions gone a long way towards 
restoring 'causation ’ in murder to its rightful
3
place." S v Maxaba en Andere is also very Important 
for its clear departure from the doctrine of common 
purpose. There it was held that mere presence 
at or acquiescence in the commission of an offence 
is not sufficient.
If A is a party to a common purpose to rob, knows 
that his companion Is armed with a firearm, shows 
no surprise or shock or any other emotion when
1 1969 S A U  391 at 396
2 Contra R v Ceere and Others 1952 (2) SA 319 (A) where, instead
the doctrine versanti in re llllclta onula lrautantur quae ex 
delicto sequuntur was applied ~
- K>3 -
3 1981 (1) SA 1148 (A)
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deceased is shot, cuts the telephone wires, takes 
money from the till and later on shares in the 
proceeds of the robbery, is he guilty of murder
without extenuating circumstances? In the more 
recent case of S v Guroede 1983 ( 3) SA 803 (TKEI
AD) the Transkei Appellate Division, per van Coller AJA,
held accordingly. But in S v Slhlahla and Others^
popularly known as "the Scriven case" the Transkei
Appellate Division took a somewhat different and
more encouraging approach. The deceased (Scriven) 
had married across the colour line and lived with
his wife - appellant n o . 3, at Butterworth. Then 
Elizabeth Scriven was charged, together with Sihlahla 
and Mankyayi, for conspiring, from 11th to 19th
April 1986, to murder her husband and secondly 
with the murder itself. It was alleged that first 
appellant had a love affair with Elizabeth,and
had slept with her in the Scriven house when Scriven 
was absent. It was further alleged by the first 
appellant himself that he had come with second
appellant to kill Scriven with the full knowledge
of and after concerted preparations with Elizabeth,
One Anna gave evidence of having been a go-between 
in the procuring of poison to kill Scriven. . On 
the night of the murder Elizabeth's own conduct 
was very strange and unsatisfactory as disclosed
by her own evidence. She was present in the house
1 Case No. 37 of 1986 TKEI AD (unreported)
when the murder Cook place but did not cause "havoc" 
of any kind. After the murder she told neighbours 
that she did not know the murderers of her husband 
at all and yet in truth, it turned out, she knew 
them very well. She told the same lie to the Police. 
She claimed that she had told these lies because 
she had been threatened with being killed if she 
had revealed the identity of the murderers. Inciden­
tally she had also switched off the lights shortly
after the murderer had directed it and had no satisfac-
1
tory explanation for this act.
All this notwithstanding, the Court stated that 
the case of murder against third appellant had 
been established "upon a balance of probabilities 
only, and not beyond reasonable doubt" - more 
particularly because first appellant and two female 
witnesses, Ann and Julia, were found to have exaggerate^ 
or "lied in their attempts to implicate third appellant^ 
(i.e. Elizabeth). The fact that she had falsely 
told the Police that first and second appellants 
were both masked to such an extent that she could 
not indicate whether they were black, white or 
coloured did not matter so much -
"it may well be that when it (the murder) 
happened, it was not at variance with her 
wishes and that she was content to be a 
passive bystander."
- tí.s -
1 This fact is on the record though it does not appear 
in the judgment
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The court then referred to S v Maxaba and Others 1981 (1) 
SA 1148 AD at 1157C about "mere knowledge" and 
"mere presence".^ The convictions of first and 
third appellants for conspiracy were set aside, 
first and second appellants had their death sentences 
for murder confirmed but the appeal of third appellant 
against conviction and setence to death on the 
murder charge was allowed. She was found guilty 
of being merely an accessory after the fact to 
the murder of Scriven and was sentenced to only
3 years imprisonment.
It is thus evident that the doctrine of common 
purpose is no holy cow and the courts both in South 
Africa and Transkei can easily abandon it once 
and for all. Regrettably however they soon returned 
to it rather than abandon it.
1 See page :160 above
107
However, the South African courts clearly found 
it difficult to wean themselves for all time from 
the umbrella of the Transkei Penal Code and the 
doctrine appears to have come back in full force 
in S v Khoza ■ 1 This was an appeal from a conviction 
of murder in the Circuit Local Division where it 
appeared that the appellant, the deceased and two 
co-accused had, after a drinking party at which 
they had consumed liquor, Left in the deceased's 
car for the homestead of one of the co-accused (who 
had been acquitted by the trial court). While 
the deceased had been repairing the car, which 
had broken down en route, he was attacked by the 
other co-accused and stabbed twice. The appellant 
then struck the deceased twice with a cane and 
thereafter the co-accused again assaulted the deceased. 
The corpse of the deceased was then put in the
car by the other co-accused who set the car alight 
with the result that the body of the deceased was
incinerated. The Court, in considering the appeal, 
determined the liability of the appellant on the
basis that the other co-accused might, as a reasonable 
possibility, have fatally injured the deceased 
with a cane and that there was no proof of what 
effect the two blows with the cane had had on the
deceased.
6.1.3 The Return to the Doctrine of Common Purpose
1 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A)
An outstanding feature of this case is the very 
great difference of opinion between the judges 
of appeal regarding the role of accused no.A. 
Some confirmed the conviction of murder, others 
said it was a case of attempted murder while others 
saw it as a case of assault common. The whole 
conflict centred around the applicability of the
doctrine of common purpose.
Botha AJA supported the conviction of murder purely
on the basis of the doctrine of common purposed
2
The view of Corbett JA was similar to that of Botha
AJA but differed only in degree in that he considered
the case to be one of attempted murder. He reasoned
that the appellant had joined the attack with the
intention of associating himself therewith and
of assisting accused No. 2 "to some extent". The
sentence proposed by him was four years imprisonment
as against the nine years imposed by the trial
court and confirmed by Botha AJA. The view that
the correct verdict was one of assault common for
which a sentence of only four months imprisonment
3
should be imposed was taken by Holmes AJA and fortuna­
tely for the appellant, that view received the
b
support of Hoexter AJA who dismissed the "common 
purpose" idea and drew attention to the drunken 
state of appellant and deceased. Taking everything 
into consideration it can be concluded that this 
case halted the march of the courts away from
the doctrine' of common purpose._____Then came the
1 See at page 10A7 ff 3 At page 1040 ff.
2 At page 1026 ff. 4 At page 1044 ff.
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case of the famous 'Sharpville S i x ' . In this case 
the Appellate Division in South Africa resurrected 
the common purpose doctrine in unequivocal terms, 
thereby proving once again the resilience of section 
78 of the Transkei Penal Code.
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1
1 S v Safatsa & Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A)
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6.1.4 Objections to the Doctrine of Common Purpose
When crimes have been committed in circumstances which 
make it possible to invoke the doctrine of common
purpose it seems that it can quite often be an 
easy matter to identify roles in group offences 
and the law should insist on such identification. 
This is said against the background of a case decided 
in May 1984* which case illustrates more graphically 
the extent to which the application of the doctrine 
can be stretched, with results which in my submission 
are unsatisfactory. The trial court on convicting 
the accused of murder said:
"...it is quite clear that the deceased
was attacked seriously with extremely danger­
ous weapons in the nature of axes or bush 
knives or something of that nature, and even 
if you yourself did not possess such a weapon 
at an earlier stage, there is the chance that 
you obtained such a weapon, and even if you 
did not, you took part in the assault at a time 
when you must have appreciated how seriously 
the deceased was being assaulted by others".
(my emphasis)
To this finding of the Trial Court the argument 
was raised on appeal that at most, the finding
of the Court amounted to this, that the appellant
was "somehow involved" in the killing of the deceased
1 S v Mkhuzeni N t o z l m b i , Transkei AD, 8 May 1984,
Case No.172/82 unreported
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but had no evidence of:
(a) the actual nature of his involvement in the
commission of the offence;
(b) the weapon used by him;
(c) the brutality of his attack and the fatalityof
any blows he may have inflicted;
(d) his persistence in going ahead with the
killing at a time when, perhaps, other members 
of the party had desisted.
The Appellate Division (Transkei) arrived at the 
following conclusion:
"The Appellant did insist that deceased should 
come out but did not threaten him and in fact, 
whether honestly or not, assured him that he would 
not be harmed. There is no evidence whether the 
appellant actively participated in removing the 
deceased from the hut and in assaulting him or 
to what extent or at which stage. On the evidence 
it cannot be rejected that some of his companions
could have been mainly or entirely responsible 
for inflicting injuries which caused his death. 
Several offences were being committed simultaneously 
inside and outside the hut and it cannot be said 
who was participating at any one time in respect 
of any particular offence. Appellant's conviction 
is based on the doctrine of common purpose because
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he was Che firsC to ask Che deceased Co come oucside,
directed aCtention to him when he knew that violence
prevailed, shots were being fired and tempers were
inflamed. He must have appreciated the danger in which
his attitude was placing the deceased. Moreover the
appellant and his companions acted jointly and supported
" 1
and assisted each other in the acts of lawlessness.
The courts in South Africa have attempted to trace the
2 3
doctrine of common purpose to Roman Dutch law. Rabie
however discourages these attempts and argues that
although the statements by the old authors display
a similarity with the principle of common purpose,
the importanC difference is that according to Roman
Dutch Law the acCions of the participants are not imputed
to one another. Furthermore, he strongly objects to
the continued application of the doctrine of common
purpose on the ground that "the participants cannot
be regarded as co-perpetrators (mededaders) where they
do not fulfil all the requirements of the definition
4
of the crime.
He further objects to it on the ground ChaC ic is based 
on Che principle of impuCability, and in order to do
this the English Law appeals to the mandate basis: that the participants
1 The sentence of the Trial Court was reduced from 25 years 
to 15 years - equal to the sentences of co-accused who had 
made confessions and had thus been readily convicted of 
attempted murder
2 See e.g. R v Duma Another. 1945 AD 410
3 See page 417
4 Ibid
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have given each other a mandate in regard to the killing. 
Of course an actual mandate can never be proved
and the courts, as in McKenzie v Van der Herwe
2
and R v Duma and Another make the best of a bad 
job and say that such mandate is implied. Finally, 
Rabie objects on the ground that although the partici­
pants have a common purpose only in regard to the 
commission of crime X, they are held liable on 
the basis of this common purpose for crime Y, the 
commission of which was only foreseen as a possibility. 
Thus in most cases the common purpose is theft 
but each one is guilty of murder if the victim 
dies at the hand of the one who does the shooting.
The doctrine of common purpose is also severely
3
criticised by de Wet and Swanepoei. It is likewise 
L.
criticised by Snyman. He regards it as being unaccepta­
ble because it is irreconcilable with the general 
principles of criminal law and unnecessary because 
the liability of different persons can be determined 
by applying the accepted general principles.
Furthermore, the emphasis on the common purpose 
led to a disregard or considerable watering down 
of the requirement of causation in murder. The 
learned author decries the application of the doctrine 
to the crime of culpable homicide in which the 
mens rea required is negligence and not intention,
1 1917 AD 41
2 1945 AD 410
3 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg 4 ed (1985 ) ppl92 ff
4 Criminal Law pp 212 - 213. Butterworths 1983
stating that this is possible only by having recourse
1
to the versari doctrine. He argues, quite rightly
in my view, that even if the doctrine of common
purpose is applied, it can never be applicable 
to crimes of negligence such as culpable homicide, 
for the reason that it is impossible to intend
to be negligent." In this connection the learned
?. 3
author recalls S v Thenkwa’ and S v Coetzee. There
it was held that if a number of persons are together
charged with culpable homicide it must be determined
whether each one's conduct, considered individually,
stands in a casual relationship to the death, and
whether each one, considered individually, was
negligent in respect of the death.
To sum up, it must be accepted that section 78 
of the Penal Code exerted a great deal of influence 
on South African law. That the doctrine of common 
purpose is not universally accepted appears from 
the partial departure from it by the courts as 
well as the strong objections raised against it
by several writers. However the indications are 
that the doctrine will retain its influence for
a long time to come inspite of all protestations/
The 1983 Penal Code of Transkei has, through its
section 27 already taken the lead in entrenching 
the doctrine of common purpose. That section takes 
over verbatim the provisions of section 78 of the 
1886 Code.
1 At 215
2 1970 (3 ) SA 529 (A)
3 1974 (3) SA 571 (T)
4 Se e Sv Safabsa and Others 1988 (l) SA 86 (A). See 6.1.3 Supra.
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This subject is dealt with in Section 81 of the Transkei Penal Code
The term "accessory after the fact" is of English
2
Law origin and is unknown to Roman - Dutch Law.
In this respect the Transkei Penal Code once more
played its role as a gateway for the reception
of English Law into South African Law. Thus Gardiner
3  
& Lansdown make the point that the term has been
adopted in South African practice and motivate
by reference, first among others, to section 8 1
of the Transkei Penal Code. The English law definition
oE this crime is similar to the first part of the
Transkei Penal Code except that it has "maintains"
4
in addition to "receives, comforts or assists".
The question that arises is : what is the nature
and extent of the reception of this term in South
African Law? The Appellate Division has for a
long time refrained from stating exactly what constitutes
an accessory after the fact in South African Law.
5
In H v von 51 ling Watermeyer CJ conceded as much and 
said that apart from the old English common law 
idea expressed in section 81 of the Transkei Penal
Code, he had not found any other South African
definition of the term, and he did not hesitate
to adopt the definition.
1 See Appendix A
2 Gardiner & Lansdown Vol.I 6 ed 153;
Burchell & Hunt vol. 1 2ed 439
3 Op cit, ibid.
4 Ibid
5 1945 AD 234
6• 2 Accessories After The Fact
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A leading case in which Che wider definition of 
the term came up for close scrunity is Nkau Majara 
v The Queen 1954 AC 235 PC. This was an appeal 
from the High court of Basutoland (as it then was)
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
The Privy Council had to apply Roman-Dutch Law 
because Lesotho was a Roman- Dutch Law country. 
It ruled that although under English law a necessary 
element of the offence is assistance Co Che principal 
offender by a physical act and not merely by omitting 
to do something, the term does not bear the same 
meaning in South Africa. There it is sufficient 
to establish that the assistance was given to the 
principal offender in circumstances in which it 
would appear that the giver "associated" himself 
in the broad sense of the word with the offence
committed. This then is the wider definition of 
the term. In this case of Nkau Majara, a headman
who was under a legal duty to effect an arrest
had refrained from arresting murderers on his arrival 
at the scene of a ritual murder. He subsequently 
failed to report the murder and to give prompt 
assistance to the police, and he also gave the 
murderers an opportunity to escape from justice. 
By these omissions he had plainly associated himself 
with the murder. The view of the Privy Council
in this regard was echoed by Gardiner & Lansdown^.
1 Vol 1 6 ed 154
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Our courts hastened to associate themseves with
the dictum in Nkau Majara. In Munango's case the
appellant, a clerk in the Government service, had
remained passive and had failed to report money
shortages which he had noticed when he took over
control from a colleague who had gone away on leave.
Burchell & Hunt have no quarrel with this line
of reasoning and cite quite a few cases to support
2
it. Prominent among these is R v Jonganl 1937 
AD where it was regarded as sufficient for a conviction 
as an accessory after the fact to murder when the 
accused expressed approval after being told that 
a cyclist had been stabbed and took possession 
of the deceased's personal belongings. This whole 
approach is of course contrary to the spirit of 
section 81 of the Transkei Penal Code which requires 
assistance of an offender in order to enable him 
to escape and is therefore a narrower definition 
of the term.
This narrower definition likewise gained a great 
deal of support in South African legal circles 
and thus showed again the enduring influence of 
the Transkei Penal Code. In R v Mlooi & Others 
the Appellate Division did not pay any heed to 
the wider definition, and laid emphasis on the 
requirement of assisting an offender in order that
1 See e.g. R v Munango 1956 (1) SA 438 (SWA)
2 Op cit 441
3 1925 AD 131
he may escape from justice. The same emphasis
2
was also laid in several other cases. More recently
this line of approach has been reiterated by the
3
Appellate Division in S v Khoza.
4
Among the authorities Snyman strongly supports
the narrower definition. The learned author criticises
the decision in R v Jongani as being incorrect,
giving as it does too wide an interpretation
to the concept of accessory after the fact. Legal
uncertainty on this question remains a reality
and in some instances the Appellate Division has
actually declined to say whether it gives preference
to the wider or to the narrower definition. For
5
in R v Von Elling Watermeyer CJ said: "... it
is unnecessary for me to decide whether the term
accessory after the fact, when used in our criminal 
law, bears the meaning given to it in the Native
Territories Penal Code or a wider meaning...."
The indications are that for a long time to come
some judges will adhere to the wider meaning while
others will prefer the narrower meaning. For
despite Snyman's view that the narrower definition
reflects the preponderant judicial opinion, the
6
more recent case of S v Velumurugen suggests at
1 See at page 142
2 E.g. R v Maserow 1942 AD 164 at 173; R v Van 
Rensburg 1943 TPD 436 at 441
3 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A)
4 Criminal Law p.221
5 1945 AD 234
6 1985 (2) SA 437 D & CLD
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1
least that the wider definition still enjoys a 
great deal of respect. In that case the court 
referred to Nkau Majara with approvaL.
There is nothing in section 81 which says that
the person assisted should be the actual perpertrator
and indeed he could be another accomplice. The 
r 2
case of R v Ganl therefore merits consideration. 
It was held that although, on a charge of murder, 
it may not be known which one or more of the accused 
committed the murder, each one of them, if he co-opera­
ted with the others in desposing of the body knowing 
that the deceased had been murdered, can be found 
guilty of being an accessory after the fact. This 
underlines the fact that the crime of being an 
accessory after the fact is distinct from the principal 
crime and not part of it. One who murders another 
is not therefore an accessory after the fact if 
he himself hides the body. In the result there 
is in all indictments for murder an implied alternative 
charge of being an accessory after the fact to 
the main charge, and an accused can thus not rightly 
be acquitted of both charges merely because it
is riot clear which of the two crimes he actually
3
commited. It is all very well if emphasis is laid 
on the aspect of an implied alternative charge,
- 179 -
1 Supra
2 1957 (2) SA 212 (A)
3 See especially at page 220
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and it is submitted that this aspect does not in 
any way conflict with section 81.
1
The problem with the Gani case is that the three
accused were tried and acquitted of the murder,
and there remained no actual perpetrator. To whose
murder could anyone of them then be found guilty
as an accessory after the fact? That notwithstanding,
the crown successfully appealed on a question of
law reserved, and it was ordered that the accused
be charged for the crime of being accessories after
the fact. This was the unanimous verdict oE SchreinerJA,
Fagan C J , and Beyers and van Blerk JJA. The judgement
2
has been the subject of much criticism. Thus Burchell
highlights the fact that there was no actual perpetrntof
to whose murder any of the three accused could
be found guilty as an accessory after the fact.
It is indeed absurd and contrary to the tenor of
section 81 that there should be laid a charge of
being an accessory after the fact out and out without
an indictment charging the principal crime. That
is contradictory to the rule that there Is an implied
alternative charge of being an accessory after
the fact. This rule came out clearly in S v Khoza
1982 (3) SA 1019 at 1040. In the former situation
3
a plea of autrefois acquit will be deEeated. The
1 Supra
2 (1971) 8 8 SALJ 292
3 See Burchell & Hunt op cit 441 footnote 263
181
Gani decision was further criticised by Lewis JA in 
the Zimbabwe case of S v Rossi-Conti. The reasoning 
of Schreiner JA was described as losing sight of the 
fact that there is a presumption of innocence in criminal 
law. There is merit in this critisism, but the alternative 
that faced the Appellate Division was that all three 
accused would escape criminal liability altogether 
and that did not accord with the court's sense of justice 
as it had been proved beyond doubt that the murder 
had been committed by one or other of the three accused.
That the Appellate Division should have departed from 
general principles in order to solve a legal problem 
is an alarming novelty.
4
Snyman has raised the question as to whether it is 
really necessary to have the crime of being an accessory 
after the fact in South African law. The learned author 
points out that once the narrower definition of this 
crime is accepted, it is completely overlapped by the 
crime of defeating or obstructing the course of justice. 
It may take a long time before this view point becomes 
law, if ever.
It has thus been demonstrated that South African 
legal thinking remains strongly divided on whether
1 1971 (2) SA 62 (RAD)
2 At page 65
3 See Burchell (supra) at page 294
4 Criminal Law page 224
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Co follow Che wider or narrower definiCiCon of
Che Cerm "accossories afCer Che face". The adherenCs 
of Che narrower definiCion CesCify Co Che strong
influence of the Transkei Penal Code on South African 
law.
To the important point raised by Snyman in the
previous paragraph the 1983 Transkei Penal Code 
has already responded positively. It has gone 
a step further than the narrow definition and has 
inserted the concept of defeating the ends of justice 
into it. 1 In this regard the Transkei Penal code 
has once more taken a lead and demonstrated clarity 
and certainty where the jurisprudence of South 
Africa is In the midst of controversy. In this 
field the continued influence of even the new Transkei 
Penal Code on South African Law now appears to 
be guaranteed.
1 See S e c tion 42 of Act No 9 of 1983-
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE INCHOATE CRIMES
ATTEMPT
There are certain basic problems In relation to
attempt. Prominent among them are the difficulties
in determining whether an objective or a subjective
approach should be followed in determining where
preparation ends and consumation begins. This
problem exists in several legal systems and the
jurisprudence of South Africa is no exception.
The crucial question is the relevance of section
83 of the Transkei Penal Code of 1886 to South
1
African Law in the field of attempt. That section 
defines attempt. It is couched in very wide terms 
and it raises the important question of criminal 
liability for attempting to commit a crime which 
is physically incapable of commission.
The question came several times before the courts
in South Africa and the earlier decisions thereof
were not at all harmonious. The objective approach
was adopted and the courts applied the test of
absolute or relative impossibility. In some cases
the accused persons were found not guilty of the
2
attempt because of the impossibility. In other cases
3
the accused were found guilty despite the impossibility.
1 See appendix A
2 R v Maarntan (1886) 5 EEC where Che cash box broken into was 
empty: K v Seane & Another 1924 TPD 668 where the gold which 
the accused tried Co sell was brass.
3 R v Freestone 1913 TPD 758 where the complainant was in fact not
pregnant: R~v Parker & Allen 1917 AD 552 where the diamonds
sought to be sold were in tact pieces of glass.
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The courts reasoned that if the crime attempted
was absolutely impossible of commission guilt could
not follow, but if it was only relatively impossible
an accused person could still be found guilty of
1
an attempt to commit it. It is self-evident that 
the adoption of the objective approach led to difficul­
ties and was largely, if not wholly, responsible 
for the lack of harmony in the decisions of the
South African courts.
In the midst of this state of uncertainty the Transkei
Penal Code constantly offered itself as a ready
and clear-cut measure which could make the task
of the judge much easier than it was. Of the
cases mentioned above, R v Seane is a leading example
of this. In that case Curlewis jp had this to
2
say: "But after all, however, reprehensible or
immoral the act may be the Courts have only 
to deal with the question whether the act
with which an accused is charged is a crime 
or not. If there is no other provision in
our law under which the accused can be dealt
with, then of course it may be necessary for
the legislature to introduce some provision 
resembling section 83 of the Transkei Penal 
Code - i.e. the law as laid down in the Cape 
Act No.24 of 1886."
1 See discussion by Burchell & Hunt; South African Crim-inai 
Law and Procedure vol. 1 page 461
2 At page 683
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Thus Che South African Court is heard to lament 
the EacC that the Code cannot be applied as such 
in South Africa.
The objective test continued to be employed Cor
the next thirty years after Seane's case and as
a result the state of uncertainty continued. It
1
was in R v Davies that the Appellate Division resolved 
the impasse and ruled that an accused can be found
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime which is 
physically incapable of commission, as long as 
he is not labouring under the mistaken belief - 
the mistake of law that what he thought was a crime 
was not in fact a crime, for example an attempt 
to commit adultery thinking it is a crime when 
in fact it is not. In so doing Schreiner JA did 
three significant things:
(a) tie impliedly found fault with the TPD in Sea n e ' s
case for saying that what it did about the 
Transkei Penal code instead of quietly applying 
it and he overruled the case.
(b) He applied section 83 of the Code without 
saying so in so may words.
(c ) He rejected the objective approach with its 
test of absolute and relative impossibility.
1 1956 (3) SA 52 (A)
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In a concurring judgement Reynolds JA reiterated the
view that Seane's case had been wrongly decided. He
said nothing about the relevance or otherwise of the
Transkei Penal code and thus, by implication, accepted
that it was a correct reflection of South African law
on the point. This decision thereafter reflected the
1
South African law and was appLied in S v W. In that 
case the question was whether a person who had inter­
course with a dead female while under the delusion that 
she was alive, under circumstances which would otherwise
have amounted to rape, was guiltv of attempted rape.
2 '
Jansen JA following the Davies case found that the question
fell to be answered in the affirmative. In the
3
later case of S v Palmos the Court departed from the
4
line taken in Davies and W and thus from the Penal
Code line and opted for the objective approach taken
5
in R v Seane and Another. Gardiner and Lansdown after
discussing the controversy between the subjective and
the objective approach are not reticent about their
appreciation of the significance of the Transkei Penal
Code and its contribution to legal certainty. They state
that in the Transkeian Territories the question is
settled (ray emphasis) by section 83 of the act 2h of
6
1886 and proceed to quote the section in full.
1 1976 (1) SA 1 (A)
2 Supra
3 1979 (2) SA 82 (A)
4 Supra
5 Supra
6 6 ed vol 1 p.140
Section 82 of the Transkei Penal Code describes
an attempt to commit an offence as an act done
or omitted with intent to commit that act, forming
part of a series of acts or omission which would
have constituted that offence if such series of
acts or omission had not been interrupted either
by the voluntary determination of the offender
not to commit the offence or some other cause.
The influence of this definition is seen in the
decision of Bristowe J in R v Sharpe 1903 TS 8 6 8
at 875. This influence is recognised by Burchell
& Hunt. The authors also demonstrate the similarity
between this section and the English law as reflected
-  2
by Stephen in his digest of the Criminal Law.
It is quite evident from the aforegoing that in
the field of attempt the Transkei Penal Code of
1886 exerted a distinct influence on South African 
law. So much was this influence that a South African 
judge expressed the wish that legislation similar 
to this be introduced in South Africa. the weakness 
of the Penal code of 1886, however, lay in the
fact that it embraced the objective test in this
regard. As time went on the courts in South Africa 
discovered this weakness and discarded the objective 
test in favour of a subjective test. The 1983 
Penal Code via its section 31, has followed this 
development and discarded the controversial section 
83 of the old Code with its objective test.
_ 187 -
1 Vol. 1 page 457 footnote 61
2 Ibid
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of the crime. It requires an agreement between
two or more persons that a crime should be committed.
In English law there is the fiction that husband
and wife are one for the purposes of this crime
and therefore neither can be guilty of conspiring
1
with each other. But if husband and wife and a
third party agree to commit a crime then all three
2
are conspirators.
7.2 Conspiracy
Conspiracy is a very early stage in the commission
Under the Transkei Penal Code of 1886 conspiracy
3
to do certain acts is forbidden. Transvaal law
of 1892 made provision against conspiring to win
money or articles by illegal game. There is no
relationship between this and the provisions of
the Transkei Penal Code. Later on in South Africa
several acts were passed to penalise conspiracy
4
in different directions. The Transkei Penal Code's 
provisions have no bearing on these aspects of
legislation which in themselves have no bearing
on each other. The only statute that appears to
be all embracing is the Riotous Assemblies Act
which forms the broad basis of liability for conspiracy. 
It lays down that any person who conspires with
any other person to aid or procure the commission 
of or to commit any offence whether at common law
1 See Burchell & Hunt Vol. 1 page 486
2 Op cit ibid
3 See Appendix A Sections 8 6 , 111, 1 1 2  and 24 5 .
4 E.g. the Prisons Act No . 8 of 1957, relating to the escape of 
prisoners, the Ceneral Law amendment act no.76 of 1962 relating 
to conspiracy in general, and the Inmorality Act No.23 of 1957
5 Act No. 17 of 1956
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or against a statute or statutory regulation shall 
be guilty of an offence and be punisheable as though 
the offence had actually been committed.
The fiction of English law whereby husband and
wife are one for purposes of conspiracy never recomme­
nded itself to Transkeian and South African law.
It would have been interesting to see how the jurispru­
dence of South Africa would have responded had
the fiction become part of the Transkei Penal Code
of 1886. In the field of conspiracy, therefore,
there appears to be no influence exerted by the 
code on South African law.
7.3 Incitement
There has been a controvercy on the question whether
a mere incitement to commit a crime was punishable
at common law. In 1921 the Appellate Division
settled the matter in the affirmative when it ruled
that it is a crime at common law to incite another
to commit an offence even though nothing be done
by the person incited in the furtherance of its
1
commission. The matter was put beyond doubt, both
in rspect of common law and statutory offences,
2
by Act 17 of 1956. In the Transkeian Penal Code
of 1886 there was provision against incitement.
Under the Code any incitement to commit any offence
1 R v Ndhlovu 1921 AD 485
2 Section 18 (2) (b)
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was punishable by a term of imprisonment, the option
to give a fine in deserving cases was given to
1
the courts. Here the logal position was therefore 
clear from the bc-ginning.
The leading South African case of incitement emanated
2
from Transkei, namely S v Nkosiyane. The Appellants
were charged with the crime of incitement in terms
3
of Act 17 of 1956. In this case the law relating 
to incitement was fully laid out by Holmes JA when 
he confirmed the verdict of Jennet JP of the Eastern 
Cape Division. The incitement was aimed at the 
political assassination of the Transkei Chief Minister 
K.D. Matanzima, as he then was. The learned Judge 
of Appeal said that an inciter is one who reaches 
and seeks to influence the mind of another to the 
commission of a crime. The machinations of criminal 
ingenuity being legion, the approach to the other's 
mind may take various forms, such as suggestion, 
proposal, request, exhortation, gesture, argument, 
persuasion, inducement, goading or the arousal 
of cupidity. The list is not exhaustive. The 
means employed are of secondary importance; the 
decisive question in each case is whether the accused 
reached and sought to influence the mind of the 
other person towards the commission of a crime.
1 Section 246
2 1966 (4) SA 655 (A)
3 Section 18 (2) (b)
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Where the intended influence does not reach the
mind of the prospective incitee, the crime may
be of attempted incitement, e.g. where an inflamatory
letter is sent but goes astray. It is the conduct
and intention of the inciter which is vitally in
issue. There may be, depending on the circumstances,
an incitement irrespective of responsiveness, real
or feigned, or the unresponsiveness of the person
1
sought to be influenced.
This case illustrates that the statutory law gained
prominence over the common law in relation to inciteme-
ment in South Africa. It does not illustrate harmony
between the Transkei Penal Code and South African
statutory law in the field of incitement, although
the charge in this case was drawn under the one
statute read with the other. The Transkei Penal
Code did not go into any details about the nature
and meaning of the crime of incitement - it merely
2
provided punishment for incitement. Sections 140 
and 144 do not deal with incitement as such but 
actually deal with murder and punishment for murder
respectively. That is their only relevance to 
the Nkosiyane case.
The only reasonable conclusion therefore, is that 
the code did not give much room for inter-action
1 Those who had been "incited" were police agents who had pretended 
to favour the opposition Democratic Party and had readily agreed 
to suggestions that they undertake the killing of the Chief 
Minister for reward.
2 Section 246
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between it and South African law in the field of 
incitement. Strangely enough the 1983 Penal Code 
does not make any provisions against incitement. 
The Marginal note to section 47 of the act says 
"inciting defiance of lawful authority of public 
officers" and at first sight one gains the impression 
that it covers incitement to a limited extent.
But this is not so - the section does not deal
with incitement as such.
It is section 54 that provided against incitement 
but that is specifically against incitement to
public violence only. Such incitement can be by 
speech, conduct or publication. It is hard to 
see why incitement was not dealt with in a broad 
sense especially after the experience of the Nkosiyane 
case and related ones from South Africa. In the
result the 1886 Code made no contribution to legal 
development in South Africa in the field of incitement 
and the 1983 Penal Code equally lacks resourcefulness.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
8 . 1  THEFT
8.1.1 Resistance Co Code's Influence
Theft is defined aC some ^length in Section 179
of the Transkei Penal code. This definition was
2
taken verbatim from Section 246, Stephen's Code,
thereby establishing once more the English law
influence on the Transkei Code. The definition
was then substantially taken over by Gardiner and
3
Lansdown when it first appeared in 1919, and this 
found its way into South African Law. The definition 
strongly resembles that contained in Section 1 
of the English Lacerny Act of 1916 which reads:
"A person steals who, without the consent of the
owner, fraudulently and without claim of right
made in good faith, takes and carries away anything
capable of being stolen with intent, at the time
of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner
4
thereof . This definition does not expressly include 
furtum usus as does section 179.
1 See Appendix A
2 Hunt: South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol.2
page 565: Juta 1970
3 See page 1082
4 See Snyman Page 425: ironically, the Lacerny Act of 1916 ceased
to apply in England in 1968 when the Theft Act of 1968 was 
passed. A new crime, theft, was created to replace the old 
crimes of lacerny, embezzlement and fraudulent conversion.
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It was approved In several cases. Thus in R__v
von Elling* WateYmeyer CJ spoke of "the ordinarily 
accepted definition of the crime of theft which
I take from Gardiner & Lansdown." In R v Harlow
2 3
& Ano Neser J said "the definition of theft, according
to Gardiner &  Lansdown, which has been accepted
for years past, is that..". The definition continued
to be cited with approval even in the following
4
decade.
Despite the strategic position which the Transkei
Penal Code occupied enabling it to play its role
in the process of bringing English law into South
Africa, the South African law however, did not
fall too readily under the influence of it and
5
English law in the field of theft.
The vigilance of the Courts against the powerful 
Transkeian Code cum English law is demonstrated 
by the following passage by Schreiner ACJ in the 
case Minister of Justice re: R v Gesa; R v De
Jongh ^ : "it is not correct to say that our lawj
treatment of both types of fraudulent acquisition 
of another's goods - the larceny by a trick type 
and the obtaining by false pretences owes its origin
1 1945 AD 234 at 236
2 1955 (3) SA 259 T
3 At page 26 3
4 See e.g. S v Kotze 1965 (1) SA 118 (A) at 125
5 See Hunt loc.cit. tor details of important respects in
vrtiich the South African courts did not follow &iglish law.
6 1959 (1) SA 234
to English practice. On the contrary in 1895 in
R v Swart, 12 SC 421, De Villers CJ stated that
our law differs from the English law and has always
treated facts covered by the English crime of obtaining 
by false pretences as theft."
Ten years later in R v Collins 19 EDC 163, Kotze JP
said that theft in South African law has a much 
wider scope than the corresponding term in English 
law and that here the crime of theft is wide enough 
to include the obtaining of goods by false pretences.
It was true that the name of the English crime 
of obtaining by means of false pretence might well
have suggested the use of the expression "theft
by false pretences" as in the Transkeian Penal
code, sections 191 to 193, but South African law 
had successfully resisted any tendency that there . 
may have been to confine theft within the narrow 
limits of larceny. The learned judge went further 
and stated categorically that the Transkeian Code 
may not in a particular instance accurately represent 
the law of South Africa.
8.1.2 Acceptance of Code's Influence
8 .1.2.1 Theft of Trust Honeys
The theft of trust moneys is provided for in section
. 1  
183 of the Trasnskei Penal code which deals with
theft by an agent. The significant aspects of
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1 See Appendix A
Che lengthy secCion are:
1. The requiremenC Co accounC for or pay money 
or the proceeds thereof to another person, 
such not necessarily being in specie the identical 
money. Such money is generally (and perhaps 
loosely) understood as trust money.
2. The debtor and creditor relationship envisaged 
by the section and the proper entry requirement 
that goes with such relationship.
The distinction between trust money and debtor-creditor 
money therefore assumes vital importance. The
obvious reason is that if the latter relationship 
is proved the consequences for an accused person 
are prima facie serious.
1
In R v Golding the accused was charged with the
crime of theft at the Circuit Court in Oudtshoorn, 
in that he had received and taken into his possession 
certain money which he was required to pay to Schmolle 
but failed to do so and instead appropriated and 
converted that money to his own use. He was a 
collector-salesman for Singer Company and it was 
in that capacity that he received moneys due to
be accounted for to his principals. On trial he
was found guilty of theft but a point of law was
reserved for argument before the Supreme Court 
namely: did the evidence substantiate the crime
of theft?
_ 196 _
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When Che matter came before Che Supreme CourC d e 
Villiers CJ dealc wich Che maCCer having regard 
Co the Transkeian Penal Code as if it was a SouCh 
African sCatute. He said: '
" I have always regarded Che 183rd section 
of Che Native Territories' Penal code as 
fairly stating the law of the colony proper 
in regard to thefts by agents. If the
terms of the agent's employment are that 
he is to be an ordinary debtor in 
respect of moneys received on behalf of 
the principal, and that the personal 
liability only of Che debtor is to be 
relied upon, then the appropriation by 
him of moneys so received does not amount 
to theft, provided that they are properly 
entered in the debtor and creditor 
account rendered by him to the principal."
This decision was later to be criticised by de
2
Wet & Swanepoel who say that the verdict given
by Lord De Villiers is unsatisfacCory "in every
respecC". Despite the charge sheet which avers 
that the money was stolen from the payers concerned, 
and despiCe Che emphasis on Chis aspect by the
attorney for Che defence, Lord De Villiers gives
1 AC 215, See also R v Tsholoba and others 1960(1) SA 764 (0);
S v George en Andere 1966 (4) SA 10 (GWLD) where Che Code's 
provisions were embraced.
2 Op ciC 326 c -f- E-M - Burchell : Is ic theft? SALJ 1955 page 38
a verdict as if Golding had been accused of stealing 
the money from the S company. It was unnecessary 
to bring in Section 183 of the NTPC. Golding stole 
no money from the people concerned, since they 
no longer were the owners thereof. If the charge 
had read that Golding had stolen the money from 
the S company, the question would have arisen whether 
Golding or the company was the owner of the money. 
But this question was not relevant. Reference 
to Section 183 of the NTPC was therefore unnecessary. 
What is more, it is false to aver Chat: "I have
always regarded the 183rd section of the NaCive 
Territories Penal code as fairly stating the law 
of the Colony proper in regard to thefts by agents", 
and to then give a verdict on that basis. Section 
183 certainly does not reflect Roman-Dutch law, 
they conclude.
The learned authors clearly identify the gravamen 
of their objection to section 183, namely that 
in-so-far as the section covers the appropriation 
of something with which one has been entrusted, 
and of which the right of ownership vests in someone 
else, there is no conflict wich R o m a n-Dutch Law, 
"but this section goes furCher and includes as 
theft also the application for personal benefit
of a thing which has perhaps even been transferred
. . "  *
to one in ownership to be used for certain purposes.
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However, Che judgement opened the way for the full-scale 
application of the Transkei Penal code in South 
Africa in cases involving the theft of moneys by 
agents. As early as 1907 the impact of section
183 was felt as far afield as the Orange River
1
Colony (as it then was) in the case of R v Theunissen.
There, both the crown and the defence appear to
have been completely poor in ammunition and each
2
side relied solely on R v Golding in support of
the viewpoint that it contended. The crown specifically
mentioned "the Penal Code for the Transkei, section
3
183." The judgement of Maasdorp CJ was as follows:
"The money was handed to the accused for the purpose 
of settling two accounts, and not merely to obtain 
two cheques. The evidence of his statement in 
June to the effect that he had settled the accounts 
cuts away the ground from the argument that he 
might have overlooked the matter. The accused 
was merely the duct for the passing of the money
- either this was to have taken place by way of 
cheque or otherwise - and the fact that he did 
not do so is evidence of theft. There is no doubt 
about the law, in view especially of section 183 
of the Penal code for the Transkei, which, as he 
says, may be taken as fairly stating the law of 
the colony proper in regard to thefts by agents." this 
judgment is also criticised by de Wet and Swanepoel.^
1 1907 ORC 118
2 Supra
3 Page 118 .
A See footnote 2 on page 7 supra
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In R v Satlsky the court, per De Vilters AJ, recalled2  ^
the statement in G o l d i n g 's case about the Transkei 
Code stating the law of the Colony proper, adding 
"with this view of the law the court entirely agrees."
The learned acting judge then went on tc quote
section 183 in full so as to illustrate the point
3
he was making. In R v Fartsuharsoii,' a case from 
Fort Beaufort outside Transkei, section 183 was
again quoted in full and embraced as being applicable, 
regard being had to the previous decisions discussed 
above.
The Impact of section 183 was felt even as far
4
afield as Zimbabwe. For in R v Harlen Beadle CJ
stated;
"In all the counts the charge of theft arose 
from what is commonly known as misappropriation 
by an agent. The accused's company acted 
as an agent to collect moneys for principals, 
and the indictment alleges that the accused's 
company misappropriated these moneys. The
law applying to charges of theft such as these
is now well settLed and may be found in section
183 of the Transkei Penal code. 1^
1
1 1915 CPD 574
2 Supra
3 1925 EDL 50
4 1964 (4) SA 44 (SR)
5 At 45
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The learned Chief Justice further mentioned "the
1
Transkeian Code" three times in circunstances suggesting
that it was a statute applicable in Zimbabwe.
In so doing he simultaneously applied the Satisky 
and Monakali cases.
Although it might at first sight be thought that
a finding that the money was not held in trust
but was merely a debtor-creditor item should terminate
the trial in favour of an accused person, it is
in fact not so. Several deicisions, which are
based on section 183 of the Transkeian Penal code,
show that the accused will be guilty of theft if,
with intent to steal, he omitted to pay and omitted
to enter or improperly entered the debt in his
account with his creditor. Of course the state
must still prove a fraudulent omission to enter
or a fraudulent entry, otherwise there can be no
3
conviction.
4
In R v Satisky the court said:
"It may, therefore, be taken as law that an agent
standing in the position of ordinary debtor to 
his principal commits theft if he receives any 
money which he not only fails to pay over to his 
principal, but fails to enter in the debtor and 
creditor account which he renders to his principal, 
if the omission to enter it in the account is fraudulent
1 On pages 46 & 47
2 Supra
3 See Hunt op cit (1982) 636
4 Supra
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The three eLements must all be present, viz., the omission
1
to pay, the omission to enter, and the fraudulent intention."
2
These sentiments were quoted with approval in R v Monakall 
This was a Transkeian case which arose from the district 
oE Centane. The accused, the principal of Tutura Mission 
School, received monies from the sale of school books 
from numerous persons but failed to hand over the said 
monies to the Rev. T B Soga, the Manager of the School, 
but converted the monies to his own use in contravention 
of section 183 of the Penal Code. The guilt of the 
accused was based on his omission to pay, there being 
no actual account stated between the principal and the 
manager, on which an omission to enter could be based.
3 '
In R v Harlem the Court reiterated this standpoint
and indicated that such legal position was clear "not
only from the Transkeian Code, but also from the
4 . 5
decision in R v Satisky." And in Slduntsa v Rex
the appellant was charged and convicted of theft in
terms of section 199 of the Code by the Magistrate
of Ngqeleni, Transkei. When the matter came before
the Supreme court in Crahamstown, the presiding
judge rightly drew attention to the fact
1 At page 579
2 1937 EDL 248
3 Suora
4 At page 46
5 1912 EDL 431
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Chat Che charge should have been in terms of section 
183, buC ^rather unexpectedly found shelter in R 
v Golding for stating that the section had always
been regarded as fairly stating the law of the
„ 2 
Colony proper in regard to theft by agents.
The Transkei Penal code distinction between trust
money and debtor-creditor money has been applied
in numerous other cases in South Africa, even though
the judgements may not have referred particularly
3 4
to section 183. In S v Botha it was held that
the appropriation for his own use of articles by
the secretary was theft from his principal even
if the articles never became the property of his 
’ 5
principal and in S v Rynecke the view was expressed
that today it may not be necessary, strictly speaking,
on a charge of theft of trusC money, Co allege
in Che indicCmenC who is Che person invested wich
Che "special properCy interest" in Che money stolen.
The judgement in the Reynecke case was confirmed
by the Appellate Division as appears from the editor's
note.
8 .1.2.2 Stealing from a Bank Account
It is orthodox banking law that if a person deposits 
money in his banking account, the bank owes Che 
money and Che relationship between the bank and
1 Supra
2 See page 434
3 Hunt: op cit (1982) 634 footnote 317
4 1970 (1) SA 6 8 8 (0)
5 1972 (4) SA 366 (T)
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Che customer is one of debtor and creditor. The
bank however, remains under an obligation to honour 
cheques validly drawn by the customer.
2
In S v Kotze it was held that the misuse of funds
by persons who are in a position of trust in relation
thereto can, in appropriate circumstances, be theft,
even if those funds are irregularly drawn out oE
someone else's banking account. In that case,
his principal had placed the accused in full control
of his bank accounC, but his mandate was restricted
to the drawing or causing to be drawn of cheques
for the purposes of his principal's business and
the accused had drawn and issued a cheque in settlement
of his private debt. The Court held that the fact
thac the money was in his principal's bank account
was no insurmountable obstacle to a finding that
he had stolen that money which was still the property
of or in Che lawful possession of his principal,
because although the principal was not the owner
of the money in his banking account he was nevertheless
a person with "a special property or interest therein^
In so finding, Ogilvie Thompson JA recalled with
approval the Transkei Penal Code definition of
theft as enunciated by Gardiner and .Lansdown and
3
upheld by Watermeyer CJ in R v Von Elling. Ke
invoked the trusteeship concept and decided that
the funds in the bank fell within the ambit of
1 See S v Kearney 1964 (2) SA 495 (A) at 502
2 1965 (1) SA 118 (A)
3 See page 125
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Che concept of funds held in trust. And since 
the funds were trust moneys the beneficiary was 
invested with a special property or interest.
The interaction between banking and criminal law 
principles arose recently in the Swaziland case 
of Rex v Alpheus Dlaminl. The accused was a teller
at Barclays Bank. There was a shortage of R5 000 
in his cash. In order to cover that up and avoid 
dismissal, he withdrew R5 000 from a savings account 
of one Alvit Dlamini and paid it to the bank to 
make good the shortage. That withdrawal was immediately 
discovered and the bank refunded Alvit's account
and the parties were back to square one with the 
accused being liable to the bank for the original 
shortage of R5 000.
2
In an illuminating review of this case Takirambude
argues strenuously that the conviction of the accused
was not warranted if one took into acount "the
3
existing criminal law and banking principles."
He also contends that the accused should not have
been convicted on any basis whatsoever. in this
connection it is interesting to note that Nathan CJ 
observed that there was no ground for ordering 
repayment to the bank as the theft was from Alvit
Dlamini's account and not from the bank - he merely
1 Crim TS 70/80 High Court of Swaziland (unreported)
2 Head of the Department of Law, University of Botswana
3 See XV CILSA 1932 page 215
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sentenced him to R500,00 or one year's imprisonment 
and that was all.
8 .1.2.3 Delictum Continuum
Section 190 of the Transkei Penal code provides that 
everyone who, having obtained any property by any 
act which if done in these terri:ories wouLd have 
amounted to theft, brings such property into these 
territories, shall be guilty of thef:. This therefore 
means that the Code makes theft a continuous offence
- a delictum continuum. Now although, as it appears 
on the face of it, the provision applies only to 
thefts committed outside the territories it is submitted 
that in practice it applies even to thefts committed 
inside them.
The South African law became the same on the point:
"Theft... is a continuous offence sc that if property
is stolen outside the Republic and brought into the
1
Republic by the thief he may be tried in the Republic."
2
In R v Von Elllng Tindall J A affirmed his own dicta
3
in R v Attia and said: " The meanir.g of the statement
that theft is " a continuing offence" means no more
than that theft continues as long as the stolen property 
is in the possession of the thief or some person acting on behalf or even,
1 Swift: Criminal Procedure 2 ed Butterworths 1969,Snyman & '
Korkel: StraEproses reg p~.48 Juta 1985
2 1945 AD 234
3 1937 TPD 102
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possibly, In the interest of the original thief
1
or party to the theft." Swift merely states that
the posion that theft is a continuing offence is
an exception to the common law principle that a
Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court
of South Africa will have jurisdiction in respect
of offences committed within it, or, in other words, 
that all statutory crimes are local.
2
In R v Dzwaka & Another the accused were charged 
before the magistrate at Mt Fletcher, Transkei,
with the the theft of cattle from Basutholand and 
introducing same into Mt Fletcher. Reynolds J
invoked the provisions of Section 190 of the code 
and held that it was unnecessary to prove that
theft was a crime according to the law of Basutholand.
This is understandable. But the concurring judgement 
oE Jennett J is interesting. Re says: "According
to the law prevailing in the Transkeian Territories 
the accused's act of taking in Basutoland constituted 
a theft of stock. Even if section 190 of Act 24 
of 1886 did not exist that theft, if it was a theft 
according to the law of Basotholand, which was
'continued' in the Union by the accused's possession
there of the stolen property was a theft of stock,"
The learned judge further said that the doctrine 
of theft being a " continuing offence" is well
established in South African Criminal Law, and
1 Op cit See also Snyman & Morkel p.54 ff
2 1950 (3) SA 870 EDLD
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1 2
relied on R v Von Elling 1965 AD 234. Snyman
reiterates the doctrine that theft is a continuous
offence and also mentions the much criticised rule
that as far as theft is concerned there are no
accomplices or acessories after the fact. Commenting
3
on R v Dzwaka & Another de Wet & Swanepoel object
to the whole idea of theft being regarded as a
continuous offence and state: "(fc)ot tyd en wyl
ingesien word c!at diti opvntbing oor dieEstal as sogenaamde
voortdurende inisdaad slegsverwarring skep, sal heLtng
as besondere soort diefstal nie klaarheid In ons
4
regspraak verkry nie." (Until such times as It
is appreciated that the view that theft is a continuing 
offence merely creates confusion, receiving stolen 
property as a particular form of theft will gain 
no clarity in our law) .
The doctrine of theft being a continuous offence
also received attention in Zimbabwe. Fieldsend CJ 
described the doctrine as being common to English
law and modern Roman-Dutch law. (My underlining). 
The learned Chief Justice expressed doubts about 
the full significance of the doctrine and taking 
other relevant factors into account, acquitted 
the accused in the case.
1 At page 876 '
2 Criminal Law page 44
3 Supra
4 Op cit 2nd rd p. 368
5 S v Kanikinyeka and Others 1931 (4) SA 194 (ZAD)
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It is quite evident from what has been said above Chat 
in this respect the Transkei Penal Code of 1886 
once more fulfiLled its role as a vehicle for the
importation of English law principles inCo South 
African law. In this regard Che statement by FieldsendCJ 
is relevant. The new Transkei Penal code retains 
the provisions of section 190 of Act 24 of 1886. '
2
8.1.3. The Significance of Sections 180 - 182
The Important point that arises from these provisions
is that theft is completed as soon as one takes
the thing, moves it or allows it Co be moved. In
3
this connection the case R v Carelse and Kay is 
noteworthy for its demonstration of the influence 
of the Transkei Penal Code on South African law.
In Chat case Carelse removed a tin of petrol from 
a store-room and placed it elsewhere in the building
i.e. where empty tins were usually put away. The
intention was that Kay would return later and pour 
the petrol into his car's petrol tank. However,
Carelse's actions were observed and reported Co 
the owner of Che garage. The peCrol was Caken 
back and stored before Kay could take it. Although 
it was argued that this was a case of attempt, 
the judge did not give a straight answer in this 
regard. Here it was found that theft is completed
1 Supra
2 See appendix A
3 1920 CPD 471
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as soon the thing has been moved with a view to 
taking it away later, "that is, converted, and 
therefore there was a contrectatlo fraudulosa."
The mere fact that the petrol had been returned 
to the place £rom where it was originally removed 
"cannot remove the fraudulent intention, in other 
words, the intent to steal, which was manifested 
by the circumstances." Commenting on this decision 
de Wet and Swanepoel 1 record that the action took 
•place in Cape Town where the N.T.P.C. did not apply 
but "onder invloed van hierdie kode word nou dieselfde 
reg vir die hele l)nie verkondig" (Under the influence 
of this code the same law became effective in the 
whole Union).
That this principle was adopted throughout South
2
Africa is also clear from R v Banda■ In that case 
an employee of the Durban Corporation was stopped 
by the watchman at the gates leading to the workers' 
compound en route from a Power Station where certain 
wire belonging to the corporation was used. He 
had some wire under his coat and the watchman had
him charged with theft, of which he was convicted
and sentenced. The Natal Provincial Division
confirmed the conviction and sentence of theft 
and said that on the evidence as given by the watchman 
the only reasonable inference that could be drawn
1 Op cit 2ed 320 ff.The authors stress the Code's influence
2 1953 (2) SA 781
was that the wire so found belonged to the Durban 
Corporation and was being removed from the corporation 
premises by the appellant. (my underlining).
Nowhere did the court consider the question of
attempt to steal the copper wire. On the question
as to when theft is completed, the influence of
the code on South African law is beyond doubt. The Transkei 
Penal Code Act of 1983 is similar to the 1 8 8 6 Code.*
8 .2 Arson
2
According to Gardiner & Lansdown arson is committed
by any person who wilfully and with intent to injure
or defraud another sets fire to and sets on fire
any immovable structure of the nature of a house.
This is in accordance with the views of the later
writers such as Van der Linden 2-4-7 who says
that arson is committed by those who, with the
purpose of injuring another, set fire to buildings
or other immovable goods - "gebouwen of andere
onroerende goedere" whereby the property takes
fire and damage is caused. On the other hand the
Transkei Penal Code's definition of arson departed
from the common law definition and was based on
the views of the earlier writers who saw arson
3
as relevant to both movables and immovables. For 
instance Kersteman in his Wordenboek defined arsonists
I See Section lj2 of Act 0 of 1983­
2 6 ed volume 2 page 1779
3 S 236, appendix A
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(branstichters) as those punishable deliquents 
who wilfully and with intention to injure someone 
set fire to houses, mills, stables, barns, ships 
and boats. A noteworthy departure from at least 
the early English law, in both tha Code and the 
writers' definition is the total lack of reference 
to the ownership of the property.
In 1908 the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed
2
in the Transvaal. It referred, in relation to
3
arson, to any building or structure thereby departing 
from the common law meaning of arson which confines 
it to immovable structure and bringing the Transvaal 
law into line with the provision of the Transkei 
Penal Code by extending the meaning of arson to 
include movable structures. A similar move was 
taken by Natal the following year via the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of 1909 which defined arson so 
as to include "all kinds incendium, of whatever 
nature the property in respect of which the offence 
is committed may be." Following the lead of the 
Transkei Penal Code, therefore, the law of South 
Africa was gradually changing to make the crime
of arson relevant to movables as well. It may 
be mentioned that English law has always regarded
arson as being relevant to immovables. Not unexpectedly
1 See Gardiner & Lansdown op cit 1780
2 Act No-16 of 1908
3 Section 8
4 See Hunt: 
vol 2 766-767 Juta
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Che lack of uniformity to be seen in the works • 
oE the Roman-Dutch writers and the statutes was
reflected in the case law. At the Cape there were 
cases which reflected a difference of opinion on 
the question as to whether the term arson meant 
the same as the Dutch word brand stich ting (and
the Latin word incendiutn 1, and more particularly 
whether arson related to movables in addition to 
immovable property.
1
In R v Enslin Lord de Villiers followed the view
of Van der Linden that arson is relevant only to
immovable property. "The facts show a malicious
burning of the barley stacks of another, and the
legal and descriptive appellation of such an offence
2
is certainly not arson." The learned Chief Justice
made it clear that the prisoner should have been
3
charged with malicious injury to property. Ke
refused to identify arson with brandstichting.
In a dissenting judgement Barry JP was not satisfied
that the word arson, borrowed as it was from English
law, could be given such an extensive meaning as
incendium of Roman law. Arson in England meant
the malicious setting of fire to an immovable which
a haystack was not. The term arson therefore had
. 4
been misapplied to the facts set forth in the indictment.
1 (1885) Buch A.C. 69
2 At page 70
3 Ibid
4 When the accused was later charged with malicious injury to 
property the Chief Justice dismissed a plea of autrefois acquit 
as he had not been in jeopardy in the first instance -
see at page 119.
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The Transkei Penal Code was passed in the following year.
Thereafter came the case of Rex v Hoffman, Rex
1
v Saachs &  Hoffman. However it is significant
that the learned Chief Justice no longer distinguished
between the wider (Roman-Dutch law) and the narrower
(English law) meanings implicit in brandstichting
and arson respectively, which he treated as synonyms.
Ten years later the view expressed in the Transkei
Penal Code, that arson relates to both movable
and immovables, appeared to have gained momentum
at the Cape although no legislation was passed
similar to that passed in the Transvaal and Natal.
2
Thus in R v Peizee Hopley J declared: "The term
'arson'all through my life and probably for generations 
before that, has been adopted and used, and I think 
it includes all that was intended by the Dutch 
word ' brandstichting' and by the Latin word 'incéndium'. 11
The controversy had now reached its climax and
the time was ripe .for the Appellate Division to
play its role in establishing uniformity in South
African Law. That court took a decisive stand
3
in the matter in R v Ma v r o s . The appellant had
been convicted in the High Court of Southern Rhodesia 
(as It then was) for the crime of arson in that
he had wrongfully and maliciously set on fire his
own store with intent to burn it and defraud an
1 (1906) 2 Buch A.C. 342
2 1916 SR. 13
3 1921 A.D. 19
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insurance company of Che money for which he had
insured the store and foods therein contained.
Innes CJ went into the question of the earlier
writers and thereupon identified himself fully
with the decision in R v Palzee:^
"In every translation which I have been able
to consult I find that the offence of
brandstlchting is described as arson, and
I do not know how else it would have been
2
possible to describe it."
Van der Linden's definition was accepted as correct 
and the view that arson can be committed only in
respect of immovables became entrenched.
From the time that the Mavros case was decided
it became clear that the influence of the Transkei
Penal Code was going to be terminated. In a number
of cases there were charges of arson where huts
or other such infomally constructed dwelling structures
for blacks had been set on fire. In each case
the point was raised that the hut or similarly
constructed structure was not proved to be immovable
regard being had to the requirements for fixtures
3'
to be accepted as immovable. Convictions for arson 
were accordingly not secured where it had not been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that these huts
1 Supra
2 At page 24
3 See in this regard McDonald Ltd v Radln M.O and the Potchefstroom 
Dairies and Industries Co. Ltd 1915 AD 454
216
and other structures were immovable. R v Mabula
was the first such case, and the principles laid
2
down therein were followed by the Provincial Divisions.
3
In R v Soqokomashe the appellants had set fire
to a rondavel classroom (hut) in the Peddie District.
They had pleaded guilty but were nevertheless acquitted
on appeal because the accidental burning ^of the
hut had not been excluded by the evidence. And
in S v Motau en 'n Ander the conviction of arson 
~ 6 
was substituted by one of malicious injury to property.
In all these cases the absence of the influence
of the Transkei Penal Code in terms of which the
burning of these structures would have been regarded
as arson was conspicuous.
By 1979 the Transkei Penal Code was completely 
out of the way in the field o£ arson and Hunt defined 
arson as "unlawfully setting an immovable structure
1 1927 AD 159
2 See R v Motaung 1953 (4) SA 35 (0), R v Soqokomashe and others
1956 (2) ÍJA 142 EDLD and S v Motau 196:4 (2) SA 521 (T). See also 
discussion: Koyana: Customary Law in a Changing Society p.67
3 1956 (2) SA 142 EDLD
4 This illustrates once more the absurdity of a rigid adherence 
to the accusatorial system as now a man who pleads guilty is 
nevertheless set free on a technicality - something which can 
no longer happen after the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 in 
South Africa and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1983 in Transkei.
5 1963 (2) SA 521 (T)
® C.f. the second case of R v Enslin (1885) Buch A.C. 69
7 Op cit 768
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on fire with intent to injure another." Hunt also 
criticised the Gardiner ?■ Lansdown definition of 
arson and said:
(1) "wilfully" has English law over tones;
(2 ) "sets fire to" is not and can hardly be an 
element separate from "sets on fire";
(3) "in the nature of a house" is misleading 
because a common connotation of 'house' is 
a dwelling house, yet arson can surely be 
committed in respect of buildings used solely 
for storing property.
The last remaining traces of the influence of the
Transkei Penal code on South African law in this
field were wiped out in 1970 when the Transvaal
2
and Natal statutory provisions were repealed by
3
the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act. In S
4
v Solomon the court simply stated that both Roman
and Roman-Dutch law recognised the offence was 
limited to certain property such as buildings.
To sum up, there was a lack of uniformity in the 
works of the Roman-Dutch writers and, later on, 
the statutes, in relation to arson. The Transkei 
Penal Code favoured the view that arson can be
committed even in respect of movables and this 
view, harmonious as it was with that of some of 
the writers, made an impact on the case law until
1 Ibid
2 Supra
3 Act No.26 1970
4 1973 (4) SA 644- (C)
1
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1921 when R v Mavros  ^was decided. Thereafter the
contrary view that arson can only be committed
in respect of immovables prevailed and the spirit
of the Transkei Penal Code was wiped out. The
2
new Transkei Penal Code practically adheres to 
the 1886 definition of arson and the law relating 
to arson in Transkei is decidedly different from 
the South African law.
8 .3 Robbery
8.3.1 English Law and the 1886 Code
The definition of robbery is contained in Section
3
211 of the Transkei Penal Code. This definition
was taken over by Gardiner and Lansdown in their
4
first edition in 1919, except that they slightly
expanded on the section 211 definition. Section
2 1 1  was for its part copied directly from section
5
288 of the English Draft Code of 1879.
8.3.2 The Influence of the Transkei Penal Code
The South African Law was once again very inadequate 
in this regard and had to resort to borrowing. 
This inadequacy is realised by Hunt when he says:
"The Courts in South Africa found it helpful
to use the wealth of English and American case
authority to clothe the somewhat bare bones
6
of our old authorities."
1 Supra 2 Act No. 9 of 1983 ”
3 See Appendix A 4 See page 1118
5 See HUNT: South African Criminal Law and Procedure
Vol. 2 page 679. Juta 1982
5 South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol,2 
page 6 79 Juta 1982
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While thus recognising Che resort Co English and 
American case authorlCy, Che learned auChor appears 
Co have overlooked Che resort to the Transkei Penal 
code which, it is submitted, became quite conspicuous 
as Cime went on. Earlier on Che Orange Free State 
Court in SCaCe v JouberC* said it was of opinion 
that
" actual and physical force is indeed 
necessary to constitute the crime of 
robbery"
The ' actual violence' specified in Che Transkei 
Penal Code is noCiceable here, but it is submitted 
that although this does not by ail means necessarily 
exclude the "threats of violence" in the Penal 
Code - a threat is in itself actual and physical 
and is pregnant with violence - one cannot safely 
claim the Influence of the Transkei Penal code 
in this instance.
2
Fifty years after the Joubert case the Transkei
Penal Code made a loud and clear reminder about
Its role in the South African law of robbery. For
in Minister of Justice: in re R v Gesa; R v de
3
Jongh Schreiner ACJ admitted that there was "very 
little" in South African case law dealing with 
the question whether robbery covers handing over 
under threat (my emphasis) and he admitted resort
1 4 OR 188
2 Supra
3 1959 (1) SA 234 (A)
-  2 á o  -
to Russel (English author) on crimes 10th ed Vol.2 
and Bishop (American author), Criminal law 8 th
ed paras 1164, 1169. He then indicated that the
Transkei Penal Code was to the same effect, and
re-stated the Code's definition of robbery as laid 
down in section 211. The learned judge then recalled 
R v Buthelezi 1925 AD 160 at 170 and even showed
more faith in the relevance of the Transkei Penal
Code than had done his predecessor brothers when
he said:
"it has frequently been resorted to with 
approval by our courts as a guide to our law"
the first part being a direct quotation by him
from Kotze JA in the Buthelezi case and the second
and underlined part being his own addition. He
further recalled with approval the statement of 
Greenberg JA in R v Vallachia and Another 1945
AD 826 that the Code
"has not infrequently been found to have 
incorporated in its provisions the 
correct view of what our law is"
Accordingly, the learned judge ruled that the law 
was wrongly decided by the Provincial Divisions
in the two cases and that where A threatened B 
with personal violence in order to get possession
of a thing belonging to B and B handed it over
-  2&i -
rather than run the risk of bodily injury, A was 
guilty oE robbery and, it EoIIowed also oE theEt.
More recently robbery in South AErican law has
been defined by Hunt as Eollows:
"Robbery consists in the theEt oE property by intenti­
onally using violence or theats of violence to
"2
induce submission to the taking of it from another. 
This definition shows that the influence of the
Transkei Penal code oE 1886 on South AErican law 
has become ineradicable.
The modifications made by the Transkeian Legislature
to the Transkei Law o£ robbery via the Transkei
3
PenaL Code oE 1983 are interesting and certainly 
not surprising. Section 155 (1) emphasises the
use oE actual violence or threats thereof as being 
the gravamen of the oEEence. This thereEore is 
nothing new as far as general principles are concerned, 
and the Code therefore merely replaces the old 
code and occupies its seat and continues in a straight 
line with the functions of the old code vis-a-vls 
South African law.
Strangely enojgh, however, the courts In South
Africa have seen fit to depart from the principles 
laid down in the Transkei Penal Code and endorsed
1 See at page 241
2 Volume 2 second ed 1982 page 680
3 Act No.9 of 1983
by Hunt and have tended to create new law. This is
with special reference to bag snatching. The question
is: does the law permit a situation where there could
be a conviction of robbery where a conviction of even
2
common assault could rob be compentent? A discussion of 
the relevant case law now follows:
In this kind of case what is quite clear is fraudulosa
contrectio and there can be no dispute that the crime 
of theft is committed. Quite understandably therefore,
the courts initially held that where a bag is snatched 
in a sudden and unexpected movement with no resistance 
from the victim who is least expecting the occurence,
the conviction should be one of theft and not robbery.
This view point was most lucidly set out in Minister
3
of Justice : in re R v G e s a ; R v De Jongh where
Schreiner ACJ made this important dictum:
"If violence is only used as a direct step -
towards gaining possession of the thing desired 
in order to seperate it from the victim's person 
this is not robbery. For robbery the violence 
must aim at reducing the victim to inpotence or 
submission. The victim need not be physically 
incapacitated. It is enough if his uill is over-
- 222 -
1
1 Op c i t ., ibid
2 This question was for the first time raised by 
Middleton in SACC/SASK 1981. 85. See page 222 infra.
3 Supra
_  2 2 3  _
borne by fear, so Chat the villain can
1
safely take possession of the goods"
The learned judge referred to Gardiner & Lansdown
6 ed 707 to support this important statement. 
A perusal of Gardiner and Lansdown shows that this 
important dictum was not a bolt from the blue but 
was the scientific expression of the well considered 
views of several Jurists made over a period of
many years, inter ali a :
1. R v Edwards (1943), 1 cox 32, where the accused,
in cutting the string of a basket which he
proposed to steal, unintentionally wounded 
the hand of a woman who was holding it.
2. R v Jacobs 4 HC 236, R v Mazunga 1938 SR 11,
R v Thabata 1946 P.H., H 160 (0), R v Somaru, 
1956 P.H. H. 105 (N) where it was held that
in a case of bag snatching, without any evidence 
of violence or putting in fear, the conviction
should be theft, not robbery.
In view of these developments which reached a climax
with the decision in Minister of Justice: in re~2----------------------------------
R v Ges a , R v De Jcngh it was logical that even
during the 1960's the path of reason should continue
to be followed in the law relating to robbery.
3
In R v Matshaba the Transvaal Division reiterated
1 Page 239
2 Supra
3 1961 (3) SA 78 (T)
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Chat bag-snatching Is an offence which cannot be
regarded as robbery - the taking must be accompanied
by violence intentionally used to overcome or prevent
the resistance of the owner or by threats of injury
to his oerson, property or reputation. In S v 
1 ‘
Mokete the accused had been convicted of robbery.
The evidence showed that the complainant had stood
in a hut, that he was leaning with his arm on an
organ, that the accused had blown out the candle
in the hut and in the dark had snatched a wristlet
watch from the arm of complainant, breaking the
strap. On review if was held that the evidence
had proved the crime of theft, not robbery. The
2
celebrated dictum of Schreiner ACJ was recalled. 
By now there was therefore complete unanimity on 
this question, for even the writers de Wet and 
Swanepoel had already come in and given their blessings 
to the attitude adopted by the courts through 
the century and, by implication to section 2 1 1  
of the Transkei Penal Code. These were their words:
"Ons howe neem, na ons mening tereg, die 
houding in dat dit nie roof is nie, maar 
gewone diefstal indien 'n saak skielik uit 
die besit van iemand gegryp word en, 
voordat hy weerstand kan bied, daarmee 
weggehardloop word".
1 1963 (1) SA 223 (0)
2 Supra
3 Die Suld-Afrikaanse Strafreg. 2 ed 397 cf igd 3 7 5. See • 
also Rabie & Strauss: Punishment 4ed 346 Lex Patria 1985.
They share this view.
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8.3.3 Partial Departure from the Grip of the Transkei
Penal Code ■
In the light of the foregoing it comes as a surprise
that Rumpff CJ should have criticised the dictum
of Schreiner ACJ in the case Minister of Justice:
1
in re: Gesa and de Jcngh, albeit in an obiter
dictum.
2
That was in S v Mogala and this seems to have opened
the way to a new approach to "bag snatching" cases,
Such new approach heralded:
1 . a departure from the strict tenor of the definitio-'.
3
of robbery by Hunt, which definition, on the
question of the significance of a mere threat,
4
is supported by Snyman,
2. a partial departure from the grip of the Transkei 
Penal Codes of 1886 and 1983
5
The Mogala case was soon followed by S v Sithole
1981 (1) SA 1186 (N) and in that case the court
agreed with the views of gurnpfi__,CJ.. This was a
plain bag snatching case and having due regard
to the previous wealth of authorities and case
law in the matter and the new approach introduced
obiter by Rumpff CJ the Natal Court, per Thiron J,
went out of its way to "take a fresh look at the
6
principles governing the crime of robbery". The
1 Supra
2 1978 (2) SA 412 (A)
3 Supra
4 Criminal Law page 444
5 Supra
6 See at 1187
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sum total of the "fresh look" was that for handbag 
snatching to amount to robbery "it is sufficient 
if the culprit intentionally uses force in order 
to overcome the hold which the victim has on the 
bag ... or if the culprit intentionally uses force 
to prevent or forestal resistance which he thinks 
might be offered to the taking if the victim were 
to be aware of his intentions." The judgement 
terminates, at least partially, the influence of
the Transkei Penal Code. The Transvaal Division
1 , 2 
followed Sithole in S. v Mofeklng and S v Mangcotywa.
Middleton undertakes an interesting review of the
Sithole case. He rightly points out that the penalities
for theft are adequate for any case of bag
3
snatching. Argument that the evil of bag snatching 
has lately assumed alarming proportions therefore 
carries no weight.
Otherwise Che Transkei Penal Code's provision that
mere threats made in order to compel submissiveness
are sufficient to secure a conviction of robbery
continues to enjoy recognition. This is clear
4 5 6
from S v Makhalanyane S v Moloto and S v Kgoyane
1 1982 (2) SA 147 (T)
2 Unreported. Delivered on 1 December 1982. Contra the 
Cape Court in S v Witbooi 1984 (1) SA 242 fC)
3 See his article: Bag snatching - assautless robbery?
SACC/SASK 1981. 85 at page 87 cf S v Maizela (1) PH H 180 (C) 
and S v Mtlrokulu 1971 (4) SA 141 IT)
5 1982 (1) SA 844 where the aspect of threats was positively 
emphasised by Rurnpff C.J.
6 1982 SA 133 (J), where Minister of Justice: in Re
R v Gesa, R v De Jongh 1959 (1) SA 234 (A) was remembered
2 2 7
The conclusion can therefore be made, that the Transkei 
Penal code of 1886 exerted a distinct influence on the 
South African law relating to robbery. A partial departure 
from that influence was noticeable in relation to bag 
snatching cases, but there seems to be no justification 
for such departure as appears from the view of Middleton.
2
Section 155 (2) of the Transkei Penal Code Act of 1983
makes a drastic departure from the provisions of section 
211 of the 1886 code in that Eor the first time, death 
is introduced as a competent penalty for robbery. The 
idea is obviously to bring Transkeian law into line 
with South African law in this respect as far as the 
penalty is concerned.
1 Supra
2 Act No. 9 of 1983
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CHAPTER NINE
FRAUD, FORGERY, UTTERING AND EXTORTION
FRAUD
In the Transkei Penal Code various aspects of fraud
. 1 
are dealt with under various sections. There is positive
proof of some influence of the Transkei Penal Code's
provisions on South African Law in the early days.
This however appears to begin and end with the Orange
Free State. In that province Section 1 of Ordinance
22 of 1905 relating to the falsifying of accounts by
clerks or servants was exactly the same as Section 205
of the Transkei Penal Code. The only difference in
the lengthy provisions is the absence of the word "wilfully"
before "with intent to defraud" in the Transkei Penal
Code.
The scope of the admittedly cumbersome provisions of
the Transkei Penal Code and its relevance to the essential
elements of the crime of . fraud is well demonstrated
2
by the case of R v Nkosana, a case which emanated from 
the Engcobo District. It emerged from the case that
the fraud contemplated by the legislature in Section 
196 was of a far wider nature than that denoted by the
word in its technical sense in South African common
law, and was intended to embrace all cheating or deceit 
with intent to defraud which was not clearly accompanied 
by a misrepresentation of fact by word or conduct, but
1 See Appendix A sections 189 - 210
2 1942 EDL 81
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which results in someone parting with money or granting 
credit to the cheater or the deceiver.
That notwithstanding, it was held by Lansdown J that 
the essential element of intent to defraud still attached 
to the fraud contemplated by Section 196. The appeal 
succeeded precisely because in the charges preferred 
there was no clear implication of the essential allegation 
of intent to defraud. The appeal therefore succeeded 
and the convictions and sentences were set aside. Gane J 
concurred.
1
Gardiner and Lansdown define fraud as : " A wilful perversion 
of the truth made with intent to deceive and resulting
in actual or potential prejudice to a n o t h e r T h e i r  definition
nK
was accepted and employed by the courts for a long time.
When his turn came Hunt departed from the Gardiner and
Lansdown definition and said: " Fraud consists in unlawfully
making, with intent to defraud, a misrepresentation
which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially
3
prejudicial to another."
He complained that the word wilful had English law overtones,
In this connection the Transkei Penal code was more 
South Africa inclined than the Orange Free State which 
had this word in its ordinance. Furthermore, "perversion 
of the truth" was Victorian and meant nothing more than
misrepresentation. And thirdly "intent to deceive"
1 6 ed vol 2 at 1743
2 See e.g. R v Jones and More 1926 A.D. 350 at 352, R v Davies
1928 A.D. 165 at 1/U; v Shnhan 1965 (4) S A 64 6 (W) at 649 and
S v Francis 1981 fl) SA 230 (ZA) 231
3 See volune 2 at page 714
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did not go Ear enough - Intent to defraud was necessary.
Here one sees harmony between the Code, the Orange Free
State ordinance and the Hunt definition. De Wet and
Swanepoel omit any reference to potential prejudice,
and restrict prejudice only to that of a proprietary
2
nature. Snyman later defined fraud as:
” the unlawful and intentional making of a
misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice 
or which is potentially prejudicial to another."
The four elements of the crime are thus the misrepresentation
or distortion of the truth, the prejudice, the unlawfulness
and the Intention. In connection with these elements
some matters arising from recent decisions relating
3
to fraud are noteworthy. In S v Francis it was held 
following several South African cases, that a conviction 
for Fraud is competent once a misrepresentation Is made 
with the requisite Intent, regardless of whether or 
not there has been actual prejudice, provided there was 
potential prejudice.
It is thus evident here that the Transkei Penal Code
of 1886 embraced a wider meaning of fraud while the 
South African law embraced a narrower meaning thereof. 
The little Influence that the Code's provisions had on 
South African law are seen In the Orange Free State's 
Ordinance No.22 of 1905 relating to fraud and the matter 
ends there.
-  ^ ^
2 £jiijiiiri.al_U>w_page 456
3 1981 (1) SA 230 (ZAD)
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The Transkei Penal Code Act deals with fraud and breach
of trust in eleven different sections. *
There are some interesting points arising from this 
legislation. First, the idea of several sections covering 
all contingencies in the sphere of cheating and deceit 
is self - evident. This means that the Transkeian Legislature 
has seen fit to retain the approach of the Cape Parliament 
in 1886 as far as fraud is concerned. Secondly, as 
if to put matters beyond doubt, Section 167 is couched 
in terms which indicate that the Legislature clings 
resolutely to a meaning of fraud wider than that given
to it by the common law.
At the end of the day, therefore, it becomes clear that
the wider meaning of fraud remains as ever before a
prominent feature of the Transkei Penal Code. The effort
of the Judges of the Supreme Court to introduce a narrow
2
interpretation of fraud in section 196 has been unsuccessful.
9.2 Extortion
According to Gardiner and Lansdown : " a person is guilty
of the crime of extortion who, from improper motives
and by inspiring fear in the mind of another, demands
from and compels the latter to render some advantage
3
which is not due."
1 See sections 1 - 11 of Act No.9 of 1983
2 R v Nkosana Supra
3 6 ed 1709
This definition is not quite in harmony with the provisions
1
of the Transkei Penal Code of 1886. Prominent in the
Gardiner and Lansdown definition is the concept of an
advantage "which is not due" which concept is plainly
wrong because even if an advantage is due it would not
be right that such advantage should be allowed to be rendered
under compulsion, thereby allowing one to take the law
into one's own hands. This criticism is aptly made by
2
Hunt.
Be that as it may, there is nothing to suggest that the 
common law was not adequate to deal with the problem of
extortion and yet in the Transvaal and Orange Free State
statutory provisions were made for the punishment of extortion 
which supplemented the common law. The Transvaal provisions 
were contained in section 12 - 17 of Ordinance No.26 of
1904 and the Orange Free State provisions in section 5
of Act 8 of 1908. They were practically identical and
it is clear from them that the Transvaal and Orange Free
State did not escape the influence of the Transkei Penal
Code especially having regard to the similarity of the
provisions.
In some of the cases that followed the concept of "an
advantage which is not due" was not highlighted, and
the courts seemed to simply consider whether or not the
complainant had yielded to illegitimate pressure exerted
3
by the accused. In Notaris v R the accused an employee
of______the_____ Creek_____ consulate______in___________ Johannesburg,
1 See Appendix A, section 214 c.f. S v von Molendorff & Another
1987 (1) SA 135 (T) -------- ;----------
2 South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol. 2 (1970) page 653 
Footnote 23
3 1903 TS 484
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had accepted bribes from persons who wanted permits to 
enter the country. It was held per Innes CJ that because 
of the absence of pressure of any kind the correct indictment 
could not be extortion. It was emphasised that illegal 
pressure was an essential element of the offence. Any 
suggestion that the Notaris case upholds the concept of 
"an advantage which is not due" would be incorrect, and 
yet Stratford CJ does exactly that in R v Mohamed and others
. 2 3
would blindly follow him. In R v Farndon this test was
4
clearly employed. This was a case from Port Elizabeth.
In R v Xalasile Gardiner AJ was faced with an extortion
case from the Umtata District. The accused had been convicted
of extortion by obtaining from complainant money on threat
of arrest if he failed to pay. According to the evidence
the complainant youth arrived from work on the mines and
slept with the accused and had intercourse with her. In
the morning she demanded payment. He objected and she
thereupon threatened him with arrest, and he then promptly
paid. There is no mention of the charge having been in
terms of the Transkei Penal Code and it is clear that the
accused was charged under the common law "as though the
offence had been committed in the colony" as indeed permitted
6
by section 269 of the Transkei Penal Code of 1886. In 
its judgement the court re-stated the Gardiner and Lansdown 
definition but departed from it. The demands for payment 
which was due were illegal and could therefore not be
countenanced. The conviction therefore stood.______________________
1 1928 AD 58 at 67
2 See also Hunt op cit 653 footnote 28 and S v Munyani 1972 
SA 411 (RAD)
3 S37 EDL 180
4 See at page 187, See also R v Gqobo 1918 EDL 75 (Transkei case)
5 1939 EDL 189
6 See Appendix A
_  2 3 3  _
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R.v' Ngqanda ! is similar to X alastle. 2 The
magistrate of Umtata convicted Nobomvu Manto and two
other prostitutes for attempted extortion in that they
threatened not to allow three youths to take away their
luggage from their (women's) house after a night's consorting
unless the sum of 30 shillings was paid in each case.
3 •
And in R v G the point at issue was extortion by demanding
£ 2 0 0 . 0 0  from another under threat of disclosing his
immoral conduct at a preparatory examination. The
old authorities were reviewed and the definition of
some of them translated but nowhere did the concept
of "an advantage which was not due" surface, neither
did de Villiers JA mention it at any time during the
4
course of delivering his judgement.
On the other hand the emphasis on extortion being committed
when money or property which is not due has been taken
or sought to be taken was laid by the courts. The Appellate
5
Division did so in R v Mahomed. It also did so in
6
R v Matlmba Tindall JA clearly followed the Gardiner 
and Lansdown definition as shown by the phrases " conscious 
impropriety of conduct" followed by:
"if the accused demands what he knows is not due, 
or he represents that he has authority to order 
payment when he knows that he has no such authority, 
the element of impropriety is present."
1 1939 EL 213 2 Supra 3 1938 AD 251
4 For instance Matthaeus 477 defined concussie as being "nothing else 
than to inspire fear with the object of extorting money or some other 
thing" - nihil aliud quam terror injectus pecuniae vel rei alicuius 
extorquendae gratia
5 1929 AD 58 at 67
6 19V» AD 23
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R v Matimba is important for giving an indication of the
possible origins as well as the real nature of the parting
of the ways between the Gardiner and Lansdown approach
on the one hand, and the Transkei Penal Code, Transvaal
- Orange Free State approach on the other hand, the
latter backed as far as possible by the Eastern Districts
Local Division. In this case a Headman from Southern
Rhodesia ( as it then was) imposed a fine on someone
for the killing of game. There was no express threat
but the pressure lay in the pretence of authority.
The result in my view is the same. The accused himself
pleaded guilty. The court assumed in favour of the crown that
the accused represented that he had authority to fix
and impose fines for the killing of Kudu. But the Headman
was acquitted because the evidence did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that he was 
2
acting improperly "the evidence contains no investiga­
tion of the question whether natives, living under the 
conditions under which the accused and the other natives 
here concerned live, recognise a distinction between
a payment of compensation and a payment exacted as a
3
fine."
The emphasis of the statutes, on the other hand, lies
on the illegitimate pressure, hence the girls in the 
two Umtata cases were convicted although they knew and 
the complainants knew and the court itself knew that
the payment sought was "due ", the law being simply
1 1944 AD 23
2 See at 33
3 Page 32
1
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bent on eliminating illegitimate pressure as a means of 
achieving goals.
For a long time after MaCimba the case law drifted more
and more towards the Gardiner and Lansdown definition
1
on the question of extortion. In R v Slgonga Jennett J
said that if the fear is not inspired unlawfully, then
the crime of extortion has not been committed. Four years
2
later in R v N Ramsbottom J sharply critisised the judgement
of Jennet J as being inconsistent with the decisions of
the Appellate Division and the authorities. In the following
3 4
year R v Lepheane approved R v N thereby making bigger
the difference between the Eastern Districts and the Transvaal 
courts. The Appellate Division upheld the emphasis on
the extortion of something that is not "due", and overruled
----------- 5
Che decision of Jennet J in R v Slgonga.
6
In S v Gokool the court stood firmly by the Gardiner and
-------------- 7 8
Lansdown definition, approved Notaris v Rex, R v N and
R v Lepheana. In the course of doing so the Natal courC
gave wholehearCed approval to the formulations "conscious
impropriety" and "advantage which is not due". By this
time even Che EasCern Districts Local Division could not
maintain its original stand-polnt and had yielded to the
pressure implicit in the preponderant judicial formulations
on extortion. Thus in S v Mntonintshi a Headman in the
Tsolo District, Transkei, informed four complainants ChaC
if_________ they_________ desired ______ their________ lands Co
Ï 1951 (1) SA 266 (E) 2 1955 (2) SA 647 (T)
2 1955 (2) SA 647 (T) 3 1956 (1) SA 377 (A)
4 Supra 5 Supra
6 1965 (3) SA 461 (N) 7 Supra
8 Supra 9 Supra
10 1970 (2) SA 443 (E)
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be ploughed (in terms of a contract between the Transkei
Government and the farmers who thereafter pay the Government 
for ploughing) they should first make certain payments 
to him. In one case it had to be R2,00 and another
a bottle of brandy and in the remaining two, a fowl 
each. Three of them paid accordingly and their lands 
were promptly ploughed. In confirming the convictions 
by the Magistrate, Tsolo, Jennet JP said all that was 
necessary to constitute the crime of extortion was that 
there should be illegitimate pressure which caused the 
victim to part with money or other thing which was not
due. The learned Judge quoted Gardiner and Lansdown 
but did not even mention the Transkei Penal Code, a
Code which by this time was being used exclusively in
Transkeian cases wherever circumstances permitted. 
In this way the Eastern Cape Division found itself being 
party to the watering down if not complete termination
of the influence of the Transkei Penal Code in South 
Africa as far as extortion was concerned. This is much 
to be regretted in view of the fact that the judges 
of the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court were 
themselves sitting regularly at circuits at Butterworth
and Umtata, Transkei at that time as long before. They 
were fully aware of the identity which Transkei was
establishing, especially at that time which was only 
three years before the formal establishment of the Transkei 
High Court. For that matter they were themselves to 
play a leading role in the establishment of this new 
court and clothing it in its distinctive colours.
As early as 1959 there were pronouncements by jurists
which amounted to open rumblings against the line that
was taken by Gardiner and Lansdown and followed by the
Courts on extortion. Burchell, discussing extortion,
said that the decision in R v Jansen 1959 (1) SA 777
(C) emphasising the concept of "not due" had gone too
far as far as that aspect was concerned. The most important
element of the crime was the illegitimate pressure and
there was thus no need to go further. "The submission
is therefore, that it is immaterial whether the advantage
obtained was due or not except in those cases where the
pressure was not per se illegitimate."
2
When P M A Hunt came on the scene in 1970 that which
had gradually become the established order in the field
of extortion began to change and yield place to a new
approach. The learned author realised the ineffectiveness
which had long characterised the Transvaal and Orange
Free State provisions. This ineffectiveness was, in
my submission, brought about by the ascendancy of the
Gardiner and Lansdown formulation which had also blunted
all the sharp edges of the Transkei Penal Code. Hunt
therefore contended that the provisions could well be
repealed. He argued that the common law was adequate
and the provisions which contained technical requirements
foreign to the common law could only increase an accused
3
person's prospects of acquittal. These provisions were
4
indeed duly repealed by the pre-Union Law Revision Act.
The second important suggestion that the learned author 
made related to his definition of extortion
1 1959 SALJ 260 at 262 ~ ~ ~
2 B.A (Hons), LLB (Natal) LL.M. (Rand) Advocate of the Supreme 
Cburt of South Africa and member of the Natal Bar
3 See footnote 86 on page 695
4 Act No.43 of 1977
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which reads:
" Extortion consists in taking from another sans advantage 
by intentionally and unlawfully subjecting him to pressure
u+iich induces him to submit to the taking."
This was a calculated departure from the Gardiner and
Lansdown formulation. This learned author said, quite
rightly in my view, that the Gardiner and Lansdown definition
2
omits the element of intention. He also criticised
the concept of an advantage which is not due. None of
the old authorities had ever said that the advantage
3
must be "not due”, he argued. The author was either modest
about the great move he had taken in drawing attention
to the wrong formulation that was dominating the courts
or simply mistaken about its real significance. He said:
" I have departed from the Gardiner and Lansdown formulae in
most instances precisely because they do not accurately or
4
comprehensively reflect what goes on in the courts."
But in reality, certainly as far as extortion is concerned
the courts began to depart from the Gardiner and Lansdown
5
formula and adopt his own. Thus in S v J Smalberger J 
repeated Hunt's definition with approval. There seemed 
to be no logical reason to distinguish between the situation 
where the pressure was applied to secure an advantage
of_______pecuniary_______or_______proprietary______ nature,_______or
1 At page 652
2 See footnote 28 page 653
3 See footnote 74 on 658
4 Preface page 5 c.f. de Wet and Swanepoel: Strafree 4ed page
379
5 1980 (4) SA 113 (E) c.f. S v von Mollendorff 1987 (1) SA 135 (T)
-  2 3 g  -
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some other subjective advantage.
It is submitted that the new trend of thought and 
formulation, departing clearly as they do from the 
Gardiner and Lansdown approach, actually go back, 
in large measure, to the vicinity of the Transkei 
Penal Code of 1886. True enough the wording of the 
Code is itself characteristically clumsy and haphazard, 
but what is significant for this enquiry is that section 
214 relates to "whoever with intent to extort or gain 
anything from any person..."
This is in line with Hunt's definition and with the 
dictum of Smalberger J:
"the graveman of the offence of extortion is the 
use of threats or intimidation tc obtain a benefit."
It therefore came as no surprise when. Hunt's definition
was taken over word for word in the Transkei Penal
2
code of 1983.
To conclude, it can be said that the Transkei Penal 
code of 1886 exerted an influence on the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State legislation relating to extortion, 
thereby causing those provisions to drift away from 
the common law. A long period of uncertainty followed, 
with the courts sometimes following the common law 
and at other times following the statutory provisions 
of the Transkei Penal Code and the Orange Free State 
and the Transvaal.
1 S v J page 166. c.f. S v Hunyanl 1972 (1) SA 411 (R.A.D); S v Potgieter
1977 (3) SA 291 (0) S v Von Mollendorff & Another 1987 (l)SA 135(T)
2 Section 156 of Act No.9 of 1983
When Hunt came onto the scene he successfully influenced 
both the repeal of the Provincial legislation and 
the improvement of the common law definition of extortion 
as previously given by Gardiner and Lansdown. The Transkei 
Legislature promptly took advantage of these improvements 
by adopting the Hunt definition word for worá.
9.3 Forgery and Uttering
9.3.1 Forgery
As regards forgery there is incontrovertible evidence
of the influence of the Transkei Penal code of 1886
on South African law. This influence is testified
2
to by Gardiner and Lansdown and is also seen in the 
case law. It has also been more recently acknowledged 
by Hunt and Snyman.
9.3.1.1 Definition of Forgery
The Code gave a long definition of forgery which contained
3
unsatisfactory explanations. It emanated from section
, 4
315 of Stephen s Indictable Offences Bill. Gardiner
and Lansdown do not hesitate to indicate that this
definition adequately represents the common law of
South Africa, and in this regard they rely openly
5
on section 2 2 1  and 2 2 2 .
The courts made no effort to riggle out of the influence
of the Transkei Penal code in this regard. In the
6
leading Transkeian case of S v Dreyer, in which the
-  2 4 1  -
1 See section 156 of Act No.9 of 1983
2 See below
3 See Section 221 and 222
4 See Hunt op cit 743
5 See pp 1748 - 1749
6 1967 (4) SA 614 (E)
Che accused was charged under the Code, Addleson J 
referred with approval to Gardiner & Lansdown "where
it is also noted that the relevant provisions of Act
1
24 of 1886 substantially represented the common law".
More recently, Hunt has defined forgery discreetly
as: "unlawfully making, with intent to defraud,
a false document which causes actual prejudice
2
or which is potentially prejudicial to another."
-  242 -
This definition is in line with the dictum of Addleson J
3
in S v Dreyer viz that it is not possible to divorce
the definition of forgery from that of a false document.
The considerable influence of the Code in respect
of forgery is noticeable from the fact that the learned
4
author mentions it repeatedly throughout his discussion. 
The author also merely reframes the wording of the
code rather than substantially detracting from it.
XC is submiCCed that he has made no effort to terminate 
the influence of Che Code as far as this crime is
concerned.
The Transkei Penal Code has once more succeeded in
spreading its CenCacles as far afield as Zimbabwe.
5
In S v Potgieter ic was repeatedly mentioned with
approval in its own right and with reference to the
6 7
Dreyer case which was applied. Davies JA was satisfied
that the common law of Zimbabwe is as stated by Hunt
1 At 618
2 Op cit 744
3 Supra
4 See especially at page 748 where it referred noC less Chan five times
5 1979 (4) SA 64 (ZRA)
6 Supra
7 Now Judge of Appeal of Che Supreme Court of Transkei
and Gardiner and Lansdown, " and accords substantially with 
the provisions of the Transkeian Penal Code"^ The 
learned Judge mentioned a general lack of decided 
cases in England and South Africa on the matter and 
the absence of authority contrary to Addleson J's 
findings in the Dreyer case. As in several other 
instances the Transkei Penal Code and now even a case 
arising directly from it, has been ready at hand to
fill up the lacuna■
3
In 1981 the Zimbabwe Court in the case of S v Ratiyo
accepted the findings of Davies JA in the Potgieter
case. Fieldsend CJ recalled the Code when discussing
4
S v Dr e y e r . The Dreyer case, he said directly concerned 
as it was with forgery under the Transkei Penal code,
stated what "is recognised as the law in South Africa
and in this country". The learned Chief Justice referred 
to the South African case of S v Banur Investments
(Pty) and Another 1970 (3) SA 767 (A) and the Zimbabwean
„ 6 
case of S v Potgieter.
Hunt's improved definition of forgery has been adopted
7
by the Transkei Penal Code Act. The new Penal Code 
will therefore continue the function of its predecessor 
obviously for a long time to come.
1 At page 66
2 Supra
3 1981 (3) SA 34 (ZAD)
4 Supra
5 Page 35
6 Supra
7 Act No.9 of 1983
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Apart from the influence of the Code with reference
to the definition In general, there is a distinct
connection regarding the meaning oz the word document.
In section 219 of the Transkei Penal Code of 1886
a document, for the purpose of forgery, is defined
as "any substance on which is impressed and described
by means of letters, figures or marks, any matter
which is intended to be or may be used in a court
of justice, or otherwise, as evidence of such matter."
Wessels J gave much the same definition of "document"
when he held that a book was a "document" in Seccombe
1
v Attorney General.
The wider meaning of document as contained in the
Transkei Penal Code was thus introduced into South
2
African law. The acceptance of this wider meaning 
was consistent with the much earlier decision in R
3
v Smith where It was held that intent to defraud may 
be inferred even though the forged Instrument Is used
to obtain something to which the accused is legally 
entitled. But whenever there was ro proof of prejudice, 
actual or potential, (the materiality of the Transkei 
Penal Code) the courts consistently acquitted the 
accused persons.
-  2 4 4  -
9.3.1.2 Meaning of Document
1 1919 TPD 270
2 See also R v Letsoela 1942 OPD 99 R v Dlamini 1943 TDP 20, and 
R v LebalIo~T954 (2) SA 657 (C)
3 84 J P 67
4 See R v Mclean 1918 TPD 94; R v Vllakazi 1933 TPD 198;
R v DHlamni 1943 TPD 20 ------------
2 4 5  _
De Wet and Swanepoel prefer a narrow definition which
restricts the meaning of document to written documents
which embody legal transactions or can be effective
1 2
as evidence of legal transactions. Hunt rejects this 
narrower meaning of document, and argues that if it 
were Co be accepted then several cases in which the
wider meaning was accepted would fall to have been
wrongly decided e.g. R v Letsoela 1942 OPD 99, R_v
Dhlamini 1943 TPD 20, R v Motete 1943 OPD 55, and
R v Leballo 1954 (2) SA 657 (0). Furthermore, "it
is in the public interest to treat falsification of 
documents such as testimonials as forgery and not 
as non-criminal." The limitation would lead to
technicality and fine distinction, the author argues.
3
Snyman acknowledges the influence that the Code has
4
on the South African Courts in this regard. Furthermore
he looks at the old authorities and makes out a strong
5
case in favour of the wider definition. This effectively 
counters De Wet and Swanepoel's reliance on Roman 
Law as a basis for promoting the narrower definition. 
Section 219 of the Transkei Penal code thus retains 
the upper hand in a remarkeable way both in respect 
of the courts and the recent authorities.
9.3.2 Uttering
When it comes to the crime of uttering the developments 
are also interesting. Section 226 of the Transkei
1 3ed 1975 505
2 Vol 2 2ed 1982 at page 787-788
3 Criminal Law
4 See at page 465 cum footnote 10 where he actually repeats
. verbatim the "broader definition" of document given by the code
5 Page 465 £f.
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Penal Code of 1886 deals wieh the use of forged documents
and refers to someone who uses or acts upon or causes
or attempts to cause any person to use or act upon
it as if it were genuine. Such person became liable
to the same punishment as if he had forged that document.
It does therefore appear that the requirement of prejudice
is here dispensed with. This view is subscribed to
1
by Hutton J in R v Maninjwa although he did not commit 
himself to a decision on the question.
The South African law took over from the English law
2
the rule that uttering is a crime distinct from forgery.
As a result the English definition accurately reflects
3 4
the South African law. The definition given by Hunt
is that the crime of uttering consists in putting
off, unlawfully and with intent to defraud, a false
document which causes actual prejudice or which is
potentially prejudical to another.
The difference between forgery and uttering lies in 
the passing off - the comminication oE the document 
to another. The Transkei Penal Code explains the 
matter more fully as it indicates that the document 
is meant to be used or acted upon as if it was genuine.
1 1919 EDL 196 at 198. See also R v Mfombo 1937 EDL lfifi
2 ^ S ^ J o u b e r t  1961 (A) SA 1965(01 8 v Miekerk 1980 (1) 
SA 594 10), see also Hunt op cit 752_ footnote 111
3 Hunt ibid 
A Loc cit
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Commenting on forgery and uttering, B. D. van Niekerk
reiterates Chat they are derived from English law
but omits to highlight the role of the Transkei Penal
Code in the process of South AfricanisaCion of these
crimes*. Obviously having in mind Che frequent overlapping
thaC occurs regarding forgery and uCtering on the
one hand and fraud on the other, he advocates their
scrapping in view of the wide nature of fraud. If
they are to be retained the desirabiliCy of reCaining
Che requirement of prejudice acCual or poCential
should be realised. In this respect the learned authors
thinking is consonanC with Che Transkei Penal Code
which does noC pay serious aCtention to this requirement.
But that is not all. The learned author also favours
Che wider definicion of document as against the narrow
one. In this way he supports the Transkei Penal Code
approach and the case law and the authorities. This
is sufficiently clear from the few words he says about
the matter: "suffice it to say that rather more than
2
fewer documents should be protected. " He relies on 
Van der Linden: Koopman's Handbook 2.6.4.
It is thus clear from the above exposition that the 
Transkei Penal Code of 1886 exerted a distinct influence 
on South African law in the fields of forgery and 
uttering. In the field of uttering the wider definition 
contained in the code was embraced by the courts
1 Vol 87 1971 SALJ 26
2 See at page 30
_  2 4 8  -
and Che auChoriCies and none of Chern ever made an
efforc Co deparC from iC. In Cerms of Che Transkei
1
Penal Code of 1983 uCCering becomes an offence in
iCs own righc and Che definicion Chereof is exacCly
2
Che same as ChaC given by HunC save ChaC Che Transkeian 
Code uses Che words "passes off" insCead of "puCCing 
off".
1 Ace No.9 of 1983
2 Op ciC
CHAPTER TEN
RAPE, ASSAULT, MURDER AND SUICIDE
10.1 RAPE
10.1.1 Introduction
In the field of rape there is again conclusive evidence of
the influence of the Transkei Penal Code on South African
law. Contrary to what the position was with fraud,
South African Law was not adequate and had to borrow
from elsewhere. It could not avoid English law and
one very reliable means that South African law had
for the importation of English law was the Transkei
Penal Code. When the cargo landed in Cape Town it
was taken to the various parts of South Africa by
Gardiner and Lansdown. Section 159 of the 1886 Code defines
rape - and this definition embraces the so - called
2
14 year rule. Gardiner and Lansdown's definition
3
also embraced this rule.
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10.1.2 Who Can Commit Rap e ?
As appears above the Transkei Penal code laid down
that a boy below the age of 14 years was conclusively
deemed to be incapable of committing rape. The Transkei
Penal code was passed some nine years before the first
. 4
reported case in South African law on this question. 
South African Law followed the Code, and in so doing 
departed from the view of Matthaeus Proleg 2.4 and
1 See Appendix A
2 See 10.1.2 infra
3 Vol 2 6 ed page 1622
4 S v Jeremy (1895) 12 Cape LJ 231
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Carpzovious 1.43.58 - that upon proof that a boy under 
14 had reached puberty he could be convicted of rape.
The 14 year rule has at last been discarded as a result
1
of recent legislation in South Africa. This development
2 '
has been welcomed by South African legal scholars.
10.1.3 The Requirement of Consent
Section 159 of the 1886 Code contains a proviso relating
3
to consent. The courts, both in South Africa and 
Rhodesia as it then was, fell under the influence
of this section. The problem is highlighted by cases 
where a woman consents to intercourse thinking that
the man in question is her husband. Apparently the
point is obscure in Roman and Roman Dutch Law. In 
English Law there was for a long time a conflict of
decisions on the question. The dilemma was resolved 
by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 which provided
1 Section 1 of the Law of Evidence and the Criminal 
Procedure Act Amendment Act 103 of 1987 provides: "no 
presumption or rule of law to the effect that such a 
boy is incapable of sexual intercourse shall come into 
operation".
2 See discussion under 10.1.3 infra.
3 See Appendix A
for the affirmative of the proposition. Gardiner and Lansdown 
state: "connection after assent obtained by such personation
is safe in the Transkei Territories under Act 24 of 1886 Section 
159, and this is also Che rule of South African common law
- see R v C 1952 (4) SA 117 (0) But in their 5th edition
published before R v C was decided in 1952 the learned authors 
already asserted that this was the rule of SouCh African Law 
and the decision in R v C was influenced by that assertion.
2
In R v Mahomed Rahaman the court referred to Section 159 of
the NTPC with approval. This constitutes more evidence of
the influence of the Code far away in Zimbabwe. This pare
3
of SecCion 159 is criCicized by De Wet Swanepoel who indicate 
that according to English Law authorities such as Cross & 
Jones as well as HaIsbury permission obtained by means of 
intimidation or a trick such as the personation, of the woman's 
husband or by fraud affecting the transaction is not permission 
and the subsequent sexual intercourse is in fact rape. This
criticism appears to me to be reasonable.
Ic seems clear, therefore, that the Transkei Penal Code exercised
a definite influence on South African law in this field.
I find it strange ChaC Chis should have happened in view of
a matter which arose in Che first case in which the courts
4
in South Africa followed the code. The court said that in 
many cases involving blacks in South Africa there was the 
Inherent difficulty of establishing age. ThaC would surely 
have been a good reason for rejecCing the 14 year rule and
1 South African Criminal Law and Procedure 6 ed vol 2 (1951) P.1624
2 1929 SR 17
3 Op ciC 479
4 3 v Jeremy, Gupra
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adhering to the view of Matthaeus Proleg 2.4 and Carpzoviuj
1.43.58 which view runs contrary to the presumption-
This view is indeed sound and it caters for the uncertain­
ties and surprises that abound in life.
The Transkei Penal Code Act of 1983 steers completely
clear of the 14 year rule. This development is welcome.
10.2 Assault
10.2.1 The Impact of Section 155
The code's definition of assault is to be found in
1
section 155 thereof. This definition was introduced
into South African Law when it was adopted by Gardiner
2
and Lansdown. The only difference between theirs 
and the Code's definition is that they add the words 
"and unlawfully" after intentionally
3
Gardiner and Lansdown further state that the English
law on the subject of assault has been adopted in
South Africa except that the terra battery has been
discarded and the superflous distinction between it
and assault has been abandoned. The learned authors
further state that what constitutes the crime of
assault in either system (i.e. English and South African)
"is well epitomised in section 1S5 of the Transkeian
4
Territories Penal Code, act 24 of 1886". The Code 
therefore once again appears at the forefront as a 
vehicle for the smooth introductian of English Law. 
into South African Law.
1 bee i\ppen3Tx~R — ~
2 6 ed Vol. 2 page 570
3 Ibid K
4 Ibid
- 253
For a long time the relationship between section 155
of the Transkei Penal code and South African law was
1
a cordial one. As early as 1918 the element of Che
Transkeian Code's concept of assault by ChreaCs where
Che complainanC had reasonable grounds for apprehension
was applied. Then followed Gardiner and LansdownJ
definiCion in Cheir firsC edicion which came ouC in
1919. The cordial nature of Chis relationship reached
iCs climax when a case of assaulC wiCh inCenC Co murder
2
came before the Appellate Division in 1920. Innes
said " The definiCion of assault in South African
practice as given by Gardiner and Lansdown (vol 2
page 1020) is as follows....The definition is substantially
taken from the Transkeian Penal Code. It commended
itself to the trial courC, and would appear Co be satisfa-
3
ctory for all practicel purposes." In a concurring
judgement Kotze JA said that a comprehensive definition
of an assault was to be found in Article 155 of Act
24 of 1886, commonly known as the Transkeian Code.
That definition of an assault had been generally accepted
4
in the South African Courts he said.
Because of the precedent sysCem iC is well Co be expected
that in subsequent assault cases the courts in South
Africa would follow Che definiCion sec out by Gardiner
and Lansdown and the approach adopted by the Appellate
5
Division in R v Jolly. In so doing the provisions
1 See R v Abrahams 1918 CPD 590
2 R v Jolly and Others, 1920 AD 176
3 At page 179
4 See at page 184
5 Supra
of section 155 of the Transkeian Penal Code would naturallv
1
be echoed. In a case from the Libode district, Transkei,
the learned Judge applied the Gardiner & Lansdown definition
and Jolly's case and did not even mention the Transkei
------—  2
Penal Code. Commenting on this case P M A Hunt classes
this case as a South African case and seems not to be
aware that the Gardiner and Lansdown definition is quite
appropriate to it by reason of it being a Transkeian
case if not for any other reason. However, in the Natal
3
case of S v Marx the learned Judge President reiterated
the Gardiner & Lansdown definition and acknowledged that
it was substantially taken from the Transkeian Penal
4
Code.
10.2.2 Objections to the Code's Influence
The Transkeian definition thus commands an enormous
amount of respect in the South African cases and this
gives Hunt much cause for concern. He admits as much,
and undertakes a lengthy discussion of the English law,
which discussion he says is necessary to water-down
this respect. He therefore criticises the Gardiner
and Lansdown definition at some length and in so doing
6
he criticises the Transkei Code's definition.
Hunt's definition of assault is as follows:
"Assault consists in unlawfully and intentionally:
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1 S v Sikunyana and Others 1961 (3) SA 550 (E)
2 South African Criminal Law and Prrc.edurp Vol. 2 2nd edition
by J R Milton page 468
3 1962 (1) SA 848 (N)
4 See also S v Mlya and Others 1966 (4) SA 274 (N) where section
155 was once more relied on
5 Op cit page 479
6 See page 468. See also de Wet and Swanepoel 4 ed 236
(1 ) applying force to the person of another (2 ) inspiring
a belief in that other that force is immediately to
1  ’ 
be applied to him". Thi= H»F-t •
inis definition is a great impro
verosnt on that of the Code and Gardiner and Lansdown.
The essential elements are therefore (1) the unlawfulness,
(2) the intention and (3) the applying of force or 
inspiring apprehension thereof. As to the third element, 
the learned author insists that although in English 
law there could not be an assault by words only and 
that is how the Transkei Penal code came to specify 
"acts or gestures" - it is ridiculous to exclude words. 
He also objects to the words "upon reasonable grounds" 
because in criminal law liability rests on intention 
and it is therefore absurd to require the reasonable 
apprehension of an assault. He then finally says:
"It is accordingly not unfair to conclude by commenting
that the Transkeian Code preserves, like ugly
fossils, several unsatisfactory and illogical
ideas which were inaccurate even in 1886 and which
have since been largely rejected by the legal
2
system whence they came".
3
Snyman defines assault as consisting in :
(a) "applying force, directly or indirectly, to the person 
of another or
(b) threatening another with immediate personal violence 
in circumstances which lead the threatened person 
to believe that the other intends and has the 
power to carry out that threat".
- 255 -
1 Page 467 2 Page 478 3. Criminal Law p. 393
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The emphasis is therefore on the fear inspired not
so much the ability to execute the threat as suggested
by Gardiner & Lansdown and the Transkei Penal Code
1
of 1886.
To sum up the position here, one can say that the
Transkei Penal Code exerted indisputable influence
2
on South African law. The authors Hunt and de Wet
and Swanepoel later tried to terminate this influence 
and they achieved a great measure of success in their
efforts. In my view this success was facilitated
by the fact that the 1886 code never took over holus- 
bolus the English law relating to assault. That
overall success is brought to a climax by the 1983 
Transkei Penal Code's definition of assault which 
is similar to that of Hunt and different from that
of the 1886 Code.
10. 3 Murder
3
10.3.1 The Provisions of Section 140 of the Transkei Penal Code
From this section there emerges further evidence of the 
influence of the Transkei renal Code of 1886 on South African 
law in relation to murder. The relevant subsections are (b) 
and (c) of section 140.
1 On the question of personal exertion of force by the assailant see
S v Marx 1962 (1) SA 848 (N), R v Sophy 1961 R & N 358 R v Mathews
1950 (3) SA 671 (N)
2 See de Wet & Swanepoel 4 ed 238 for the influence on the 1917 and 
1955 Criminal Procedure Acts.
3 See Appendix A
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The provisions of this section were applied in a case
that went to the Appellate Division as an appeal
1
from the Witwatersrand Local Division. After
referring to the old authorities such as Moorman
and Carpzovius on the question of murder, Greenberg JA
says; "It is interesting to see that section
140 of the Transkeian Penal Code (Act 24 of
1886), which has not infrequently been found
to have incorporated in its provisions the correct
view of what our law is, provides that culpable
homicide becomes murder in a number of cases,
one of which is that if the offender means to
cause the person killed any bodily injury, which
is known to the offender to be likely to cause
death, and if the offender, whether he does
or does not mean to cause death, is reckless
whether death ensues or not. It will be seen
that in that code It Is necessary that the accused
should know that the injury he inflicts is likely
to cause ceath... We may, I think, conclude
from these authorities that the crime of murder
will at all events have been committed if it
be proved, by necessary inference from all the
circumstances, that the accused killed the deceased
by an act which they must have known to be of
such a dangerous character that death would
be likely to result thereform, and were reckless
2
whether it did or not."
10.3.1.1 The Impact of Section 140 (b)
1  R y Valachia & Another 1945 AD 826 c.f. page 1 supra
2 Page 479
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As far as sub-section (c) is concerned there arises
the important question of aberratlo ictus - the
going astray of the blow - and the section plainly
means that cases of aberratlo ictus are murder.
This Is not good law because a person's intention
to kill ought to relate to the very person killed.
Even as recently as 1949 the Appellate Division
of South Africa, basing its findings on Roman-Dutch
authorities, took a line similar to the provisions
of sub-section (c) of the Transkei Penal Code.
In an appeal that came from the Natal Native High
Court^ van der Heever JA did not hesitate to confirm
the death penalty where the person killed was
2
not the person intended. He further held that 
the realisation of the murderous intent upon the 
wrong victim was not a mitigating factor. Centlivres JA 
and Hoexter JA concurred in this judgement.
10.3.1.3 Termination of the Influence of Section 140 (c)
The subject subsequently received the careful
3
attention of de Wet and Swanepoel. The learned 
authors departed emphatically frcm the view that 
In cases of aberratio ictus a verdict of murder 
is competent. Also informative is their detailed 
discussion of the related yet separate question 
of error in objecto.
10.3.1.2 T he Impact of Section 140 (c)
1 R v Khuzwayo 1949 (3) SA 761 (A)
2 See page 770
3 Op cit 2ed 134 ff.
In the Zimbabwean case of R__v Habena the accused
was charged with murdering the deceased. He pleaded 
not guilty, saying that he had not been fighting 
with him but with one Ranga Mpof u, and that he did
not remember seeing the deceased at the time. It 
was therefore a case of aberratlo ictus. When it 
became clear what had happened in the semi-darkness
accused expressed regret, saying he had not intended
to injure deceased.
1
In the course of his judgement Young J took into
2
account the dicta made in R__v Kuzwayo which he said
were of high persuasive value and had been referred
to with apparent approval as recently as 1963, but
expressed his full agreement with the argument raised
4
by de Wet and Swanepoel in their work. In his summing
up of the law of aberratio ictus the influence of
5
section 140 (:) was effectively terminated. The
termination of the code's influence became irreversible
6
when the Transkei Penal Code Act was passed.
It is thus clear that initially sections 140 (b)
and (c) of the code made a distinct Impact on South
African law, but in relation to sub-section (c) the
intervention of de Viet and Swanepoel brought about
a termination of the influence. The Transkei Penal
7
Code of 1983 promptly discarded the provisions of
1 1967 (3) SA 525 (SR)
7  Supra
3 In S v Nkombani 1963 (4) SA 877 (A)
4 At page" 129 tt
5 C.f. S v Mtshiza 1970 (3) SA 747 (A) ; S v Tissen 1979 (4) SA
293 (TTf.S v Mav+iungu 1981 (1) SA 56 (K)
6 Act No 9 oTTTJBl
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Che old code. IC followed Che new paCh indicaCed 
by de WeC and Swanepoel and echoed by the courts.
1
10.3.2 The ImpacC of SecClon 134
The Transkei Penal code has also registered a positive
influence on South African law via its section 134
which is concerned with the important question:
who is a "person" for purposes of murder? Where
a child has been murdered, it thus becomes essential
that it should have been born alive, and the test
2
for live birth is Chat the child should have breathed.
This is according Co English law, which further requires
that the infant must be wholly born, the killing
of a child that is partly within and partly outside
3
its mother's body being therefore not murder. There
appears to be little or no Roman-Dutch authority 
on this subject, and there is likewise a scarsity
of South African case law thereon. This provided
an excellent opportunity for the Transkei Penal Code 
to once again take the stage and dispaly its resourceful­
ness. And then here, as in other insCances, Gardiner 
and Lansdown shower praise upon the Code for its
eminent role. The authors say:
"where Roman-Dutch authorities are silent 
or obscure on a point of criminal law, 
the Cape courts have often referred, as
a guide, to the Transkeian Penal Code,
1 See appendix A ~ ' --------- --------
2 Gardiner and Lansdown 6 ed Vol. 2. naee 1538
3 Op cit, ibid ’
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Act 24, 1886 (C). Upon Che question under
discussion, therefor^ Che following provision
conCained in secCion 134 is of importance • . -
and Che authors quote secCion 134 verbaClm as parC
1
of Che text.
As Cime went on the South African Legislature saw fit
to follow the Transkeian example and specify its wishes
by statute in this regard. This was done by section
306 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1917 which provided 
as follows:
"On the trial of aperson chaigedlwith murder, 
or culpable homicide of a newly born 
child, such child shall be deemed to 
have been born if it is proved to have 
breathed, whether or not it has an independent 
circulaCion and iC shall not be necessary 
to prove that such child was, at the 
time of its death, entirely seperated 
from Che body of iCs moCher."
The South African statute therefore gave prominence
to the "breathing" test and departed from the CodeS
and English law's requirement of complete separaCion
2
from Che moCher while sCill in a living sCaCe. Of
course Che section relates Co procedure and not to
1 See at page 1538
2 See also the successors section 272 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act No. 56 of 1955 and section 239 (1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
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substantive law and its wording is ambiguous.
Here again, therefore, the 1886 code, with the help of 
Gardiner and Lawsdown, exercised positive influence 
on South African law. This influence was only slightly 
departed from by the Criminal Procedure Act of 1 9 1 7  
and its successors.
10.4 SUICIDE
For murder to be commited the victim must be "another
person.” It follows therefore that suicide ^cannot
be murder, neither is it any crime at all. But
what is the position ab^ut attempted suicide? The
Transkei Penal Code of 1886 specifically made attempted
suicide a crime. The only reported case on attempted
suicide is R v Tshemese 1918 EDL. That was a case
in which the charge was in terms of section 147
and the Magistrate of Mount Frere had correctly
accepted that attempted suicide was a crime. However,
the accused was acquitted on review because there
was a distinct doubt as to the sanity of the accused.
3
In R v Peverett the court did not have to go into
the question whether attempted suicide is or is
not a crime in Roman-Dutch Law. In R v Nbakwa the 
Rhodesian court (as it then was) reiterated that 
suicide was not a crime in Rhodesia. Beadle J then 
went on to say that even if it had been a crime
in Roman-Dutch law it must have become abrogated 
by disuse because there had been no prosecutions 
for it in South Africa for such a long time. Incitement
1 See S v Gordon 1962 (4) SA 727 (N), S v Grotiohn 1970 (2)
SA 35b (A)----  -------- *---
2 Section 147
3 1940 AD 213
4 1956 (2) SA 557 (SK)
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to commit suicide was thus also not a crime . In a
subsequent case it was reiterated that suicide
1
was not a crime. In all these cases there was
no mention of Section 147 of the Transkei Penal
2
Code and the supporting case of R v Tshemese. 
In the result one must accept that the codes provisions 
failed Co exert any influence on South African 
law in the field of suicide.
1 S v Gordon 1962 (4) SA 727 (N)
2 Supra
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
POSITIO QUAESTIONIS 
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE TRANSKEI PENAL CODE
Introduction
When, on 9th July 1886, Act 24 of 1886 was passed
"to provide for a Penal code for the Transkeian
Territories" because it was seen "desirable
1
to provide a Penal code for the Transkei Territories" 
it was seen fit to give it the compromise name of 
"Native Territories Penal Code" instead of the 
name that suggested itself from the preamble 
itself. It is unique for having achieved what 
was least expected of it. For while it was described 
as a statute for a native society just emerging 
from barbarism, it performed very well and became 
an important factor both in South African and 
Rhodesian criminal law where it exercised a great 
deal of lasting . influence. The areas in which 
this- influence was distinct have been indicated 
as clearly as possible above. But the code also 
failed dismally to make an impact where it could 
and should have done so. This is particularly 
so in respect, for example, of incest, suicide 
and intoxication. Likewise some of the successes 
it made remain a matter of regret because they 
entrench doctrines which are to the writer's 
mind unfortunate. The extent to which the courts 
relied on the Transkei Penal Code constitutes
1 See preamble
the greater bulk of evidence of the extent of its 
influence.
It must not at all be thought that the Transkei
Penal Code once establishing itself as a force 
to be reckoned with in Southern Africa, merely 
concerned itself with the importation of English 
law. Those who drafted it saw themselves as being 
free to take what seemed worth taking front Roman -
Dutch law and Roman law as well, and the code was 
thus successful in importing aspects of these legal 
systems into Transkeian and South African jurisprudence.
11.1.2 Assault
When considering the success of the Transkei Penal
code of 1886 one is immediately reminded of the
bold step taken by the Commission with reference
to reperation and compensation for injuries sustained
especially in assault cases which. regrettably
remain in abundance to date. They departed from
both English law which allowed no civil claim for
damages for a felony and customary law which had
the same prohibition based on the adage: "no man
can eat his own blood." They said they thought
that in this regard the people would accept a change
and they came up with a firm recommendation which
became section 17 of the Code. This was an experiment
1
and it proved to be a resounding success.
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1 See discussion at 3. 4.2 supra
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The reasons for the success of this experiment 
are not far to seek although at first sight they 
may be obscure. It is submitted that customary
law had in the first place created a legal fiction
by saying that no man can eat his own blood. 
This fiction readily found acceptance because of 
the sacral character of the legal institutions
of the African people, as against the purely secular 
character of Western law. The belief could thus 
well have been widespread, that if one "ate one's 
blood" the ancestors would not take kindly to 
it and one might then be visited by disaster. 
This fiction, however, had a flaw In that it did
not entirely abolish an aggrieved party's rights 
to compensation. It created a spes, and always 
left him in a state of hope, the hope that a chief 
of grace might give him a portion of the damages. 
Although it was sometimes frustrated the hope was 
sometimes fulfilled and for that reason it was 
bound to keep on lingering in the minds of the
whole community.
The initiative of the commissioners in bringing 
about section 17 of the Code was the first step
towards ending a chapter of uncertainty in favour
of the injured party. This could not but be welcomed 
by any community and that is why sooner than later 
the litigants wrested the initiative even from
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"Che magistrates of grace" a la section 17 and 
instituted action themselves. Here the Penal Code 
was therefore successful in bringing about harmony 
between the customary law and the received western 
law along the peaceful and good-neighbourly lines 
which the commission had envisaged when they rejected 
a speedy and inconsiderate overthrow of the customary 
law. The commission therefore had a specific ambition 
as to how the criminal law of Transkei could and 
should develop in an evolutionary as against a 
revolutionary manner. What is more important they 
devised a formula for the fulfilment of those ambitions 
and that formula worked and succeeded with mathematical 
precision.
11.1.3 Theft
In the field of theft one finds a clear illustration 
of how the Transkei Penal Code became a vehicle 
for the importation of Roman Dutch law as well 
as Ekiglish Law concepts into South African law. 
In this regard the provisions of Sections 180 to
182 of the Code are noteworthy!. Commenting on these
provisions De Uet and Swanepoel say:
"The NTPC conCains a strange mixture of English
law and Roman-Dutch law concepts. Appropriation 
is not required, but the intention to deprive the 
owner or other holder of such rights, does represent 
a requirement. On the other hand, again, certain
1 See 8.1.3 supra
actions of attempt are regarded as theft - this, again, is of 
Roman origin.1'
That the Transkei Penal Code also served as a vehicle
for the importation of Roman Law rules into South
African law appears from the case of R v Carelse
2
and Kay. De Wet and Swanepoel register their objection 
to the importation of the Roman Law rule into South 
African Law. The authors voice their disagreement 
with the findings of the court and go on to say:
" The ‘intent to steal' - whatever it may signify
- is just as essential for attempt as for completed
theft. To aver that theft is complete because
there was an 'intent to steal', or appeared to
be such an intent, provides no answer to the distincticn
3
between attempt to steal and the completed theft."
4
The New Transkei Penal Code does not do anything
to remove the Roman Law features of the old code 
in our criminal law. The following provisions 
are noteworthy in this regard:
Section 132 (1)
(b) Theft is complete when the offender takes 
or moves anything capable of being stolen, 
or causes it to move or be moved, for the
purpose of converting it, although such 
conversion be not completed.
1 2ed 321 cf 4ed 307
2 19'20 CPD 471. See discussion under 8.1.3 supra
3 4ed 311 ff. The code's influence is emphasised!
4 Act No.9 of 1983
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(c) Theft is committed when the offender cuts,
rips or otherwise begins to cause to be
; movable anything part of or growing out
of or attached to any immovable property 
with intent to steal it.
(d) Any person who kills any living creature
capable of being stolen with intent to 
steal the carcass, skin, plumage or any 
part of such creature, shall be guilty of 
theft.
11.1.4 Rape
When the Transkei Penal Code laid down that a
boy below the age of 14 years was conclusively
1
deemed to be incapable of committing rape It followed
2
Roman Law and English law. Among the Roman Dutch
writers there was a difference of opinion on the
3
question. The curious circumstances under which
South African law simply followed the Penal Code
4
have been indicated above. It is submitted that
as early as 1895 when S v Jeremy was decided Souïh 
African law should have found its way clear to
discarding the Justinian view cum section 159 of 
the Transkei Penal Code, and followed the view
of Matthaeus and Carpzovious which allows a boy 
under 14 to be convicted of rape upon proof that 
he had reached the age of puberty? Strangely enough
1 See 10.1.2 supra
2 Hunt 403
3 Gardiner and Lansdown vol.2 .6 ed page 1622
4 1 0 .1 . 2  supra
5 Sfee discussion under 10.1.2 supra
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the court let go the golden opportunity of setting 
a precedent which would have diluted the English 
Law influence in South Africa and also caused doubts 
as to the adviseability of continued adherence to the
14 year rule both in Transkei and South Africa.
In both countries the difficulty of assessing the
ages of illiterate accused is still encountered
by the courts despite the lapse of a century.
The success achieved by the 1886 code in simply
dragging the 14 year rule into South African law
is mind boggling bearing in mind that the rule is
on the face of it unreasonable and notin accordance
with day to day human experience. In the light
of this and of the views of Snyman against the
1
14 year rule the move taken by the Transkei Legislature
2
can only be welcomed. The 14 year rule was abolished
in 1983. Since then any male person who has carnal
knowledge of a female person against her will or
without her consent is guilty of the crime of rape.
This finally awards supremacy to Mathaeus and Carpzovious.
4
In the meantime the drive of Snyman and others of the
same school of thought has gained momentum and
South African law has followed Transkei's lead
as it did when the path of Justinian was still
most alluring to the courts exactly a century ago.
. 5
The 14 year rule was abolished by legislation in 1987.
1 See 5.1 supra
2 Act No.9 of 1983
3 Section 96
4 Supra
5 See discussion 5.1 and 10.1.2 supra
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As far as arson Is concerned it is noteworthy that
the Transkei Penal Code departed from the English 
law and the South African common law definition
and aligned Itself with the views of the earlier 
Roman-Dutch law writers - that arson is relevant 
to both movables and immovables. The Code achieved 
indisputable success in enticing the Transvaal 
and Natal away from the common law view - point 
until better counsel prevailed. The termination 
of the Codes influence in this reeard only began 
in earnest with R v Havros 1921 AD 19.
It will be remembered that problems arose on the
question as to whether a hut, which of course is
the traditional structure of black communities,
is movable or immovable in law. These problems
arose in the course of the argument as to whether
setting fire to a hut or similarly constructed
2
structure was arson. It Is significant that although 
they saw fit to Include mines, ships or vessels 
in the definition of arson, things which played 
no role whatsoever In the lives of Transkeians
but had in fact been relevant to the Hollanders, 
the drafters of the Code failed to make specific 
mention of a hut. Arson is to-date the subject 
of many criminal charges in black communities because 
one simply strikes one stick of matches and disappears
11.1.5 Arson
1 See chapter 8.2
2 See chapter 8.2 and cases discussed
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in the darkness oE the night leaving a hut on Eire. 
The guidance oE the Code in this regard would certainly 
have been helpEul and much mentioned in the cases 
that later arose and still arise so Erequently 
both in Transkei and South AErica.
11.1.6 Intoxication
1
As indicated above Section 28 oE the Penal Code
did not project itselE on South African
law as notably as it could have done
Certainly it did not make a strong impression on
Gardiner and Lansdown who would no doubt have hoisted
its Elag sky high had it made such an impression.
As a result Hunt had no cause to oEEer any objections
regarding Section 28. It remains no mystery that
both authors should have been remarkably silent
2
about R v Bulani. The extent to which that case
reElects the direct Influence of Section 28 on 
South African law is so little, if at all, that
it could safely be ignored.
3
The Chretien decision certainly represents an
indication by South African law that it was not
in any way under the grip of Section 28 which was
h
at best only indirectly reflected in the Johnson 
decision. The indications are however that even 
that remote or indirect Impact of Section 28 wilL 
remain in evidence for a long time to come because
1 3ei 572 '
2 1938 E.D.L 205. See also cannent on D.P. Van der Merwe's
thesis at 1 . 1  and critisism of his interpretation of
R v Bulani 5.2 supra
3 See discussion at 5.2 supra 
A Ibid
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the Chretien decision caused an uproar in legal 
. 1  
circles. J.R. du Plessis complained and said:
"one vainly searches for the reason in recognised
sources or authority ...it is not clear why the
law as contained in Johnson and which had already
2
existed for many years... had to be changed."
11.1.7 Incest
As far as this aspect is concerned the remarks
made about Gardiner and Lansdown as well as Hunt
in relation to intoxication apply. In South African
law one of the Drohibited degrees is collaterals 
* 3
up to the fourth degree of relationship, yet under
the Code the prohibition extends only to the third
4 5
degree of relationship. The 1983 Code abandons
the position originally adopted and widens the
scope so as to cover "any person whom he is prohibited
by law to marry an account of consanguinity, affinity
6
or adoptive relationship."
1 THRHR 1984 (4) at page 98
2 See also Hiemstra, THR-HR Vol. 44 No.4 1981 where tre says that 
the acquittal of Chretien does not accord with one's sense
of justice.C.f. however Act No. t of 1988. See 5-2 supra-
3 See R v H  1957 (2) SA 73 (E)
4 See Section 233
5 Act No. 9 of 1983
6 Section 99
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11.1.8 Suicide
1 2 
As indicated above the Transkei Penal Code of 1886
specifically made atCempted suicide a crime, and
this provision was accepCed and applied by Che
EasCern DisCricts Local Division of Che Supreme
CourC of SouCh Africa in Che Transkeian case of
3
R v Tshemese. In laCer cases, however, Che Supreme
Courts of SouCh Africa and Rhodesia did noC uphold
the view ChaC suicide was a crime, neicher did
Chey make any mention of section 147 of the Transkei
4
Penal Code nor of the case of R v Tshemese.
Given the advantage of the specific provisions 
of Section 147 strengChened as Chey were by a case 
decided in the Eastern Districts courC of SouCh 
Africa as early as 1918 one would have expected 
Che Code to have made some definite inroads into 
South African law in this regard. Regrettably 
however, this turned out not to be the case.
11.1.9 Bigamy
Bigamy is certainly one of the areas in which the
Transkei Penal Code failed to exert an influence
5
on South African law. In this regard Section 168 
of the Code is relevant. The main provisions of 
this section are similar to the English law
1 See 10.4
2 Section 147
3 1918 EDL at..1.2.8.
4 Supra
5 See 3.2 supra
and Che South African law remained unswayed. As
far as the provisos are concerned, however, it
is the second proviso that has an influence, not
on South African criminal law but on the interpretation
of the^ law as applied to customary unions in South
Africa. The outcome of the resistance to the Code's
influence in this regard is noteworthy. When Transkei
2
revised the code the new legislation adopted the
South African law approach to the matter. This
development is relevant to the interaction of legal
3
systems.
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11.1.10 The Doctrine of Common Purpose
The Transkei Penal Code achieved tremendous success
k
as far as this doctrine is concerned. It successfully 
narrowed the gap between an acomplice and an accessory.
In S v Williams en 'n Ander the Appellate Division
satisfactorily analysed this difference. It made
the crucial point that an accomplice is one who
1 1 The first proviso exempts a person who marries when his or her 
spouse has been away for seven years. The second proviso looks 
specifically at Transkeians whose lives are governed by customary 
law and exempts those whose subsisting previous marriages were 
entered into according to customary law. This has a bearing on the 
question of the recognition of the customary marriage and it is 
noteworthy that after union was formed in 1910 the spirit of this 
second proviso was extended to the whole of South Africa by sections 
22 (1) and (7) of Act 38 of 1927. Tine case of Nkambula v Linda
1951 (1) SA 377 (A) which emanated from the Transvaal affords an 
illustration of this.
2 Penal Code Act No.9of 1983, section 106
3 C.f Chapter 3 supra
4 See chapter 6.1 supra
5 1980 (1) SA 60 (A)
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consciously associates himself with the commission
of the offence in assisting in the commission of
the offence in affording the actual perpetrator
the opportunity, information or means which facilitate
the commission of the offence. On the contrary
1
as was held in S v Maxaba en Andere, mere presence 
at or acquiescence in the commission of the offence 
is not sufficient.
The doctrine of common purpose is a concept developed 
in law in order to predicate liability on persons 
other than the actual perpetrator {s ) of the crime. 
It is therefore a harsh doctrine and it is submitted 
that every care should be taken to ensure that 
its application Is not stretched too far as can 
so easily happen. Young people, especially in 
the rural areas, are by their nature gregarious, 
and the excitement of younger and immature fellows 
going about in the company of their bigger brothers, 
carrying the weapons they carry, singing the songs 
they sing and generally doing all the things they 
do even when they have not got down to realising 
why those things are to be done is all too often 
alluring. The doctrine of common purpose is also,
I submit, alien to customary law, In which the sophistry 
of imputation could not by any stretch of imagination 
be accommodated and an effort is always made 
to identify the respective roles of the participants 
and to allocate liability accordingly.
1 1981 (1) SA 1184 (A). See also 6.1.4. supra
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1
As previously pointed out Che Transkei Penal Code AcC
2
of 1983 Cakes over verbatim the provisions of section
3
78 of the 1886 Code. This demonstrates in no small 
measure the resilience and staying power of the doctrine
of common purpose. This switches the clock back and
is much to be regretted. I would like to observe,
4
with Hugo that the existence of a common purpose is 
no philosopher's stone which renders liabLe all who 
come into contact with it. For indeed mere purpose,
however common can never by itself create liability
and should thus never be allowed to do so. It is hoped 
that the important dictum of Viljoen JA made during
the era of the move away from the doctrine of common
purpose by the courts in South Africa in S v Maxaba
5
en Andere will remain a constant reminder about the 
dire need for identification of individuals' roles 
in criminal cases. He said: "There is no magic spell
contained in the so called doctrine of ' common purpose.' 
Where there is participation in a crime then each one 
of the participants must satisfy all the requirements 
of the relevant definition of the crime before he can 
be convicted as an accomplice. Murder is a consequence 
crime (gevolgsmisdaad). If the State wishes to prove 
common purpose, then it must prove, not that each 
participant had the necessary intention to kill the 
victim, but also that his part therein contributed, 
actually or psychically to the cause of death." ^
1 6.1.4 supra
2 Act no.9 of 1983
3 Section 27
4 1969 SALJ 391 at 396
5 1981 (1) SA 1148 (A) see also 6.1 supra
6 c.f., however, S v Safatsa and Others 1988 ( 1 ) SA 8 6 8 (A)
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11.2.1 IUDICIS EST IUS DICERE NON DARE
Reference has been made to the fact that the Courts 
sometimes infringed the rule iudicis est ius dicere 
non dare. When they infringed this rule the courts 
quite often hampered the Penal Code in its forward 
inarch and cut its journeys shorter than they could 
have been. An illustration drawn from the law relating 
to fraud will suffice.
Sometimes the legislature of the Cape colony deliberately
gave a wider meaning to particular crimes than did
the common law, the aim being to move away from the
numerous technicalities afforded by the common law
system and the accussatorial system of criminal procedure
which often led to a guilty man being acquitted.
The judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa to
which all appeals from the Transkeian Magistrates'
Courts lay realised this tendency whenever it occured,
. but they still side-stepped the intention of the
Legislature and in effect proceeded in terms of the
common law. A clear example is to be found in R
2 ~ 
v Nkosana. In that case Gane J, concurring with
his brother Lansdown J.P, noted that section 196
had been little used in Transkeian prosecutions,
probably:
"because our conmon law crime of falsity or fraud, 
which is also a crime in the Native Territories in
1 See for example 3,4,5,3 - the case law relating to
the spoor law.
2 1942 EDL 81. see discussion at 9.1 supra
11.2 THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
virtue (Sic!) of section 269 of Act 24 of 1886
is found so conveniently wide .is to cover almost
all cases of this class ..."
The learned judge then went on to reiterate Lansdown
J P's view that the aim of the Legislature was to cast
the net so wide in Transkei as to cover cases of deceit
or cheating which would not be covered by the common
law. As a result the man who sold worthless roots
at a high price "to natives who are always ready to
2
pay well for what they regard as medicine" would possibly
offend against the section. The learned judge then
sai d :
11 I hazard this suggestion because I think the 
frames of the Native Territories Penal Code were 
probably influenced by English models and 
precedents, and used the word "fraud" in a wider 
sense.........." 3
Here we see a clear example of the infringement of 
the rule iudicis est ius dicere non dare. What does
it matter if the Legislature was influenced by English
models since after all South African law has still
itself in so many instances responded positively to
the influence of English law? What is more, the Legislature 
has been proved in some instances to have fallowed
R o m a n - D u t c h  law and not English law, for example in 
the law relating to arson. The Legislature was consciously 
taking advantage of its unique position of being able
to draw at will from the two legal systems and present 
an amalgam which would meet all situations that could
arise in the new Transkeian situation. They had the 
privilege to create a new mould and it is much to be regretted
- 279 -
1 At pages 87 - 88
2 At page 87
3 Ibid
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that judges should have done what they did, effectively 
and rather deliberately frustrating the Legislature's 
noble intentions. Fortunately the Transkei National 
Assembly stood firmly on the path of its predecessor, 
the Cape Parliament. It insisted on exercising its
right of picking and choosing at will from the precedents 
that lay before it, and thus refused to be swayed
to the narrower meaning of fraud as preferred by
the courts and the authorities, old and new.
It must be stated in conclusion that the common law 
was found to be adequate in the sphere of faud and
there was therefore no need to borrow ideas from 
the Transkei Penal Code. Because of the advantageous 
position that they occupied the judges sought to 
water down the provisions of the Code and to give 
prominence to the common law approach but the Transkeian 
Legislature has been unbending. It is certain that 
the judges can no longer say that they hazard the 
suggestion of the wider meaning of fraud - this is 
the law of Transkei and falls to be stated as it
is. This brings out once more the fundamental difference 
between the law of South Africa and the law of Transkei, 
which differences are now understood and correctly 
expressed by South African jurists seconded to the 
Supreme Court of Transkei. This is a healthy sign*
1 See, for exanple, address by the Attorney-General on the
occasion of the opening of the Transkei Legal year in 
February 1987 (unpublished) where the differences are high 
lighted.
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11.2.2 DECISIS STARE ET QUIETA NON HOVERE
In other instances the South African courts drifted
away from the precedent system 1 with the result that
the onward march of the Transkei Penal Code was dealt
serious blows and brought to an abrupt stop. This
2
is to be seen in relation to robbery. The deviation
Erom the famous dictum of Schreiner A C J in Minister
of Justice in re R v Gesa; R v de Jongh which dictum
had been upheld in many judgements and by de Wet
3
and Swanepoel is a case in point. That deviation
began with the obiter dictum of Rumpff C.J. in S 
4 ~
v Mogala with reference to bag-snatching cases.
In their favour therefore, it can be said that the
courts did not blindly carry around and promote the
onward march of the Transkei Penal Code wherever
they came across its "spoor." This observation applies
with equal force to the infringement made to the
rule iudicis est ius dicere non dare.~*
U . 2 . 3  CODE MISTAKEN FOR INDIGENOUS LAW
The interpretation of the Transkei Penal Code by 
the judges was certainly not an easy matter and sometimes 
the courts proceeded in a manner which, it is submitted, 
reflected a mistaking of the Code for indigenous law. This 
comes out clearly when one looks at the law relating
to theft by a spouse. In terms of section 187
1 see 8.3.3. supra
2 see discussion 8.3.3 supra
3 ibid
h 1978 (2) SA 412 (A)
5 11.2.1 supra
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"no husband stiall be convicted of stealing, during 
cohabitation, the property if his wife; and no wife 
shall be convicted of stealing, during cohabitation, 
the property of her husband; but whilst they are living 
apart from each other, either shall be guilty of theft 
if he or she fraudulently takes or converts anything 
which is by law the property of the other in a manner 
which in any other person would amount to theft."
1
In R v Nobele the accused was convicted of theft
of wheat belonging to her husband. The parties lived 
in the district of Albert which falls far outside
the Transkei Territories and were married in terms 
of customary law. The learned judge said: While
the case of Rex v Ramdahl 1915 NPD 565 supports the 
view that a wife married in community of property 
may be convicted of theft of property wholly in the
administration of her husband, I point out that 
in the Native Territories "no wife shall be convicted 
of stealing during cohabitation the property of her 
husband; see Act 24 of 1886 section 187. 1 think
that though Albert is not in the Native Territories, 
this case may well be treated in the spirit of the 
statute just quoted."
of Che 1886 code:
1
2
1941 CEL 171 
at 172
11.3 THE ROLE OF THE WRITERS
The part played by Gardiner and Lansdown in promoting
the Transkei Penal Code has been demonstrated
in the proceding chapters. But it is perhaps
fair to leave the much criticised authors with
the consolatory reflection that they were not
the only perpetrators of this "error". The difference
may have been merely one of degree. One of the
critisisms laid at the door of the learned authors
is that they would quite often deal with the Code
as part of the text and not even by way of footnotes.
But if one is constrained to mention the Code
very often in the text or by way of footnotes,
then its power and influence remain equally evident.
In this regard, therefore, Burchell and Hunt may
well be open to criticism fairly similar to that
1
earned by Gardiner and Lansdown. The same can
safely be said of de Wet and Swanepoel who raise 
an objection in several instances where the courts 
say that the South African law is as laid down
in the Code.
1 See, for example, Burchell and Hunt: South African
Criminal Law and Procedure vol. 1 2 ed p 306-311 where "Ihe 
Transkeian Penal Code" is mentioned at pages 306, 307, 309 
and 311 (text) and at pages 306, 308, 310 and 311 (footnotes). 
Likewise Hunt: South African Criminal Law and procedure vol 2
1 ed mention "The Transkeian provision", "The Transkeian Penal 
Code", "The Transkeian Code", and "The Transkei definition" 
on each of pages 438 to 442.
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In any event Hunt is also found dealing with the Code
as part, of the text and thereby giving it much prominence.
This is noticeable with perjury in respect of which
section 106, 107, 108 and 109 are quoted in full on
2
two consecutive pages without comment. Likewise with
reference to treason sections 85, 8 6 , 87 and 8 8 of
the Transkei Penal code are reproduced in two consecutive
pages as "statutory forms of treason" and again, with
no comment beyond indicating that the said sections
are to be read with section 3 of the Republic of South
3
Africa constitution Act. In any event when one gives
a lot of space to the Code in one's work, whether one
is accepting or rejecting or merely watering down
its influence, the result is the same namely to demonstrate
the nature and extent of the Code's Influence on South
A f r ican law. The difference is ideological and the
more it surfaces the more clearly the influence of
the Code comes out. Furthermore when one looks at
the table of statutes the amount of space taken by
Act 24 of 1886 goes to show the importance of this
statute in South African criminal law no matter how
one really went about the task of dealing with it in
4
the course of the work. Admittedly, however, the difference 
in ideological approach between these authors is a
great one and that cannot be overlooked.
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1
1 Vol 2 1970
2 See pages 134 and 135
3 Act no 32 of 1961
4 See Hunt at page XXIV
CONCLUDING REMARKS '
It has been noted above that the commission quite 
advisedly consulted a wide cross-section of the indige­
nous population regarding the intended code and did
1
not confine itself to white opinion. It is obvious
that the Commission had a difficult task trying to 
find the course that would be "the lesser evil" to 
all the groups that had expressed themselves so strongly 
on each of the points that were placed in issue, the 
groups being the whites, the westernised and semi­
westernised group, and the traditionalist group adhering
strictly to customary law. Taking the sensitive
2
aspect of forced circumcision and intonjane as examples,
it would appear that the commission sometimes took
"the middle line". It is submitted that had they
opted for an outright termination of these practices
the code might have satisfied only a handful of people
and thus given rise to a great deal of dissatisfaction,
and perhaps even ending up in complete failure.
Indeed the failure of Cape rule in Transkei for all
the period up to about 1880 was caused by the fact
that European law had been applied too rapidly and
3
unimaginatively. The second matter affects the law
relating to trespass. Until the nineteenth century
1 see 3.4.4. supra
2 see 3.4.4. supra
3 see Kerr: The Cape Government Comnission on
Native Laws and Customs. Transkei Law Journal 
1986.
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land was all used for grazing purposes, and it was
only in the latter half of that century that people
1
began to depend on agriculture for their subsistence.
Trespass or injury done to cultivated land was, at
2
the beginning not actionable. For that reason, it 
may be asserted, there was no developed action on 
trespass. In this connection Brownlee had this to 
say:
"The reason assigned ... is that, all having cattle
and gardens, all are alike liable to trespass or to
be trespassed on; things being thus equal, law suits
3
are of no avail".
4
Kerr says this explanation Is not convincing. He 
contends that the better view of looking at the matter 
is that there was the extra-judicial remedy of retalia­
tion whereby women who had charge of the cultivated 
lands had a right, flowing from custom immemorial 
to drive cattle thus trespassing into the fields
of their owners, the result being that trespasses 
became less frequent. Against this back ground it 
is interesting to note that the Transkei Penal Code 
of 1886 kept away from what could be an area of difficulty 
if not controversy, and merely provided for the defence 
of movable property against a trespasser. Everyone 
who was in peaceable possession of any movable property 
or thing was justified in resisting or taking such
1 Kerr: Customary Law of Imnovabie Propprt-y
and of Succession 2 ed page
2 Me Lean: Compendiim of Kafir Laws and Custom: pg 117
3 Me Lean: op cit 117 ■
4 op cit 64
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property or thing by any trespasser as long as he
did not do grievous bodily harm to the trespassers.
This obviously had nothing to do with the trespass
of stock on cultivated land. As if to admit that
the legislature was having difficulty with the question
2
of trespass, the Transkei Penal Code Act of 1983
still did not do anything about the trespass of stock
on cultivated land, but neither did it re-enact the
provisions of Section 64 of the 1886 Code. It faced
the reality that trespass in reality is committed
on immovable property, but it brought in the novel
idea of punishing those who, with the intention of
wounding the feelings of any person or with the knowledge
that the feelings of any person are likely to be
insulted thereby, commit any trespass in any place
of worship or in any place of burial or in any place
3
set aside for the performance of funeral rites. 
Under the rule that South African law remained operative 
on attainment of independence in 1976 until specifically 
repealed, it therefore appears the South African 
statutory law (e.g. Cape Ordinance No. 18 of 1938 
on trespass) remains operative in Transkei - this 
is the only way the lacuna can be filled and protection 
given to the now sizeable farming community of Transkei.
1 Section 64
2 Act no. 9 of 1983
3 See section 79
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A further point worth looking at is the effect of the introduction
of the Penal Code on the role of the chiefs in the administration
of justice. It is well known that originally the chief personally
played an important role in the administration of justice
especially regard being had to the basic principle that every
person was "the child of the chief" and he was actually the
1
judicial officer in all civil as well as criminal cases.
As soon as Magistrates were introduced as judicial officers,
they posed a threat to the continued exercise of judicial
powers by the chiefs, but their role was introduced gradually
without the intention of bringing the activities of the chiefs
to an abrupt end. When the Penal Code was introduced one
could well fear that the risk of the exercise of judicial
powers by the chiefs being gradually reduced to a point of
being terminated became real. This could be especially so
since the option for customary criminal law had been ruled
out in favour of the received western law which only Che white
magistrates could handle. Yet It was never so and despite
the all embracing nature of the code the chiefs have been
able to continue to exercise a wide measure of criminal
jurisdiction. Their position in this regard was strengthened
2
by the Black Administration Act, which applied throughout
South Africa and this included Transkei until 1976. It gave
not only chiefs but also headmen authority to try any offence
at common law or under customary law as well as statutory
3
offences except offences referred to in the third schedule.
1 See 3.4.2 supra, and McLean: Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs surmarised 
by the 1883 Carmission in its report at Appendix B. page 17.
2 Act No. 38 of 1927
3 See section 20. As to the post-1963 Transkeian statutes in respect of which
Che chiefs and headmen enjoy criminal jurisdiction - See T.C. Mabaso: "The 
functioning of the Chiefs' and Headmen' s Courts" in: The Judicial Process
in the 'Customary Courts p.246 ed Koyana- University of Transkei - 1983.
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In Transkei Che criminal jurisdiction of chiefs was
1
re-inforced by Che Regional AuChoriCy Courts AcC. This
act greatly elevated both the civil and criminal jurisdiction
of the Paramount Chiefs and heads of Regional Authorities
as they were for the firsC time enabled Co "enjoy In all
respects the same powers, authorities and functions as those
of a magistrate's court established in terms of the
2
Magistrates Courts Act, 1944, as amended." The large volume
of cases disposed of by the cusComary courCs is hardly ever
3
realised until one goes to the districts and sees for oneself.
It can therefore be said Chat in 1886 Transkei received 
a weapon which she was to use for the suppression oE 
crime. That was the NaCive Territories Penal Code, 
popularly referred to as the Transkeian Territories 
Penal Code or the Transkei Penal Code Act 24 of 1886 
(Cape). The country was small in size and had a population 
of easily less than one million people at the time, 
such population being all rural, peasant and CraditIona 11st
1 Act No. 13 of 1982
2 Section 3. It must be observed that although Che chiefs and headmen
having jurisdiction in terms of Act 38 of 1927 range between two
and ten in each of the twenty eight districts of Transkei depending
on the size of the district and ninber of Tribal Authorities (for 
Ukntata and Mqanduli and Ngqamakwe there are ten and eight and two 
courts of chiefs and headmen respectively) Che whole country is 
divided inCo nine regions so at most there can be only nine officers 
having civil and criminal jurisdiction in terms of the Regional 
Authority Courts Act.
3 For statistics see Koyana: The Judicial Process In the Customary
Courts pp 48-182; University of Transkei 1983.
in nature. (True enough a white settlement was growing) 
It owed allegience to the chiefs, and criminal cases 
were heard and disposed of in the customary courts
in accordance with customary law. It was therefore 
possible that this weapon might not be very extensively 
used, regard being had to the fact that numerous
provisions of the act took into account the conditions 
prevailing in England, Holland and even Ancient
Rome. In this connection one may recall the remarks
of Mr Ayliff, one of the commissioners charged with 
the task of drawing up the code. In a minority 
report he refused to recommend "an admirable specimen 
of high class law for a state of native society
only just emerging from barbarism.” Transkei can 
be said to have lent the weapon to her needy neighbour 
South Africa when she came to being as such in 1910. 
That neighbour tested the weapon through the length
and breadth of her big country with its large population 
and during the process Transkei carefully observed
the ” ups and downs" experienced by the weapon during 
this long testing period. What Transkei gained 
from this exercise has been alluded to by reference 
to the 1983 Penal Code, but a few more examples 
which readily come to mind may be given. The provisions 
of the 1886 Penal Code on witchcraft influenced 
the legislation of the Provinces. In 1957 the Witch­
craft Suppression Act improved and consolidated 
the South African Statutory law on witchcraft. 
The new Transkei Penal Code1 virtually re-enacts 
the provisions of the 1957 Witchcraft Suppression
-  2<jO -
1 Act No.9 of 1983
Act of SouCh Africa. The 1983 code has also abandoned
the one yearrule relating to homicide thereby departing
from the 1886 code and the English law and Eollowing
2
South African law. It can thus be said that when 
Transkei passed the 1983 version of the Code she 
was able to reap the benefits of her generosity 
without which developments regarding the application 
and interpretation of the 1886 code would have been 
slow and unexciting.
That the 1886 Code was a success is beyond doubt. 
This has been more recently acknowledged by Kerr. 
It is submitted that the enormous influence that the Code 
exerted on South African law Is the greatest indication of 
its success, for which success the tireless efforts of the 
commission should never be forgotten.
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1
1 Section 182 (1) (a) to (f)
2 See discussion at 3.2 supra. Likewise the distinct shift 
towards a more inquisitorial form of procedure in the 1983 Code 
is in line with the South African Criminal Procedure Act
of 1977
3 Transkei Law Journal 1986 at page 30
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A C T  
T o  P ro v id e  fo r a Penal Code fo r the Transkeian Te rrito rie s .
W h e r e a s  it  is desirable to provide a Penal Code for the Preamble. 
Transkeian Territories as the same are hereinafter in this A ct  
defined: Be it  therefore enacted by the Governor o£ the Cape of 
Good Hope, w ith the advice and consent of the Legislative  
Council and the House of Asserablj’ thereof, as follows :—
T IT L E  I.
C H A P T E R  I.
P R E L IM IN A R Y .
Short Title and Operation o f Code.
1. This A ct shall be called “ The N ative Territories Penal til>$ and
■Code,” and shall take effect on and from  the first day of January , °P'ra lono ° c‘ 
1887 , throughout the whole of the territories known as The
Transkei (including Gcalekaland), Gxiqualand East, Tembuland 
(including Em igrant Tembuland, and Bomvanaland), and the 
port and territory o f St. Jo h n ’s R iver, which are hereby styled the 
“  Transkeian Territories.” The said port and territory of Saint 
Jo h n ’s R iver shall fo r the purposes of this Code form  part of the 
Chief M agistracy of Tembuland.
Offenders liable tinder the Code.
2. E very  person shall be liable to punishment under this Code, 9ffe”ací f ,
j , ♦ _f , a . .  , a h  under the Code.and not otherwise, io r every act or omission contrary to the 
provisions thereof, o f which he shall be found gu ilty  within the 
said territories on or after the said first day of Jan u ary , 1887 , and 
every person who shall be charged or chargeable on or after that 
day with any offence committed before such daj’ shall be liable to 
be tried and punished b y  the Courts hereinafter established in the 
same manner as i f  this A ct had not been passed.
Criminals from  Extra-Colonial Native Territories.
3. E very  person shall be subject to tria l and punishment under Fugitives
ihis Code for every act or omission of which he shall be gu ilty  on Native Territories!11 
or after the said first day of January , 1887 , within the territory
of any Native chief, and •which act or omission is punishable within  
the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope or its dependencies, by  
virtue of any trea ty  or engagement heretofore entered into, or 
which m ay hereafter be made, between such N ative chief and the 
Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
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Offence committed 
when and- where 
olleuCer lifts proper­
ty ix> possession or 
<<iuirol.
Interpretation of 
terms*
Offence committed when and where ('/fender /tas Property ir,- 
possession or control.
4. E very  offence consisting in unlawful taking or obtaining or 
appropriating property, or in knowingly receiving property so 
taken, obtained, or appropriated, or in forging any document, or 
in using any forged document, is committed as long as, and at 
every iplace where, the offender has the property or document so 
unlaw fully dealt with in his possession or under his control,, 
whether the original offence was committed within the territories 
to which the Code applies, or without.
Interpretation o f terms.
5. In  this A ct the following words and expressions are used in 
the following senses, unless a different intention appears from the 
con test:
(«) The pronoun “ he ” and its derivatives are used of any  
person, whether male or female. • W ords importing the 
singular include the plural, and words importing the 
plural include the singular number. The word “ man ” 
denotes a male human being of an}’ age. The word 
“ woman ” denotes a fem ale human being of any age. 
The word “ person ” includes any person or association 
or body o f persons, whether incorporated or not, The 
word “ public ”  includes any class of the public or any  
community. The word “ Government ” denotes the 
person or persons authorized b y  law  to administer 
executive government in any part of the said territory. 
The word “ Court ” denotes a  judge who is empowered 
b y  law  to act judicially alone, or a. body of judges 
empowered by law to act judicia lly  as a. body when such 
judge or body of judges is acting judicially. The word 
“ Judge ” denotes every person who is empowered by 
law  to give, in  any legal proceeding, criminal or civil, a 
definitive judgm ent, or a judgm ent which i f  not appealed 
against would be definitive, or a judgm ent which, if 
confirmed b y  some other authority, would be definitive ; 
or who is one of a body of persons empowered by the- 
law  to give such a judgment.
(b) The word “ public servant ”  denotes a person falling  
under any one of the follow ing descriptions, n a m e l y -
(1). E very  servant of the Q,ueen. (2). E very  commis­
sioned officer of the m ilitary or naval force of the Queen.
(3). E very  judge. (4). E very  officer of a Court o f 
ju stice whose duty i t  is to investigate or report on any  
m atter of law  or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep 
any document, or take charge or dispose of any property, 
or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any
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oath, o r interpret or preserve order in the Court. (5). 
E very  jurym an or assessor assisting a  Court of Justice.
(0). E very  person who holds any office by virtue of 
which he is empowered to place or keep any person in 
confinem ent,. (7). E very officer o£ Government whose 
duty i t  is as such officer to prevent offences, to give 
inform ation of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or 
to protect the public health, safety or convenience. (8). 
E very officer in the service or pay of the Government, 
or remunerated by fees or commission for performance o f  
any public duty.
(r) The words “ movable property ” include corporeal 
property of every description except land and things 
attached to the earth or permanently fastened to any­
thing which is attached to the earth.
(o') In every part of this Code, except where a contrary" 
intention appears from the contest, words which refer to 
acts done, extend also to illegal omissions. The word 
“ act ” denotes as well a series of acts as a single act. 
The word “ omission ”  denotes as w ell a series of 
omissions as a single omission; and an offence m ay be 
committed partly  by an act and p artly  by an illegal 
omission.
(e) 'When a criminal act is done by several persons in 
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such 
persons is liable fo r that act in the same manner as if  the 
act were done by him alone. "Whenever an act which is 
criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal 
knowledge or intention, is done b y  several persons, each 
of such persons who joins in the act, w ith such knowledge 
or intention, is liable for the act in  the same manner as 
i f  the aet were done by him alone w ith that knowledge 
or intention.
(/) W henever an offence is committed b y  means of several 
acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission 
of that offence, by doing any one o f those acts, either 
singly or jo in tly  with any other person, commits that 
offence. W hen several persons are engaged or concerned 
in the commission of a criminal act, they m ay be guilty  
. of different offences by means o f that act.
((f) The word “ offence ” denotes anything made punishable 
by this Code. The word “ ille g a l” is applicable to any­
thing which is an offence, or which is prohibited b y  law, 
or which furnishes grounds for a  civil action; and a 
person is said to be “ legally bound to do ” whatever it  
is illegal in  him to omit. The word “ in ju ry ” denotes 
any harm  whatever illegally caused to any person in 
mind, reputation, or property.
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Pnnishxacnts.
Pumshment
death.
(/i)-Tlie words “ l i fe ” and “ death ” denote the life  or death 
of a human being unless the contrary appears from  the 
context. The word “ anim al ” denotes any living  
creature other than a human being. The words “ year 
and month ” denote a calendar year and month. The 
word “ section ” denotes a portion of a chapter of this 
Code distinguished by prefixed numerals.
(') “ Oath ”  and all expressions relating to “ the taking of 
oaths ” include all such affirmations and declarations as 
m ay by law be substituted fo r an oath, and the 
making of such affirmations and declarations.
{,/) N othing is said to be done or believed “ in good faith ” 
which is done or believed without due care and attention. 
(/;) The word “ k ra a l” denotes any hut, houses, or enclosure 
occupied by any single fam ily, or member of a fam ilj7, 
or any aboriginal tribe, or any collection of huts, houses, 
or enclosures, occupied b y  several families of any 
aboriginal tribes, with a  recognized head known as 
vmninimzi.
(!) The word “ spoor ” denotes any mark or impression on, 
or disturbance of, the surface of any ground, 
or any mark or impression on or disturbance of 
any grass, herbage, or wood on such ground, or any  
m atter or substance le ft or found upon such ground, 
grass, herbage, or wood, indicating that any person or 
persons or any cattle have passed along in any particular 
direction. '
(»>) The word “ cattle ” shall comprise horses, mules, asses, 
horned cattle, sheep, goats, or ostriches.
C H A P T E R  II .
P U N ISH M E N T S.
6. The following punishments m ay he inflicted under this
A c t :
Death.
Imprisonment with or without hard labour, and with or 
without spare diet.
F logging and whipping.
Detention in a reform atory institution.
Fine.
P utting  under recognizances.
Punishment o f Death.
of 7. The punishment of death shall be awarded fo r murder, and 
shall in  all cases, where the circumstances w ill admit of it, be earned  
into effect within the gaols and in  the manner prescribed b y  A ct 
No. 3 of 1869  : provided, however, that the omission to comply
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w ith  any provision of the said A ct shall not make the execution of n o .im- issg.
the judgm ent of death illegal, in  any case where such execution
would otherwise he or have been legal. The punishment of death
shall be inflicted b y  hanging the offender by the neck until he is
dead : Provided always that, no sentence of. death, shall be carried
into effect without the w arrant of the Governor authorizing the
same.
Commutation o f Punishment of Death,
S. In  any case in  which sentence of death shall have been passed, Commutation of 
the Governor fo r the time being may, without the consent of the ,mul'",QCnt0 03 1 
offender, commute the punishment for any other punishment 
provided by this Code. ,
Imprisonment. -
!-). The punishment of imprisonment consists in the detention of imprisonment,
the offender in prison, and in his subjection to the discipline 
appointed for prisoners, during the period expressed in the sentence.
Imprisonment shall be with or without hard labour or w ith or 
without spare diet. I f  it  is with hard labour, the sentence shall so 
direct. No prisoner shall be sentenced to or suffer solitary confine­
ment fo r any part of the term of his imprisonment, except the 
same m ay be unavoidable or necessary for the purpose of carrj-ing  
out any sentence of spare diet. No female shall be sentenced to 
hard labour on any road, street, or public place. No offender 
sentenced to imprisonment w ith  hard labour fo r any period exceed­
ing three months shall be sentenced to spare diet, except for 
offences against the discipline of the gaol or other place at which 
he m ay be law fulty confined or employed ; and in regard to the 
infliction of spare diet, the Courts in their sentences shall observe and 
conform to such regulations and restrictions as shall from  time to 
time be deemed necessary, to prevent injurious consequences, and 
be by the Governor prescribed for the guidance of such Courts ; and 
shall in their sentences fix the particular days or times during  
which the offender shall he subject to spare diet.
No person shall be put to hard labour during any period he 
m ay undergo spare diet.
W hen any person shall be sentenced to imprisonment, it shall be 
law ful fo r the Governor to order, from  time to time, the rem oval 
of such person during the period prescribed for his imprisonment, 
from  any gaol in which he is confined to any other gaol or place 
of imprisonment within the territories to which this Code applies 
or within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
Flogging and Whipping. y 7
10 . F logging shall consist of the infliction on a male person, Flogging and whip- 
who shall have attained the age of sixteen years, of a  number of 
strokes, not exceeding at any one time fifty, w ith  an instrument 
specified by the Court, and in default of such specification, with 
such instrum ent as the Governor shall direct.
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Offenders imder It 
years rany be ■whip­
ped in lieu of impri­
sonment.
Reformatories.
Fines.
W hipping shall consist o f the infliction on a male person, who 
shall not have attained the age of sixteen years, of a number of 
strokes or cuts, not exceeding at one time twenty-five, w ith  a cant­
or rod, which last correction shall be administered b}’ such person 
in such private place as the Court shall appoint, and in case the 
father or reputed fa ther shall in person express a desire to correct 
such offender himself in the manner adjudged by the Court, it  
shall be law ful fo r the Court to permit him to do so in the presence 
of any suitable person selected b y  the Court to witness the infliction 
o f such correction. Should the age of any such offender be 
unknown it shall be law ful fo r the Court before which he shall be 
tried  to judge of the offender’s age by his appearance, or according 
to such other materials fo r forming a judgm ent upon the subject 
as shall e x is t; and no error which shall be ho nit fide made by an}’ 
Court in judging of the age of any such offender shall vitiate or 
affect the sentence by which such offender shall be sentenced to 
receive, and shall have received, any such correction as aforesaid.
In  each case, whether of whipping or flogging, the Court shall 
in its sentence specify the number of strokes to be inflicted. No 
flogging or whipping shall take place after the expiration of six 
months from the passing of the sentence. The period of imprison­
ment is to be calculated from  the date on which such sentence is 
passed: Provided, however, that the period during which the 
sentence m ay be suspended, pending appeal, is not to be reckoned 
in calculating the term  of imprisonment i f  the appeal be rejected.
No female shall be liable to be flogged or whipped.
Offenders under 16  years may be whipped in lieu of imprisonment.
.1.1. A n y  male, whose age shall not exceed sixteen years, 
convicted of any offence punishable w ith imprisonment in the first 
instance, m ay, in lieu of such imprisonment, receive a w hipping; 
and wherever an offence in this Code is punishable with flogging, 
any male whose age shall not exceed sixteen years m ay be 
sentenced to a whipping in addition to any term of imprisonment, 
with or w ithout hard labour, but shall not be flogged.
i
Reformatories. '
12. Upon the conviction of any person under the age of sixteen 
years, and whenever reform atory institutions for the reception and  
custody of youthful criminals are established within any of the 
territories to which this Code applies, the Court shall have all the 
powers conferred by the Reform atory Institutions Act of 1870 .
JPTnes.
13. W here no sum is expressed to which a fine m ay extend, the 
amount of fine to which an offender is liable is unlimited, but shall 
not be excessive.
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14. W here  the Court has power to fine without imprisonment, N o . w—i s w . 
th e  Court may, i f  i t  thinks fit, direct that the person sentenced to
fine he imprisoned, w ith  or without hard labour, un til the fine be 
paid : Provided that the Court may, at its discretion, suspend such 
imprisonment in such terms as it  thinks fit, or m ay lim it the period 
of such im prisonm ent: Provided also that in no such case shall 
anyone be imprisoned for non-payment of a-fine for more than  
■odo year.
15. W here the Court has power to fine and imprison, the term  
fo r which the Court m ay direct the offender to be imprisoned in 
default of payment of a fine shall not in any case exceed the  
maximum term of imprisonment fixed for the offence; and where 
such fine is given in addition to any term  of imprisonment which 
th e  Court may have the power to impose, the term  of imprisonment 
in  default of paym ent of the fine shall not exceed one-fourth of 
the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed fo r the 
offence; and in such case this last term of imprisonment shall take  
elfect from  and after the termination of the imprisonment which 
m ay have been awarded in  addition to fine.
Portion o f Fines may be paid to Persons assisting in bringing Offenders
to justice.
16 . The Courts empowered to pass sentence on an y  persons fo r Fortion of fines 
a n y  offence under this Code may order and direot that a portion j£nsbCi S dtiï?sPe£ 
of any fine imposed b y  the Court shall be paid to the person or j>™j^Gofr«uicrsto 
persons on whose inform ation the conviction of an y  offender m ay
have been obtained, or who m aterially assisted in  bringing such 
offender to justice.
Finos to be levied in restitution of, or as compensation for, Property  
stolen or injured.
17 . Any  Court empowered to pass sentence under the provi- Fines to be levied
fdons of this Code on any person for any offence m ay, in passing S  comp«SaSonf’i°r 
such sentences, include therein, under the punishment of fine, a stokn °r
sufficient amount to cover reasonable compensation for loss, costs,
damages, or in ju ry  caused by the offence fo r which the offender 
shall have been convicted; such fine, i f  not paid, to be levied on 
the movable property of the said offender, under and by virtue of 
a w arrant under the hand of the Judge or M agistrate imposing 
such fine, together w ith  the costs of le v y ; and out of such fine 
aforesaid, when paid or levied, it shall be competent for the Judge  
or Magistrate to direct paym ent to be made to the person injured  
fo r such reasonable compensation as aforesaid ; and any balance 
shall be' paid into the Public T reasu ry : Provided that any Magis­
trate m ay suspend the levying of any fine imposed as above until 
the record of the proceedings in the case shall have been reviewed  
b y the Chief M agistrate of the territory who shall be empowered 
to'reduce "or disallow the’ same, as shall seem to him to be m ost: in  
accordance w ith real and substantial justice.
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No. 21—ISM. Fines recoverable in Jfoneg, Stock, Grain, or other Produce.
iiwilrmo ■<’stock'blr fines which may be imposed under this Code m ay be
jnnin." 1 * pc'’ °'r"imposed, paid or recovered in money, or in cattle, or in grain, or 
other producc o f the soil, at the discretion of the Judge or Magis­
trate who shall determine the number of cattle or quantity of graiu 
or other produce of the soil to be paid in lieu of money.
Discharge without Verdict. 
without 19. In  any ease in which the Court considers that the offence 
' deserves no more than a nominal punishment, the Court may in its
discretion direct the discharge of the accused, and such discharge 
shall have all the effects of an acquittal.
Placing under lircof/nizancrs. 
piiicin£ imdcr re- 20. E very  one who under any provision of this Code is convicted 
’ "■ of any offence, fo r -which he is liable to be sentenced to imprison­
ment, m ay in addition to any term of imprisonment or instead of 
any punishment hereby authorized, be required to enter into his 
own recognizances or to find sureties or both for such amount and 
fo r such time as the Court by which he is tried considers reason­
able, that he shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour. E very  
one required to find sureties as aforesaid shall be liable, i f  the 
Court thinks fit, to be imprisoned till he find such sureties: 
Provided the Court m ay in its discretion suspend such last mentioned 
imprisonment on such terms as i t  thinks fit, or m ay Emit the  
period of such im prisonm ent: Provided also that no one shall be 
imprisoned fo r not finding sureties for more than one year, 
exclusive of any other period for -which he m ay be imprisoned by  
the sentence of the Court.
Sentences may be cumulative.
cum"!fitfve mar be ''^"ken an offender is convicted of more offences than one 
cumu ii ne. before the same Court, at the same sitting, or when any offender 
undergoing punishment for one offence is convicted of another, the 
sentences passed upon him fo r his several offences shall take effect 
one after the other, or after the expiration of the punishment 
which he is undergoing at the time of his last conviction.
Lim it o f punishment of offence made up o f several offenccs.
Limit or punish- 22. "When anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any  
ui)of f^vem"off™iTces of which part is itself an offence, defendant shall not be punishable 
with a punishment fo r more than one of such offences, unless it be 
so expressly provided. '
Punishment of Person guilty of several offences. 
runishmentof pot-. 23. In  a ll cases in  which judgm ent is given that a person is 
X S 'sUr 01 'CT<!tal g u ilty  of one of several'offences specified in the judgm ent, hut 
that it  is doubtful of- which of these offences he is guilty, the 
offender shall be punished for the offence fo r which the lowest 
punishment is p rovided ; i f  the same punishment is not provided 
fo r all.
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Common Law Principles.
24, A l l  rules and principles of the law  in force in the Cape c^ ,“°™on Law prin" 
Colony which render any circumstance a justification or excuse 
fo r any act or a defence to any charge, shall be in force and be 
applicable to any defence to a charge under this Code, except in so 
fa r  as they axe thereby altered or are inconsistent therewith. The 
matters hereby provided for are declared and enacted to be 
justifications and excuses fo r all charges to which they apply.
Children exempted.
2ó. No one whose age does not exceed seven years shall be children exempt, 
convicted of any offence.
No one whose age exceeds seven and does not exceed fourteen 
years, shall be convicted of any offence, unless i t  appear that at 
the time he committed the offence he had sufficient intelligence to 
know tho nature and consequences of his conduct, or to appreciate 
that it  was wrong.
Lnsaniti/.
26. I f  it be proved that a person who has committed an offence insanity, 
was, at the tim e he committed it, insane, so as not to be 
responsible for that offence, he shall not therefore be simply 
acquitted, but he shall be found not gu ilty  on th e ’ ground of 
insanity, and in  such case the Court before which such trial shall 
take place shall order such person to be kept in strict custody in 
such gaol, lunatic asylum, or other place of confinement either in  
the said territories or in the Cape Colony, and in such manner as 
to the Court shall seem fit. until the pleasure of the Governor shall 
be known, and the Governor m ay thereupon give such order for the 
safe custody o f such person in such place, in  such manner, and for 
such time as to the Governor shall seem fit.
To establish a defence on that ground it  must be proved that 
the offender was at the timo he committed the act labouring  
under natural imbecility or disease of or affecting the mind to 
such an extent as to render him incapable of appreciating the 
nature and quality of the act or that the act was wrong. A  person 
labouring under specifio delusions but in other respects sane, shall 
not be found g u ilty  on the ground of insanity, unless the delusions 
caused him to believe in the existence of some state of things which 
i f  i t  existed, would ju stify  or excuse this act: Provided that 
insanity, before or after tho time he committed the act, and insane 
delusionsthough only partial, m ay be evidence that the offender 
was at.the time that he committed the act in such a condition of
uu
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insanity.
Everyone committing an offence shall he presumed to be sane 
until the contrary is proved.
Intoxication.
intoxication. 27. Nothing is an offence -which is done by a person who, at 
the time of doing it, is b y  reason of intoxication incapable of 
knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either 
wrong or contrary to la w : provided that the th ing which intoxi­
cated him was administered to him without his knowledge or 
against his will.
28. In  cases where an act done is not an offence unless done 
w ith a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act 
in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he 
had the same knowledge as he would have had i f  he had not been 
intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was adminis­
tered to him without his knowledge or against his w i l l : Provided, 
however, that if the existence of a specific intention is essential to 
the commission of a crime the fact that an offender was drunk 
when he did the act which if  coupled w ith that intention would 
constitute such crime shall be taken into account by the Judge or 
M agistrate in deciding whether he had th at intention.
Compulsion.
Compulsion. 29. Compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous 
bodily harm  from  a person actually present at the commission of 
an offence, shall be an excuse fo r the commission of any offence 
other than high treason, murder, attem pting to murder, assisting 
in  rape, forcible abduction, robbery, causing grievous bodil.y harm, 
and arson : Provided that the person under compulsion believes 
that such threat w ill be executed : Provided also that he was not a 
party  to any association or conspiracy, the being party to which 
rendered him subject to such compulsion. No presumption shall 
be made that a married woman committing an offence in the 
presence of her husband does so under compulsion.
Iynorancc o f Law.
ipiorance of Law. 30. The fact that an offender is ignorant of the law is not an 
excuse fo r any offence committed by him ; but nothing is an 
offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or 
who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake 
of law. believes himself to be justified by law in doing it.
A ct o f Judicial Offlccr.
Act of judge. 31, Nothing; is an offence which is done by a Judge, or any
other judicial officer,' when acting jud icia lly  in the exercise of any 
power which is or which in good faith he believes to be given him 
b y  law.
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Execution o f Lawful Sentence. n°. -.m—iesc.
32» E very officer of any Court authorized to execute a law ful Execution of i;iw- 
sentence, and every gaoler, and every person law fu lly  assisting ful tcm™cc‘ 
such officer or gaoler, is justified in executing such sentence.
Execution o f lawful Process and W arrants.
33. E very officer of any Court duly authorized to execute any Execution of law-
law fu l process of such Court, whether of a civil or criminal nature, aud
and every one duly authorized to execute a law ful warrant issued
by any Court or Justice of the Peace, or other person having  
jurisdiction to issue such warrants, and every person law fully  
assisting them respectively, is justified in executing such process or 
w arrant respectively, and every gaoler who is required under such 
process or w arrant respectively to receive and detain any person, is 
justified in receiving and detaining him.
Execution o f erroneous Sentence or Process.
34. I f  a sentence is passed or process issued by a Court having Execution of ommo- 
jurisdictioD under any circumstances to issue such warrant, the ° ^ acntonM or p™- 
sentence passed or process or w arrant issued shall be sufficient to
ju s tify  the officer or person authorized to execute such warrant, and 
every gaoler and person law fu lly  assisting, although the Court 
passing the sentence or issuing the process had not in the parti­
cu lar case authority to do so, or although the Court or the person 
in  the particular case had no jurisdiction to issue or exceeded its 
•or his jurisdiction in issuing the warrant, or was, at the time when 
such sentence was passed or process or warrant issued, out of the 
district fo r which such person was entitled to act.
Effect o f Sentence or Process ‘icithout jurisdiction.
35. Ever)' officer, gaoler, or person executing any process, Effect of sentence 
sentence, or warrant, and every person law fu lly  assisting such jrás5kfion.'nthout 
officer, gaoler, or person, shall be protected from criminal responsi­
b ility , i f  he acts in good faith under the belief that the sentence or
process was that of a Court having, or that the warrant was that 
o i a Court, Justice of the Peace, or other person having authority  
to issue warrants, and if it  be proved that the person passing the 
sentence, or issuing the process acted as such a Court, under colour 
of having some appointment or commission law fu lly  authorizing 
him to act as such Court, or that the person issuing the warrant 
acted as a Justice of the Peace or other person having such autho­
rity , although in fact such appointment did not exist or had' 
expired, or although in fact the Court or the person passing the 
sentence or issuing the process was not the Court or tho person 
authorized by the commission to act, or the person issuing the 
■warrant was not duly authorized so to act.
Arresting the wrong Person.
3 6 . 'E ver)'one duly authorized to execute a w arrant to arrest, ArrestinstUcwrous 
■who thereupon arrests a person, believing in good faith aud on per“ D-
UU 2
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warrant, shall be protected from criminal responsibility to the same 
extent, aud subject to the same provisions, as if  the person arrested 
had been the person named in the warrant. E very one called on 
to assist the person making such arrest, and believing that the person 
in  whose arrest he is called on to assist is the person for whose 
arrest the w arrant is issued, and every gaoler whn is required to 
receive and detain such person shall be protected to the same extent, 
and subject to the same provisions, as i f  the arrested person had 
been the peison named in the warrant.
Effect, o f irregular W arrant or Process.
warrant or Íïrocoísr • E very one acting under a w arrant or process which is bad 
in law on account of some defect in substance or iu form  apparent 
on the face of it, i f  he in good faith  and without culpable 
ignorance or negligenec believed that the warrant or process was 
good in law, shall be protected from criminal responsibility to the 
same extent, and subject to the same provisions, as if the warrant 
was gooti. in law, and ignorance of the law shall in this case be an 
excuse: Provided that- it  shall be a question of law  whether the 
facts of which there is evidence m ay or m ay not constitute culpable 
ignorance or negligence in his so believing the warrant or process 
to be good in law.
A rrest by Peace Officer in case o f major offence.
ofiuíxinclScofma0 E very  peace officer who on reasonable and probable grounds
jor olluncc. believes that one of the offences as to which it  is provided in this
Code that the offender m ay be arrested without w arrant has been 
committed, whether i t  has been committed or not, and who on 
reasonable and probable grounds believes that any person has 
committed that offence, is justified in arresting such person without 
warrant whether such person is gu ilty  or not.
Persons assisting Peace Officer arresting in case o f major offence.
mceoiHc TifmsF E very one called npon to assist a peace officer in the arrest
S i  in atní'oVuwjor of a person suspected of having committed any such offence as 
oflon"?' last aforesaid, is justified in arresting if  he knows that the person
calling on him to assist him is a peace officer and does not know 
that there is no reasonable ground for the suspicion.
A rrest o f person found committing major offence.
f.)»ndCst of 'P'er“ " 40. E verjr one is justified in arresting- without warrant any
mnjur offtnco!lttlD? person whom he finds committing any offence as to which it  is 
provided by this Code that the offender may be arrested when 
found committing.
A rrest after commission of major offence.
mi^ Ton* ofter c™" ^  °^ ence as which it is provided in this Code that
offend. ma,or the offender m ay be arrested without w arrant has been committed,
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any oue who no reasonable and probable grounds believes that any Nu- gj-tssi.
person is guilty of that offence is justified in arresting him w ith­
out warrant, whether such person is gu ilty  or not.
A rrest o f Persons believed to be committing major qfficncc.
42. E very oue is protected from  criminal responsibility for arrest- Arrest of person* 
ing without w arrant any-person  whom he on reasonable and TOuSmTóoroifoúcê 
probable grounds believes he finds committing any offence as to nt uifrht' 
which it  is provided by this Code that offenders m ay be arrested
without warrant.
A rrest by Pence Officer o f Person found committing any offence.
43. E very peace officer is justified in arresting without warrant Arrcsl hv
any person whom he finds committing any offence against this
Code. imy oil- net. "
A rrest o f Person found committing any ofj'ence at night.
44. E very one is justified in arresting without w arrant any ,\1TCSt <,i ]1(Tsnn
person whom he finds committing in the night time any offence S"'
against this Code. oir«n« at nifc-iit.
45. E very peace officer is justified in arresting without w arrant Arrest of persnnH
any person whom he finds ly ing  or loitering in any kraal,
enclosure, cattle yard, promises, or other place during the night, 
and whom he has good cause to suspect of having committed or 
being about to commit any offence for which an offender m ay be 
arrested without warrant.
A rrest during flight.
46. E very one is protected from  criminal responsibility fo r Arro*t during
arresting without w arrant any person whom he on reasonable and c'sllt
probable grounds believes to have committed an offence against
th is Code and to be escaping from  and to be pursued by those 
whom on reasonable and probable grounds he believes to have 
law ful authority to arrest that person for such offence.
What force may be used in executing Process or in A rrest.
47. E very one is justified or protected from  criminal responsi- wimt f.irw may
b ility  in executing any sentence, warrant or process, or in making
an arrest, and every oue law fu lly  assisting him is justified and 
protected from criminal responsibility as the case m ay be, in using 
such force as m ay be necessary to overcome any force used in 
resisting such execution or arrest, unless the sentence, process or 
w arrant can be executed or the arrest effected b y  reasonable means 
in a. less violent manner.
Duty o f Persons arresting.
48. I t  is the duty of every one executing any process or w arrant Duty 0f pmo«K
to have i t  w ith him and to produce i t  i f  required. • arresting.
J r I t  is the duty of every one arresting another, whether with or 
without warrant, to give notice where practicable of the process or 
w arrant under which he acts, or of the cause o f’ the arrest.
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not of itself deprive the person executing the process or warrant 
or his assistant1;, or the person arresting of protection from criminal 
responsibility, ;>ut shall he relevant to the enquiry whether the 
process or warrant m ight not have been executed or the arrest 
effected by reasonable meaus in a less violent manner.
Peace Officer preventing Escape from  A rrest fo r  major offence.
i-wicc officer pro- 49. E very peace officer proceeding law fully  to arrest w ith  hr
venting cscape from . . .  J L 1 °  J , .
arrest for major of- without warrant any person tor any oiienee as to which it is 
fcu“ ‘ provided in this Code that the offender may be arrested without
warrant, aud every one law fully  assisting in such arrest is justified, 
if the person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using 
such force as m ay be necessary to prevent his escape by such flight 
unless such escape can be prevented by reasonable meaus in a 
less violent manner.
Private Person preventing Escape from  A rrest from  major offence.
r r ivate person 50. E very private person proceeding law fu lly  to arrest without
preventing escape it ' l 1 • ! - i  • i  i  •tromarrestfonmjor warrant any person tor any oiienee as to which it  is provided m 
0lI‘0':e' this Code that the oii'ender m ay be arrested without warrant, is
justified, i f  the person to be arrested takes to flight to avoid arrest, 
in using such force as m ay be necessary to prevent his escape by 
flight, unless such escape ca,i be prevented by reasunable means iu 
a less violent manner.
Preventing Escape from A rrest in other cases.
Preventing cscape 51. E very one proceeding law fu lly  to arrest any person for an}' 
vim «Inf.ch in n r>r caiige ^ an Such offence as in the last section mentioned is
justified, i f  the person to be arrested takes to flight to avoid arrest 
in asing such force as m ay be necessary to prevent his escape by  
flight, unless such escape can be prevented by reasonable means in 
a less violent manner. .
Prevcntihg Escape or Rescue after A rrest fo r  major offences.
Preventing esenpe 52. E very one who has law fu lly  arrested ail}' person for any 
for raajOT^ iSiMs?4 offence as to which it is provided in this Code that the offender 
m ay be arrested without warrant, is protected from criminal 
responsibility in using such force in order to prevent the rescue or 
escape oi tlie person ai’rested, as he believes on reasonable grounds 
to be necessary for that purpose.
Preventing Ewape or Rescue after A rrest in other cases.
Preventing escupe 53. Ever}- one who has law fully  arrested any person for any 
In otiie" cusc”  “n'cst cnuse o t h e r  than one of the offences as to which it is provided in 
this Code that the offender may be arrested without warrant, is 
protected from criminal responsibility in using such force in order 
to prevent his escape or rescue as he believes on reasonable grounds 
to "be necessary for that pupose.
from arrest in other 
cases.
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HomicUir o f Persons flying and residing to be justifiable. s°. at— issc.
5 1 . I f  an3r officer of the law or private person authorized and itomieido ofper-
. J  , . .  1 .. 1 Pons iljmc and re­required to arrest, or assist in arresting, any person who lias sis iing  to be junti-
committed, or wlio is on reasonable grounds suspected to have IWlle' 
committed, any murder, culpable homicide, rape, robbery, or 
ussault with in tent to commit any of those crimes, or in which a 
dangerous wound, is given, arson, housebreaking Tvith intent to 
commit any crime, or theft of any cattle, sheep, or goats, or any 
other crime of equal degree of gu ilt w ith any of the crimes afore­
said, ordesertion or attem pteddesertionfrom agaol or convict station, 
shall attempt to make such arrest, and the person so attempted to 
be arrested shall fly  or resist, and cannot be apprehended and 
prevented 'from escaping by other means than by such officer or 
private person killing the person so flying or resisting, such homi­
cide shall bo deemed in law to be justifiable homicide.
Suppression o f Breach of the Peace.
55. E very one who witnesses a breach of the peace is justified in Supressiao ot
interfering to prevent the continuance or renewal of such breach of ac 10 lc pe:lce'
the peace, and m ay detain any person committing or about to join
in or renew such breach of the peace, in  order to give him iiito the 
custody of a peace officer: Provided that the person interfering  
uses no more force than is reasonably necessary for preventing the 
continuance or renewal of such breach of the peace or than is 
reasonably proportioned to the danger to be apprehended from  the 
continuance or renewal of such breach of the peace.
56. E very peace officer who witnesses a breach of the peace, and 
every person law fu lly  assisting him, is justified in arresting any one 
whom he finds committing such breach of the peace, or whom he 
on reasonable and probable grounds believes to be about to join in 
or renew such breach of the peace.
57. E very peace officer is justified in receiving into custody any 
person given into his charge as having been a party  to a breach of 
the peace, by one who has, or whom such peace officer upon reason­
able and probable grounds believes to have, witnessed such breach 
of the peace.
Supj?rcssion o f Riot by Magistrates, 8fc.
58. E very  Justice of the Peace is justified in. using and ordering Suppression of riot 
to be used, and every peace officer is justified in using, such force ty magistrates, &c. 
as he in good faith and on reasonable and probable grounds
believes to be necessary to suppress a riot, and as is not dispropor- 
tioned to the danger which he on reasonable and probable grounds 
believes to be apprehended from  the continuance of the riot.
Suppression o f Riot by Persons acting under Imrfttl orders.
59. E very  one, whether, subject to military, or police law or not, Suppression of riot 
acting in good fa ith  in obedience to orders given b y  a  Justice of undKv.iui order'll 
the Peace fo r the suppression of a riot, is justified in obeying the
No.£i-i=so. orders so given, unless such orders are m anifestly u n law fu l ; and 
he is protected from  criminal responsibility in using such force as 
he on reasonable and probable grounds believes to be necessary fo r  
carrying into effect such orders.
I t  shall be a question of law whether any particular order is 
m anifestly unlaw ful or not.
Protection nf Persons subject to M ilitary Laic.
protection of p?r- CO. E very  one who is bound by m ilitary or police laV/ to obey 
tnTTi«w.jectt<>m"" the law ful command of bis superior officer, is justified in obeying  
any command given him by his superior officer for the suppression 
of a riot, unless such order is m anifestly unlawful. '
I t  shall be a question of law  whether such order is m anifestly  
unlaw ful or not.
Prevention o f major offences.
Prevention of mu- C l. E very  one is justified in using such force as m ay be reason- 
joro cnees. ab iy  necessary in order to prevent the commission of any offence 
fo r which i f  committed the offender m ight be arrested without 
warrant, and the commission of which would be likely to cause 
immediate and serious in ju ry  to the person or property of any  
oue; or in order to prevent any act being done which he upon 
reasonable grounds believes would, i f  committed, amount to any of 
such offences.
Self-defence against unprovoked Assault.
scir-defci ice G2. E very one unlaw fully assaulted, not having provoked such 
Assault! UDpr0'° e assault, is justified in  repelling force by force, if the force he uses 
is not meant to cause death or grievous bodily harm, and is no 
more than is necessary fo r the purpose of self-defence.
Self-defence against provoked Assault.
Sei f -aefencc 63. E very  one who has without provocation assaulted another, 
"Sum. pro'ol"!d or has provoked an assault from  that other, m ay nevertheless 
ju s tify  force, subsequent to such assault, i f  he uses such force under 
reasonable apprehension oi death, or grievous bodily harm from  
the violence of the party  first assaulted or provoked, and iu the 
belief on reasonable grounds that it  is necessary fo r his own 
preservation from death or grievous bodily harm : Provided that 
he did not commence the assault with intent to do grievous bodily  
harm, and did not endeavour, at any time before the necessity fo r  
preserving himself arose, to kill or do grievous bodily h a rm : 
Provided, also, that before such necessity arose he declined fu rther 
conflict, and quitted or retreated from it as fa r as was practicable.
Provocation within the meaning of this and the last preceding 
section m ay be given by blows, or words.
Defence o f Movable.Property against Trespasser.
i.bieCr™COrof ™rov‘ 64'. E very  one who is in peaceable possession of any movable 
a ' j - n i n s t property or thing, and every one law fully  assisting him, is justified
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in resisting the taking of such property or thing by any trespasser, 
or in retaking it  from such trespasser, i f  in either case he does not 
do grievous bodily harm to such trespasser : and if, after any one 
having peaceable possession as aforesaid has laid hands upon any  
such property or thing, such trespasser persists in attem pting to 
keep it, or to take it from  the possessor, or from  any one law fu lly  
assisting him, the trespasser shall be deemed to commit an assault 
without justification or provocation.
Defence of Movable Property by one having claim of right.
65. E very one who is in peaceable possession of any movable 
property or thing under a claim of right, and every one acting 
under his authority, is protected from  criminal responsibility fo r 
defending such possession, even against a person entitled by law  to 
the possession of such property or thing, i f  he does not do grievous 
bodily harm to such person ; and i f  the person so entitled by law  
to tho possession thereof attempts to take it from or otherwise 
assaults the possessor, or any one acting under his authority, such 
assault shall bo deemed to be without justification or provocation.
Defence o f Movable Property by Person not having claim o f right.
66. E very one who is in peaceable possession of any movable 
property or thing, but neither claims right thereto nor acts under 
the authority of a person claiming right thereto, is neither justified  
nor protected from  criminal responsibility fo r defending his 
possession against a person entitled by law to the possession of 
such property or th in g ; and i f  the person so entitled attem pts to 
retake any such thing, and the possessor resists and the person 
entitled thereto thereupon assaults the possessor, such assault shall 
be deemed to have been provoked, although the possessor m ay not 
have assaulted the person entitled b y  law  to the possession.
Defence o f Home or K raal.
67. E very  one who is in peaceable possession of a  dwelling- 
house, or other building or kraal, aud every one law fu lly  assisting 
him, or acting b y  his authority, is justified in using such force as 
is necessary to prevent the forcible breaking and entering of that 
dwelling-house, building or kraal either b y  night or day, by any  
person with the intent to commit any indictable offence therein.
Defence o f DtccHing-hottse or K ra a l at night.
68. E very  one who is in peaceable possession of a dwelling- 
house, or other building or kraal, and every one law fu lly  assisting 
him or acting by his authority, is justified in using such force as 
is necessary to prevent the forcible breaking and entering of that 
dwelling-house, building or kraal by night b y  any person, i f  he 
believes on reasonable and probable grounds that such breaking  
and entering is attempted w ith  the intent to commit any indictable 
offence therein.
X u . -M—  is-*;.
Defence of mov­
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bavingclnimof right
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nio'í’iu^ propéri)'!0' ^9. E very one who is in peaceable possession of any house, or
other building, kraal, or land, or other immovable properties, and 
every one law fu lly  assisting him or acting b jr his authority, is 
justified in using force to prevent any person from  trespassing on 
such property, or to remove him therefrom,- if  he does not do 
grievous bodily harm to such trespasser; and if such trespasser 
resists such attempt to prevent his entry or, to remove him, such
trespasser shall be deemed to commit an assault without justifica­
tion or provocation.
Assertion o f right to House or Land.
to'to^corianá’5111 ®vei7  one *s justified in peaceably entering in the day
' time to take possession, of any house, or other building, kraal, or 
land, to the possession of which he or some other person under 
whose authority he acts is law fu lly  entitled. •
71. I f  any person, not having or acting under the authority of 
one having peaceable possession of any such house, building, kraal, 
or land, with a claim of right assaults any one peaceably entering
■ as aforesaid for the purpose of mailing him desist from  such entry,
such assault shall be deemed to be without justification or provoca­
tion.
72. I f  any person having peaceable possession- of such house, 
building, kraal, or land, with a claim of right or any person 
acting by his authority, assaults any one entering as aforesaid for 
the purpose of making him desist from such entry, such assault 
shall be deemed to be provoked by the person entering.
Surgical Operations. ■
Surgical operu- 7 3, E very one is protected from criminal responsibility fo r per- 
‘ form ing with reasonable care and skill any surgical operation upon
any person fo r his benefit, w ith  such person’s consent, i f  in a fit 
state to give such-consent, or, in the ease of a minor, w ith the 
consent of the parents or guardians of such m inor: Provided that 
performing the operation was reasonable, having regard to the 
patient’s state at the time, and to all the circumstances of the case 
A ct done in good fa ith  fo r  the benefit o f a Person without consent.
fnUh^ for^ B benefit Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it m ay
of1 a person without cause to a person for whose benefit it  is done in good faith, even 
consent. without that person’s, consent, i f  the circumstances are such that
it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person 
is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person 
in  law fu l charge of him from  whom it  is possible to obtain consent 
in time for the thing to be done with benefit.
Excess.
EMesa- 75. E very one authorized by law. to use force is crim inally
responsible for any excess, according to the nature and quality of 
the act which constitutes the excess.
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Consent to Death. No.swssc.
70. No oae lias a right to consent to the infliction of death upon con-outto 
himself, or of any in ju ry  like ly  to cause death, unless it  be an 
in ju ry  in the nature of a surgical operation upon h im se lf; and if  
suoh consent is given, it shall have no effect upon the criminal 
responsibility of any person by whom such death m ay be caused.
C H A P T E R  I V .
OF P A R T IE S  TO TH E  CO M M ISSION  O F O FFEN CES.
Parties to Offences.
77. E very one is a  party  to and guilty of an offence who Btrties to offence».
(«) A ctually  commits the offence, or does or omits any act,
the doing or omission of which forms part of the offence, 
or .
(b) A ids or abets any person in  the actual commission of the
offence, or in  any such act or omission as aforesaid; or
(c) D irectly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to
commit the offence, or to do or omit any such act as 
aforesaid.
78.  I f  several persons form  a common intention to prosecute any 
unlaw ful purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is 
a party  to every offence committed by any one of them in the 
prosecution of such common purpose, the commission of which 
offence was, or ought to have been, known to be a probable conse­
quence of the prosecution of such common purpose.
Offence committed other than the Offence intended.
79.  E very one who counsels or persuades another to be a party  tian"ihe 
to an offence of which that other is afterwards guilty, is a party  to offence intended, 
that offence, although it  m ay be committed in a w ay different from
that which was counselled or suggested.
80.  E very one who counsels or procures another to be a party to 
an offence is a party  to every offence which that other commits in  
consequence of such counselling or procuring', and which the person 
counselling or procuring knew, or ought to have known, to he likely  
to be committed in consequence of such counselling or procuring.
Accessory after the. fact defined.
81.  A n  accessory after'the fact to "an offence is one who receives, f T^nS"ftor 1:1 c 
comforts, or assists any one who has been a p arty  to such offence, ’
in order to enable him to escape, knowing him. to have been a party  
thereto : Provided that uo married woman whose husband has been 
a part}' to an offence, shall become an accessory after the fact by 
receiving, comforting, or assisting her husband, or by receiving,
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comforting, or assisting, in his presence and by hi.' authority, an­
other person who has been a party  to such oifeuce, in order to 
enable her husband or such other person to escape.
Attempt's to comm it Offences.
82. A n  attempt to commit an offence is an act done or omitted 
w ith intent to commit that offence, forming part of a series of acts 
or omissions which would have constituted the offence if  such series 
of acts or omissions had not been interrupted either by the volun­
ta ry  determination of the offender not to commit the offence or by 
some other cause.
8-3. E very  one who, believing that a certain state of facts exists, 
does or attempts an act the doing or omitting of which would, if  
th at state of facts existed, be an attempt to commit an offence, 
attempts to commit that offence, although its commission in the 
manner proposed was by reason of the non-existence of that state 
of facts at the time of the act or omission impossible.
84. The question whether an act done or omitted with intent to 
commit an offence, is or is not only preparation for the commission 
of th at offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit 
it, is a question of law.
T IT L E  II .
C H A P T E R  V.
O FFEN CES A G A IN S T  TH E  P U B L IC  O RDER.
High Treason, or waging or attempting to wage W ar against the Queen.
85. W hoever wages w ar against the Queen, or attempts to wage 
such war, or abets the waging of such war, m ay be punished with  
death, or with imprisonment fo r a term which may extend to his 
natural life, with or without hard labour, and with or without fine, 
and w ith or without flogging or whipping, or with any two or 
more of such punishments.
Conspiracy against the Queen or Government o f the Territories.
86. W hoever within or without the said Transkeian territories 
conspires to commit any of the offences punishable by the last 
section, or to deprive the Queen of her sovereignty in the said 
territories, or any of H er M ajesty ’s dominions, or conspires to 
overawe by means of criminal force, the Queen in her government 
of the said territories or dominions; shall be punished with imprison­
m ent.w ith or without hard labour for a term which may extend to 
fifteen years, to - which fine m ay be added, or with fine only, or 
w ith flogging or whipping, or w ith any two or more of such 
punishments.
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Collecting Arm * with the intention o f waging W ar. K°~21 ^30,
87. W hoever collects men, arms, or ammunition, or otherwise £Jj"n
prepares to wage w ar with the intention of either waging or being of waging war?'“ ' "
prepared to wage w ar against the Queen, shall be punishable as in
the last section is provided.
Concerting with intent to facilitate a design to wage W ar.
88. W hoever by any act or by any illegal omission conceals the Concoating with
, , j> i • j • i. n  i ’ 2.1 i. iatontto facilitate ;texistence oi a design to wage war against the Uueen, knowing that dej%a to wage war. 
i t  m ay be likely that he m ay by such concealment facilitate the 
•waging of such war, shall be punishable ás in the eighty-sixth  
section of this Code is provided.
Waging W ar against A liks.
89. A n y  British subject who wages w ar against the Government " :,r
of any power in South A frica  in alliance or at peace w ith  the Queen, °
or attempts to wage such w ar or abets the w ag in g 'o f such w ar, 
shall be also punishable as in the said eighty-sixth section is 
provided.
Abetting Mutiny and Desertion or attempting to seducc a Soldier or 
Policeman from  his duty.
90. W hoever b y  instigation, conspiracy, or aid, abets the commit- Abetting mutiny
.. « ,, J  , P* i 7 r  ^  » ,i -T, t  aad dafertioa or at-ting of mutiny, or desertion by any person m  the m ilitary  or police u-mptingtoscdnceit 
service of the Queen, or attempts to seduce any such person from  “ om'iibd5tj‘wrnl‘" 
his allegiance or duty, shall be punished with imprisonment with  
or without hard labour fo r a term which m ay extend to seven years, 
to which fine m ay be added, or w ith fine only.
C H A P T E R  VI.
O FFE N C E S A G A IN S T  T H E  P U B L IC  T E A N Q U IL L IT Y .
Unlawful Assemblies.
91. A n  assembly of five or more persons is designated an unlawful ,wm- 
“ unlaw ful assembly,”  i f  the common object of the persons compris- 1 s' 
ing that assembly is :
(1) To overawe, by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 
any officer of the Government or any public servant in  
the exercise of the law ful power of such public servant, or
(2) To resist the execution of any law, or an y  legal process.
Being member o f unlawful Assembly.
i)2. W hoever being aware of facts which render any assembly an Being member or 
unlaw ful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues UIiU,witll!':JS<:mbl>'- 
in  it, is said to be a member of an unlaw ful assembly.
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Punishment,.
93. E very member of an unlawful assembly sliall be liable to be 
imprisoned, w ith or without liard labour, fo r a term which m ay  
extend to one year, to which a fine may be added.
Fighting in a public place nn A  ffray.
94. AVlien two or more persons by fighting at any gathering at 
any kraal or after such gathering away from  any kraal or in a 
public place, disturb the public peace, they are said to commit an 
affray, and shall be punished with a fine not exceeding five pounds, 
or in default of payment with imprisonment, with or without hard 
labour fo r a term which m ay extend to three months.
Dispensing nn Assembly after an A ffray  has begun.
95. W henever any live or more persons are assembled together, 
from  whose conduct a breach of the peace may be reasonably 
apprehended, or when any affray has actually begun, any Justice  
of the Peace or other peace officer may command such persons to dis­
perse. and on failure so to do they shall each be liable to a fine not 
exceeding five pounds, and in default of paym ent to imprisonment, 
w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to three 
months.
Obstniciing or assaulting Magistrates.
96. I f  after such command as is mentioned in the last preceding 
section, five or more persons fa il to disperse, the Justice of the 
Peace or other peace officer may use force to compel them so to do, 
and whoever by force w ilfu lly  and knowingly opposes, obstructs, 
hinders or hurts any such Justice of the Peace or other peace 
officer or persons authorized by him to compel such dispersion, 
shall be punished with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, 
fo r a term which m ay extend to one year, or with fine, or both.
Indemnity o f Persons authorized to disperse Assembly.
97. I f  any person, assembled as in the last two preceding sections 
mentioned, is killed or'hurt in the apprehension of such persons, 
or in the endeavour to apprehend or disperse them by reason of 
their resistance, every person ordering them to be apprehended or 
dispersed aud every person executing such orders shall be indemni­
fied against all proceedings of every king in respect thereof.
Liability o f Members o f unlawful Assembly.
.98 . I f  an offence is committed by any member of an unlaw ful 
assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly 
or such as the members-of that assembly knew'to be likely to be 
committed in prosecution'.of that object, every person who at the 
time of committing that offence' is a member of that assembly is 
guilt}' of that offence.
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1 ’unkhmcnt fo r  drunken, riotous and indecent conduct. No. u  issc.
i)9: A n y  person drunk in any street, road, lane, or public place, Punishment tor
. . ^ x 1 , i i i j  __.___ drunken. rititmtaandor. m or near any shop, store, hotel or canteen, and any person indecent conduct, 
guilty of any riotous or indecent behaviour in any such place as 
aforesaid, or in any police office or police station-house, shall be 
punished with a fine not exceeding two pounds, and in  default of 
payment, with imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, and 
w ith or without spare diet fo r anyi period not exceeding fourteen 
d a y s ; and in case of a second or subsequent conviction, shall be 
punished with a fine not exceeding five pounds, or in default of 
payment with imprisonment with or without hard labour and w ith  
or without spare diet fo r any period not exceeding th irty  days, 
unless the fine in any case be sooner paid.
For threats, abusive language, §c.
100. A n y  person who shall use any threatening, abusive, or For threats, abusive 
insulting words or behaviour w ith in tent to provoke a breach of lanEr““"'!’ i-c'
the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, in  
any street, road, public place, or licensed public-house, shall be 
punished with a fine not exceeding three pounds, or w ith  imprison­
ment w ith or without hard labour, and with or without spare diet, 
fo r any term not exceeding th irty  days, unless such penalty be 
sooner paid, and such .person m ay further be required to find 
sureties to keep the peace fo r such- period not exceeding three 
months, as the Court before which such person is tried m ay deem 
necessary.
For accepting from  Seamen and others Ships’ Stores, Sfc.
101. E very person who shall, in any port knowingly purchase For a«cpting from
, ■» • « ji acftincn and other*or take in exchange from any seaman or other person, not being 8hipS’ stores, 
the owner or master of any vessel, anything belonging to such
vessel ly in g  in such port, or any part of the cargo of an jr such
vessel, or any stores or articles belonging to the same, shall be 
punished with a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or w ith  imprison­
m ent with or w ithout hard labour .for an y  term not exceeding 
tliree months, but noticing herein contained shall prevent the tria l 
of such person fo r any other crime of which but for the passing of 
this Code he would have been guilty.
For Sen men and others removing Ships'1 Boats.
102 . I f  any seaman belonging to any vessel ly ing  in an y  port, For ficarocn and
or if  any other person shall take aw ay or remove from any such “1t11ip.^ ,ll0raeJ novins
vessel any boat attached or belonging to the same without having
obtained permission so to do from  the master or some officer of the 
said vessel, such seaman or other person shall (although such 
taking or rem oval may not have been w ith  intent to steal), be 
punished with a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or with imprison­
m ent w ith or without hard labour fo r any term  not exceeding three 
months.
T I T L E  I I I .
' C H A P T E R  V II.
O F F E N C E S  A G A IN S T  T H E  A D M IN IS T R A T IO N  O F  
J U S T IC E .
Judie.idl Corrrption.
'miiciuiCorruption. 103 . W hoever, holding any judicial office, corruptly accepts, or 
obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain for himself br 
any other person any money or valuable consideration, office, place, 
or employment whatever, on account of anything already done or 
omitted, or to be afterwards done or omitted by him in his judicial 
capacity, or corruptly gives to any person holding any judicial
office, or to any other person, any money or valuable consideration, 
office, oi' place of employment, whatever, on account of such act or 
omission as aforesaid, shall be punished with imprisonment, with  
or without hard labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend to five years, 
or fine, or both.
Corruption of Public Officers.
iiC oarer»"of Pub" 1 0^- W hoever, being a Justice of the Peace, or public officer
lc cers' appointed in any capacity for the prosecution or detection or
punishment of offenders, or whoever, being an interpreter in any  
Court of Justice, corruptly accepts, or obtains, or agrees to accept, 
or attempts to obtain for himself or any other person, any money, 
valuable consideration, office, or place whatever, with the intent to 
interfere corruptly w ith  the due administration of justice, or to 
procure or facilitate the commission of any offence, or to protect 
from  detection or punishment any person having committed, or 
intending to commit any such offence, or corruptly gives or offers 
to any such officer as aforesaid, with any such intent as aforesaid, 
shall be punished with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, 
fo r a term -which m ay extend to three years, or fine, or both.
Threatening ant/ Person in order to induce him to refrain from  apply­
ing fo r  legal protection. •
ïiiicatcuine any 105 . W hoever holds out anjr threat of in ju ry  to any person fo r  
m0«™ him "iT re- the pm-pose of inducing that person to refrain or desist from  
nutfdng a legal application for protection against any in ju ry  to- 
any Magistrate or other public officer or servant legally  empowered 
as such to give such protection or to cause such protection to be 
given, shall be punished with a fine not exceeding ten pounds, and 
in default of paym ent thereof, with imprisonment w ith or w ithout 
hard labour for a term  which m ay extend to three months.
P erju ry  and Subornation o f Perjury.
orationof'lnd■ 6ut>~ 100. P e rju ry  i s-an assertion as to a m atter of fact,'op in ionr
IK'rjuo‘ belief or knowledge made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as-
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part of liis evidence, either upon oath, or in any form  allowed by  No.st-tsai. 
law to be substituted for an oath, whether such evidence is given 
in open Court or b y  affidavit or otherwise, such assertion being 
known to such a witness to be false.
' E very person is a witness within the meaning of this section who 
actually gives his evidence upon oath, or in such form  as aforesaid, 
whethcr.vherwas competent to be a witness or not. Subornation 
of perju ry is counselling any person to commit any p erju ry  which 
is actually committed.
107. W hoever is gu ilty  of perju ry, or subornation of perjury, 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term  which m ay extend  
to seven years, or fine, or flogging or whipping, or any two of such 
punishments; and if  an innocent person be convicted and executed 
in consequence of any false evidence, the person who gives or 
counsels such evidence shall be punished with imprisonment, with  
or without hard labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend to the term  
of his natural life, or with such term of imprisonment and flogging  
or whipping.
Fake Statement on Oath.
108 . W hoever being required or authorized b y  law  to make a F^aiscMUitcmentoa 
statement, either on oath or in any form  permitted to be ' 
substituted for an oath, thereupon makes a statement which would
amount to perjury i f  made in a judicial proceeding, shall be deemed 
to be guilty of perjury, and punished accordingly.
Fake Declaration.
109 . Whoever" makes a statement as to any m atter of fact, raise declaration, 
opinion, or belief, which would amount to p erju ry  i f  made on oath
•.upon any occasion on which he is permitted bjr law  to make any  
statement or declaration in lieu of an oath before any officer 
authorized by law  to permit i t  to be made before him, shall be 
punished in the same m anner as i f  he had committed the crime of 
perjury.
Fabricating Evidence.
11 0 . W hoever, w ith intent to mislead any Court o f Justice or Fabricating cvi- 
person holding any such judicial proceeding as aforesaid, fabricates dence‘
or contrives evidence b y  any means other than perju ry  and  
subornation of perju ry, shall be punished w ith  imprisonment, w ith  
or without hard labour, fo r a term of not exceeding seven years, 
or with fine, or both.
Conspiring to bring Fake Accusations.
1 1 1 .  W hoever conspires w ith any person to prosecute any one conspiring to bring 
for any offence, knowing such other person to be innocent th ereo f,ílJ,e accusat‘ona' 
shall be liable upon conviction to be punished with imprisonment,
with or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to 
seven'years, or flogging or whipping, or w ith  fine, or any two or 
more of such punishm ents: Provided, how ever,' that where such
vno
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innocent accused is convicted and executed, such conspirator m a y  
be punished with death, or imprisonment with or w ithout hard  
labour, fo r a period which m ay extend to the term of his natural 
life.
Conqriringjo defeat Justicn.
1 1 2 . W hoever conspires w ith any person to obstruct, prevent, 
or defeat the course of justice, or who w ilfu lly  attempts in anv  
w ay, not otherwise criminal, to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat 
the course of justice or the administration of the law, shall be 
punished as in the last section provided.
Bribery or Corruption of Witnesses, Ju ro rs , Assessors, or
Interpreters.
1 1 3 . E very  one shall be liable to the punishment provided in 
section 10 4  of this Code who (a) dissuades or attempts to dissuade 
any person by threats, bribes, or other corrupt means, from  giving  
evidence in any cause or matter, civil or c rim in a l; or (b) 
influences or attempts to influence by threats or bribes or other 
corrupt means any jurym an, assessor, or interpreter iu his conduct 
as such, whether such jurym an, assessor, or interpreter has been 
swom or n o t; (c) or accepts any such bribe or other corrupt 
consideration to abstain from giving evidence, or on account of his 
conduct as jurym an, assessor, or interpreter.
C H A P T E R  V III.
E SC A P E S A N D  R E SC U E S.
1 1 4 . W hoever by force or violence breaks any gaol or prison 
w ith intent to set at liberty  himself or any other person law fu lly  
confined therein on any criminal charge, shall be punished with  
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay  
extend to two years.
1 1 5 . W hoever, being convicted of any offence, escapes from  
gaol or prison, or from any law ful custody in which he m ay be 
under such conviction, or attempts or conspires to make his escape 
from  such custodj', shall be punished with imprisonment, with or 
without hard labour, for a term which may extend to two years, 
or flogging or whipping.
11 6 . Whoever, being in law ful custody on any criminal charge,
escapes from such custody, shall be liable to imprisonment, w ith or 
without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to one year, or 
fine, or both. '
117 . W hoever rescues any prisoner, or assists any prisoner in  
escaping or attempting, to escape frora law ful custody, whether in 
gaol or prison or not;'or being a gaoler or .other officer having the 
law fu l custody of 6uch. prisoner, voluntarily and intentionally  
permits him to escape, or aids, him í d escaping or attempting to
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escape, shall l)e punished with imprisonment, with, or without hard Mo.ai-isso. 
labour, for a term  which m ay extend to two years, or fine; or both.
1 18 . W hoever, b jT fa iling  to perform any legal duty, permits a 
person in his law fu l custody on a criminal charge to escape 
'therefrom, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term wliich 
m ay extend to six months, or fine, or both.
1 19 . I t  shall be law fu l for the Governor to m ate  such rules and 
regulations for the several gaols and prisons of the territories to 
which this Code applies, and for the discipline therein, as 6hall to 
him seem expedient, and thereby to impose any punishment for 
the breach of such regulation, under a penalty of imprisonment, 
w ith or without hard labour, or with or without spare diet, or 
flogging, or' w h ipp ing : Provided that in no case shall any  
unconvicted person be sentenced to flogging or whipping.
T IT L E  IV .
C H A P T E R  IX .
O FFEN CES A G A IN S T  R E L IG IO N , M O R A L IT Y ,
D ECE N CY, A N D  TH E  P U B L IC  H E A L T H .
Disturbing a Religious Assembly.
120 . W hoever w ilfu lly  and without law fu l justification or .Disturbing a rei:- 
excuse, the proof whereof shall be on him, disquiets or disturbs 8'0U31138001
any meeting, assembly, or congregation of persons law fu lly  
assembled for religious worship, and whoever in any w ay disturbs, 
molests, or misuses any preacher, teacher, or person law fu lly  
officiating at such meeting, assembly, or congregation, or any  
persons there assembled, shall be punished with a  fine not exceed­
ing ten pounds sterling, and in default of paym ent w ith imprison­
ment, with or w ithout hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend 
to three months, unless such fine be sooner paid.
Unnatural Offences.
12 1 . W hoever voluntarily  lias carnal intercourse against the U nnatural oftcnccs. 
order of nature with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished
with imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term- which 
m ay extend to ten years, or with flogging, or whipping, or fine, 
or with any two or more of the said punishments. This offence 
is complete upon penetration.
122 . W hoever attempts to have carnal intercourse against the
■ order of nature w ith any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished
with imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, for a term  which 
m ay extend to five years, or flogging, or whipping, or fine, or to 
any two or more of siich punishments.
iota 2
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Ko'Zlr163C' Incest.
Inres:- 123 . Incest is tlie carnal connection of persons related b y
consanguinity within the third  degree.
Incest shall be punished with imprisonment, w ith or without 
hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to seven years, or with  
flogging, or fine, or any two or more of these punishments com­
bined.
Indecent Acts.
indecent acta. 124. W hoever commits any nuisance in any street or public-
place, or in view of any dwelling-house whereby public decency
m ay be offended, shall be punished with a fine not exceeding two
pounds, and in default of payment thereof with imprisonment
with or without hard labour fo r a term, which may extend to one-
month, unless such fine be sooner paid.
Insufficient Clothing in 1'ouns anil other Public Places.
insufficient cloth- 125. W hoever indecently exposes his person or appears in any
id? m  towns aud , . . „■J  l 1 II J
otter public plate», street or public thoroughfare without such articles or clothing as
decency requires shall be punished with a fine not exceeding two
pounds, and in default of payment, with imprisonment for a term  
which m ay extend to one month, unless such fine he sooner paid.
Burial, Disinterment, or Indignity to Human Remains.
mentri‘or 126 . W hoever neglects to perform any legal duty, either
to human rcmafna.y imposed upon him by law, or undertaken by hint, w ith  reference
to the burial o f any dead human body or human remains, or 
without law ful authority disinters a dead body, or im properly or 
indecently interferes w ith or offers any indignity to any dead 
human body or human remains, whether buried or not, shall be 
liable to a fine of tw enty pounds, or in default of payment, to- 
imprisonment w ith  or without hard labour fo r a term which m ay 
extend to six months, unless such fine be sooner paid.
Common Nuisances.
Common nuisance*. 127 . W hoever is guilty of an unlawful act or omission to 
discharge a legal duty, which act or omission endangers the lives, 
safety, or health of the public, or which occasions in ju ry  to the 
person of any individual, m ay be convicted and punished with a 
fine not exceeding tw enty pounds, and in default of payment 
thereof w ith imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, for a 
tern.' which m ay extend to six months, unless such fine be soonei- 
puid.
General Police Provisions.
ocnwui Police pro- 128 . A n y  person guilty of any of the following acts or offences- 
T,slon5' shall, upon conviction in respect of each act or offence, be punished
with a fine not exceeding five pounds, or in default of paym ent be- 
imprisoned, with or without hard labour, fo r a period not exceed­
ing three months, unless such fine be sooner paid :
NA T I V E  TERRITORIES1 P E N A L  CODE. 2145
(1) A n y  driver of any vehicle in juring any person or property |/No- 
by negligence or driving on tlie wrong side of the road.
(2) Aii}" driver of any vehicle being away from his horse or j / 
cattle so as to be unable to have the fu ll control of them. I
:<3) D riving any vehicle or riding any animal, and when 
meeting any other vehicle, or animal being ridden not 
keeping on the le ft or near side of the road or street, or 
when passing any other vehicle or animal going ir. the 
same direction, not going or passing or not allowing any  
person desirous so to do to pass when practicable on the 
righ t or oif side of such other vehicle or animal being 
ridden.
(4) Leaving upon any street, public road or thoroughfare, 
any stone, timber, bricks, or other thing, calculated to 
damage or endanger any animal or vehicle ridden or 
driven thereon.
(5) A n y  driver or guard of a public vehicle for the conveyance 
of passengers w ilfu lly  delaying on the road, using any  
abusive or insulting language to any passenger, or by  
reason of intoxication, negligence, or other misconduct, 
endangering the safety or property of any passenger or 
other - person, or demanding or exacting more than the 
proper fare due from  any passenger.
(6) Leaving' upon any public road or thoroughfare any
vehicle, plough or harrow without any horse or animal 
harnessed thereto, unless in consequence of Bome 
accident having occurred. .
(7) H aving any timber, iron, or boards laid  across any  
vehicle going along any public road so that either end 
projects more than two feet beyond the wheels or sides 
of such vehicle.
(8) Slaughtering or skinning any beast upon any public 
road or thoroughfare, or leaving any dead beast on any 
such road or thoroughfare.
(9) Setting or urging or perm itting any dog or other animal 
to attack or w orry any person, horse or other animal, or 
by ill-usage or negligence in driving any cattle causing 
any damage or hurt to be done by such cattle. .
(10) W ilfu lly  breaking any pane of glass in any building.
(11) W ilfu lly  breaking or extinguishing or in juring any
lamp, or damaging any lamp-post. •
(12) W ilfu lly  trespassing in any place, and neglecting or 
refusing to leave such place' after being warned to do so 
b y the owner or occupier, or any person authorized by or 
on behalf of the owner or occupier.
(13) P laying  or betting in any street' or other open .and 
public place, at or witla any table" o r ' in s tru m e n to f  
gaming or pretended game of chance.
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(2)
(3)
129 . A n y  person guilty  of any of the following acts or offences 
shall upon conviction in respect of each act or offence be 
punished with a fine not exceeding tw enty pounds, or in default 
of paym ent be imprisoned with or without hard labour, for a 
period not exceeding six months, unless such fine be sooner paid, or 
either to such penalty or such imprisonment, that is to say :
(1) A n y  person having in his custody or possession without 
law ful excuse (the proof of which excuse shall be on such 
person) any pick-lock, key, crow,'or other implement of 
housebreaking. ,
A n y  person found by night, having his face blackened or 
wearing fe lt or other slippers, or being dressed or other­
wise disguised w ith a criminal intent.
A n y  person found by night, without law ful excuse (the 
proof of which excuse shall be on such person) in or upon, 
or loitering in the neighbourhood of any dwelling-house, 
warehouse, coach-house, stable, cellar, or out-house, or in  
or loitering in the neighbourhood of any enclosed yard, 
garden, or area, or in any kraal, or in or on board anjr 
ship or other vessel when ly in g  or being in any port, 
harbour, or place in these territories.
A n y  person found bj' night armed with any gun, pistol, 
sword, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon or instrument 
with a criminal intent, and who being thereto required 
shall not assign a valid  and satisfactory reason for being 
so armed.
A n y  person who shall resist, or incite, or aid, or encourage 
any person to resist, and any person who shall hinder or 
disturb any constable, policeman, or officer of any local 
authority in  the execution of his duty.
(5)
T IT L E  V .
C H A P T E R  X .
O FFEN CES A G A IN S T  TH E PERSO N . 
I)idies tending to the Preservation o f Life. 
Duly to provide Necessaries.
Duties tending to 
the preservation of 
life.
Duty 
necmurica.
130. W hoever has charge of any other person, unable either by  
reason of detention, age sickness, insanity, or any other cause, to  
withdraw himself from such charge, and unable to provide himself 
to provide ^ t l i  the necessaries of life, is under a legal duty to • supply that 
person with the necessaries of life, and is .crim inally responsible fo r  
omitting without law ful excuse to perform it, i f  death is caused 
thereby; or if the life of such person is endangered,-or his health  
permanently injured, whether such charge is imposed upon him by  
law, or if  undertaken b y  him under any contract, or by reason o f 
any unlaw ful act.
XA T I V E  TERRITORIES’ P E N A L  CODE. 2147
But)/ oj Persons (loinc/ dangerous acts. No. s -^issa.
131.. 'Every one who undertakes, except in cases of necessity, to do? !ltya clou’s 
administer surgical or medical treatment, or to do any other law ful nets. 5" ° “J 
ac tj'th ed o in g o f which is or m ay be dangerous to life, is under a 
legal duty to have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill, care, and 
caution in doing any such act, and is crim inally responsible for 
om itting to discharge that duty, i f  death is caused thereby.
Buii/ o f Persons in charge o f dangerous things.
13 2 . E very one who has in his charge, or under his control, any- c)®u^ 0°f 
th ing whatever, whether animate or inanimate, or who erects, tiílufs6.0 aD°cr‘>u'' 
makes, or maintains anyth ing whatever which, in the absence, of 
precaution or care, m ay endanger human life, is under a legal duty
to take reasonable precautions against, and use reasonable care to 
avoid, such danger, and is crim inally responsible fo r the conse­
quences of omitting without law ful excuse to take such precautions 
or to use such care.
B ufy to avoid omissions dangerous to Life.
133 . E very one who undertakes to do any act, the omission to Duty to avoid omis- 
do which is or m ay be dangerous to life, is under a  legal duty to litS* d:mscious tu 
do th at act, and is crim inally responsible fo r the consequences of
omitting, without law ful excuse, to discharge that duty.
Homicide defined.
134 . Homicide is the k illing  of a human being b y  another nomicidc defined, 
directly or indirectly b y  an y  means whatsoever.
A  child becomes a human being within the meaning of this 
Code, when it  has com pletely proceeded in a  liv ing  state from  the 
body of its mother, whether in a case of suspended respiration, it 
has breathed or not, and whether it has an independent circulation 
or not, and whether the navel string is severed or n o t; and the 
killing  of such a child is homicide when it  dies after birth  in 
consequence of in juries received before, during, or after birth.
Culpable Homicide.
135 . Homicide is culpable when it  consists in the killing of any CuipabichomMdc. 
person either b y  an unlaw ful act or by a culpable omission to perform
or observe any legal duty, or by both combined, or by causing a  
person by threats or fear of violence, or by deception, to do an act 
which causes th at person’s death, or by w ilfu lly  frightening a 
child or sick person.
Homicide which is not culpable is not an offence.
Death must be within a year.
13 6 : No one iscrim in a lly  responsiblé fo r the k illing  of another Death must be 
unless the death take place within a year of' the1 cause of death. wlUun RyC!ir’
The period of a yea r shall be reckoned inclusive of the day on
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No, 24—isk. wliicli. the last unlaw ful act contributing to the cause of death took 
place. "Where the cause of death is an omission to fu lfil a legal 
duty, the period shall be reckoned inclusive of the day on. which 
such omission ceased. W here death is in part caused b y  an 
unlaw ful act and in part by an omission, the period shall be 
reckoned-inclusive of- the day on-which the last unlaw ful act toolc- 
plaee or the omission ceased, whichever happened first.
Acceleration o f Death.
death'01™1'011 o£ 137 . E very  one who by an act or omission of a legal duty
‘ ' causes the death of another shall be deemed to k ill that person,
although the effect of- the bodily in ju ry  caused to such other 
person be m erely to accelerate his death, while labouring under 
some disorder or disease arising from  some other cause.
Causing Death which might have been prevented.
which* m? U °h!we 138 . E very  one who b y  an act or omission of a legal duty
been prcvcDtea. causes the death of an o th ersh allb e  deemed to k ill that person,
although death from  that cause m ight have been prevented by  
resorting to proper means.
139 . E very  one who causes a bodily in ju ry  to any person from  
which death results shall be deemed to kill that person, although 
the immediate cause of such death be treatment applied in good 
fa ith  fo r the purpose of cure, even if such treatment was improper : 
Provided that i f  the in ju ry  was not in itself of a dangerous 
character, and the improper treatm ent was the cause of death, that 
shall be a defence to a charge of murder or culpable homicide.
Murder, i§-c.
Murder, &c. 140 . Culpable homicide becomes murder in the following
cases:
(a) I f  the offender means to cause the death of the person 
killed.
(b) I f  the offender means to cause to the person killed any  
bodily in ju ry  which is known to the offender to be likely  
to cause death, and i f  the offender, whether he does or 
does not mean to cause death, is reckless whether death  
ensues or not.
(c) I f  the offender means to cause death or such bodily in ju ry
as aforesaid to one person, so that i f  that person be 
killed the offender would be guilty of murder, and by 
accident or mistake the offender kills another person, 
though he does not mean to h u rt the person killed.
(ei) I f  the offender for any unlaw ful object does an act which 
he knows' or ought to have known- to be like ly  to .cause' 
death,' and., thereby kills- any. person,1 though h e -m ay  
Have, desired that his object should'be'effected ■without 
hurting any one.
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Provocation. No. 34 issc.
14 1 . Homicide which would otherwise be m urder m ay be revocation, 
l'educed to . culpable homicide if the person who causes death
does bo in the heat of passion occasioned by sudden provocation.
•' A n y  wrongful act or insult o f such a nature as to be sufficient 
to deprive any ordinary person of the power of self-control m ay be 
provocation, i f  the offender acts upon it  on the sudden, and before 
there has been time fo r his passion to cool.
W hether any particular w rongful act or insult, whatever may 
' be its nature, amounts to provocation, and whether the person 
provoked was actually deprived of the power of self-control by the 
provocation which he received, shall be questions of fa c t : Provided  
th a t no one shall be deemed to give provocation to another only  
b y doing that which he had a legal right to do, or by doing any­
th ing which the offender incited him to do in order to provide the 
offender with an excuse for killing or doing bodily harm to any 
person : Provided also th at an arrest shall not necessarily reduce
the offence from  m urder to culpable homicide because the arrest 
' was illegal, but if  the illegality  was known to the offender, it  m ay  
be evidence of provocation.
Punishment fo r  Murder, Sfc.
142 . E very  one who commits murder shall, upon conviction Punishment for
thereof, be sentenced to death. murder, &c.
“ 143 . E very  one who attempts to commit m urder shall be 
punished w ith imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a 
term  which m ay extend to tw enty years, fine, or flogging or 
whipping, or w ith any two or more of such punishments.
144 . W hoever
(a) Conspires or agrees w ith any person to m urder or to cause 
or procure the m urder of any other person, whether the 
person intended to be murdered is a subject of H er 
M ajesty or not, or is within H er M ajesty ’s dominions 
or n o t: or ’
(ft) Counsels or attempts to procure any person to murder any  
other person, although such person is not murdered in  
consequence of such counselling or attempted procurement, 
whether the person whose murder is counselled or 
attempted to be procured is a subject of H er M ajesty  
or not, or is within H er M ajesty’s dominions or n o t : 
shall be punished w ith imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, 
fo r a term  which m ay extend to tw enty years, or with line, or 
flogging or whipping, or any two or more of such punishments.
Accessor;/ after the fa c t to M w der.
145. (.W hoever is an accessory after' the fact to murder shall be Accessors-after the 
punished with, imprisonment, .with- or ■without hard labour, fo r a fact^ murder, 
term which m ay extend to ten years, or fine, or both.
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No.ti i^s-'o. Punishment <>/ Culptiblc Homicide,
cuir iUt bomicídc'" -^vel7  one commits culpable homicide shall be punished
cu p.i i oimci c. ;mprisonmGntj -vvith or without hard labour, for a term which
m ay extend to tw enty years, or with fine, or w ith flogging or 
whipping, or any two or more of such punishments.
Aiding, and abetting Suicide,.
Kuidde’°naabett^  1^7. W hoever counsels or procures any person to commit suicide,
’ actually committed in consequence of such counselling or procure­
ment, or whoever aids or abets any person in the commission of 
suicide, shall be punished w ith  imprisonment, with or without 
hard  labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to ten years, or w ith  fine, 
or both: Provided, however, that fo r abetment of suicide of a 
minor or insane or intoxicated person the term of such imprison­
ment m ay extend to his natural life.
Attempting Suicide.
eide.tt<:mplmB 8ui~ 148 . E very  one who attempts to commit suicide shall be 
punished w ith  imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, for a 
term which m ay extend to one year, or with fine or both.
Concealment of Child-birth.
.Concealment of 149 . W hoever disposes of the dead body of any child in any  
ciu<- itt . manner, w ith  intent to conceal the fact of its birth, whether the 
child died before, during, or after birth, shall be punished with  
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which may 
extend to five years, or with fine, or both.
Bodily injuries and acts causing danger to the Person.
nSadily Sn’irton>1cr ' ^ loever with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do
thepersoiu nn;!cr grievous bodily harm  to any one, or, to resist or prevent the law ful 
apprehension or detention of any one, un law fully wounds or does 
actual grievous bodily harm to any person, shall be punished with  
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay  
extend to ten years, or w ith fine, or w ith flogging or whipping, or 
any two or more of such punishments.
The following kinds of hurt only are designated “ grievous ”  
bodily harm, v iz .:— 1, Emasculation ; 2, permanent privation of 
the sight of an e y e ; 3, permanent privation of the hearing of an 
3 a r ; 4, privation of any member or jo in t ; 5, destruction or 
impairing of the powers of any member or jo in t ; 6, permanent 
disfiguration of the head or fa ce ; 7, fracture or dislocation of a 
bone; 8, any hurt which endangers life  or which causes the sufferer
• to be during the space of tw enty days in severe bodily pain, or 
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
Administering Poison so as to endanger Life.
: Adminittcringpoi: 1 5 L  W hoever- kn o w ing lý 'and ïw ith 'in teh t' tó in jure, aggrieve,
MnBoaatocaaangcc.^.^^^y,any  pej sc;n administers;Jor'causes -to be administered to, 
or be taken' by1 such' person,-'any poison^ o r ’ other noxious or
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destructive tiling, whereby the life  of r.ny person is endangered or No. 5i-is?c. 
grievous bodily harm is caused to any person, shall be punished 
w ith  imprisonment, with or without hard labour, fo r a term which 
m ay extend to seven years, or w ith fine, or with Hogging or 
whipping, or any two or more of sucli punishments.
Administering Poison with intent.
152.’ 'W lfoever' know ingly and with intent to in jure, aggrieve, A dm in istering  poi- 
or ann'Oy any person, administers to, or causes to he administered to,*nn wltu lnlent-
or be taken by such person, any poison or other destructive or 
noxious thing, although no in ju ry  m ay be caused thereby, shall be 
punished with imprisonment w ith  or without hard labour for a 
term which m ay extend to one year or with. Hogging or whipping, 
or any two or more of such punishments.
Forcing or aiding, or procuring- the enforcement o f Circumcision or
Intonjanc.
153 . W hoever b y  force or threats compels any person to submit Fordug:or niding, 
against his or her w ill to the act of circumcision, or to take part in “o r? cme n t c írcu™I 
the ceremony named infonjrme, or whoever b y  force or threats cisioa or ir,tonj;'ne- 
compels any person, male or female, against his or her w ill, to
submit to any other like act or ceremony, shall be punished with  
fine, and in default of payment, with imprisonment, w ith  or without 
hard labour, for a term which m ay extend to one year.
Circumcision without consent.
154 . A n y  person aiding or procuring the circumcision of any Circumcision with- 
youth without the consent of his parent or the person having the out conscnt- 
law fu l custody' of such youth, shall be gu ilty  of an assault, and
shall be punished as in the last preceding section mentioned.
Assault defined.
155 .  A n  assault is the act of intentionally applying force lo  A ssault defined, 
the person of another, d irectly or indirectly, or attempting, or 
threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person
of another, i f  the person m aking the threat has or causes the other 
to believe upon reasonable grounds that he has the present ability  
to effect his purpose.
Indecent Assault.
156 . W hoever indecently assaults any female shall bo punished indcccnt assault, 
w ith imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term  which
may extend to two years, or w ith fine or with flogging, or whipping, 
or any two or more of such punishments.
Assaults on Peace Officers, and to resist Apprehension.-
157 . W hoever
(a) Assaults any person with intent to commit an offence, or Assmits on pence 
to resist or prevent the law ful apprehension or detention ®^ 0rce”én"iou0 resist 
. of him self, or o f any other person for any offence, or to
‘ ‘ rescue any person from  law ful custody.;
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No. M-is». (i) Assaults, resists, or -wilfully obstructs any peace officer in
the execution of his duty, or any person acting in aid of 
such officer; or
(c) Assaults, resists, or unlaw fully obstructs any person in the 
law fu l execution of any process, against any lands or 
goods, or w ith intent to rescue any goods, taken nnder such 
process, or taken under any law ful distress; 
shall be punished with imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, 
for a term  which m ay extend to two years, or with fine, or both.
Common Assaults.
common assaults. 158 . W hoever commits acommoQ assault shall be punished with 
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, for a term which may 
extend to one year, or w ith  fine or both.
Iiape.
n»pc. 159 . Iiape is the act of a man having carnal knowledge without
the consent of a woman who is not his w ife : Provided that nothing 
shall be deemed to be consent which is either extorted by threats or 
fear of bodily harm, or obtained by personating the woman’s 
husband, or b y  falsely and fraudulently misrepresenting the nature 
and quality of the act. This offence shall be complete -upon 
penetration.
A  boy under fourteen years of age shall be conclusively presumed 
to be incapable of having carnal knowledge of a woman within 
the 'meaning of this section.
W hoever commits rape shall be punished -with imprisonment, 
w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to 
tw enty years, or w ith  flogging or whipping or with fine or any two 
or more of such punishments.
Attempt to Jifipc.
Attempt to mpe. ig o . W hoever attempts to commit a rape shall be punished with 
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, for a term which may 
extend to seven years, or with flogging, or fine, or whipping, or 
any two or more of such punishments:
Carnally knowing Children.
c^arnally knowing 16 1 . W hoever carnally knows any g irl under the age of twelve 
' ‘ " years, whether he believes her to be of or above that age or not,
’ and w hethër she consents or not, shall be imprisoned, with or 
without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to twenty years, 
or w ith  or without flogging ór whipping or fine, or any two or 
more of such' punishments.
162 . .W hoever attempts carnally to know any g irl under the age 
of.,tw elve ,;years, whether.he.believes her,to-be of. suoh age or not, 
. shall be, punished w ith  imprisonment .w ith . or .without hard labour,
for a term  which m ay' extend to two years, Or w ith ' fine, or with 
flogging or whipping, or any two or more of the said punishments.
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A ge of Children. No. m - issi.
163 . I t  shall be law ful fo r the Court or Ju ry  b y  whom the Age of children, 
accused is tried to judge from  the appearance of the g irl in
question in such-prosecution, and also, if  the Court thinks fit from  
th e  opinions du ly  given in evidence of persons skilled in ascertain­
in g 'th e  age of such girls, and from any other evidence that may 
-be.adduced on the subject, whether the g irl was under the age of 
twelve years at the time the offence was committed or not.
Causing Death o f Child by weans o f Miscarriage.
164 . "Whoever causes the death of any liv ing  child, which has Causins of m,"s- 
not proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother, in
such a manner that he would have been gu ilty  of m urder i f  such 
child bad been fu lly  bom, shall be punished with imprisonment 
with or without hard labour fo r a term which m ay extend to seven 
years or w ith  fine or both : Provided that no one shall be guilty of 
an offence under this section who by means employed in good 
faith for the preservation of the life of the mother of the child, 
causes the death of any such child before or during or after its 
birth.
Procuring Miscarriage.
165'. W hoever; w ith  the intent to procure miscarriage of any rrocurintr mis- 
wóman, whether she be or be not w ith child, u n law fu llycarmffc- 
. administers to, or causes to be taken by her, any poison or other 
noxious thing, or unlaw fully- uses any instrument or other means 
•whatsoever with the like intent, shall be punished w ith  imprison­
ment w ith or without hard labour, for a  term which m ay extend 
to five years, or fine or b o th : Provided that suoh woman herself 
shall not be indictable under this section.
Woman procuring her oicn Miscarriage.
166 . W hoever unlaw fully administers or permits to be admin- Woman procuring 
istered to herself, any poison or other noxious thing, or un law fully  hcro,rnmiEoarrme<!- 
uses or permits to be used on herself any instrum ent w ith  intent to
procure her own miscarriage, shall be punished w ith  imprisonment 
with or without hard labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend to two 
years, or fine, or both.
Supplying means o f procuring Abortion.
167 . "Whoever un law fu lly  supplies or procures any poison or sujipij-inp me.™* 
pther noxious thing, or any instrum ent or thing whatsoever, know- tí0„proc"nue :lbor“ 
ing that the same is intended to be unlaw fully used or employed
Jvith intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she 
is or is not with child, shall be punished with imprisonment, w ith  
jOr without hard labour, fo r a period which m ay extend to one year, 
or fine or both.
• ' Bigamy.
■ 168 . W hoever, having a  husband or wife, living, marries in  any Bigamy,
ía se  in-' which such marriage is and shall be void b y  reason of' its
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‘  ° ' ! 1 Z 1SSG' taking place during the lifetime of sucli husband or wife, shall bo 
punished w ith imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, for a 
term which m ay extend to five years, or with fine or b o th : 
Provided, however, that this section shall not extend to any person 
whose marriage w ith such husband or wife has been declared void 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or to any person who con­
tracts a m arriage during thé life "of such husband or wife, i f  such ' 
husband or wife at the time of the subsequent marriage shall have 
been continually absent from such person fo r the space of seven 
years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being 
alive within that time : Provided that the person contracting such 
subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, 
inform  the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the 
real state of facts, so fa r as the same is within his or her know­
ledge : Provided, further, that this section shall not extend to any 
person whose previous marriage with a husband or wife living was 
entered into according to Native custom, whether the same was 
registered or not.
Stealing or abducting Children under fourteen years o f age.
dittHn1''children un~ W hoever w ith  intent to deprive any parent or guardian or
der "fmutêciTyear» other person having the lawful care or charge of any child under 
oí the age of fourteen, unlaw fully leads or takes away or decoys or
entices away or detains any such child, or receives or harbours any 
such child, knowing it  to have been dealt w ith as aforesaid, shall 
be punished with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for 
a term which m ay extend to five years, or fine, or both : Provided  
that nothing herein shall extend to any one who gets or takes 
possession of an y  child, claiming in good faith a right to the 
possession of the child.
Abandoning or exposing Children.
170- W hoever, un law fu lly exposes or abandons any child under 
the age of seven years, or who, being law fu lly  bound to take 
charge of any such child, knowingly and without law ful excuse 
leaves it  abandoned or exposed, whereby its life  is endangered or 
its health is perm anently injured, shall be punished with imprison­
ment, w ith  or w ithout hard labour, for a term which m ay extend 
to three years, or with fine, or both.
CHAPTER' XL 
PR E T E N D E D  W IT C H C R A F T .
Imputations o f Witchcraft.
»i\dJUVt!ltlons oi 171- W hoever imputes to any other the use of non-natural 
means in causing any disease, in any person or aninial, or in 
causmg.^any. in ju ry.-to  any person;o r ’p roperty ,'that is 'to  say, 
whoever . names or . indicates ■ another to be a wizard or witch
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(ttmhihiti) shall be punished w ith a fiue not exceeding: fo rty  ko.w—isso.
shillings sterling, or in default of paym ent with imprisonment, 
with or without hard labour, fo r fourteen days unless such fine be 
sooner paid.
1 7 i .  W hoever having named or indicated any person as wizard  
or witch, shall be proved to be by habit and repute a witch-doctor 
or witch-finder (isannsi) shall be punished w ith imprisonment, 
with or without' hai'd labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend to two 
years, ■ or w ith fine, or flogging, or any two or more of such 
punishments.
Employing a  Witch-doctor.
173 . W hoever employs or solicits any witch-doctor or witch- Employing a
j-> i /♦ - "i.i. ’ ^ é l  * j  *j.i vriteh-doctor.inider (ismiusi) to name or mdicafce any person as wizard or *witcli 
(,umtal'aii) shall be punished with a fine not exceeding five pounds, 
and in default of payment to imprisonment, w ith or .without hard' 
labour, for a term which m ay extend to two months unless such 
fine be sooner paid.
Witch-doctors supplying Advice or Witchcraft Materials n-ith. intent
to injure.
174.  A n y  person professing to a knowledge of so-called witch- •witch-doctors 
craft, or the use of charms, who shall advise any person applying StSlcmil Twitemlx 
to him how to bewitch or in ju re persons, property, or cattle, or "■«Uiuitenttoinjuro’ 
who shall supply any person w ith the pretended means of witch­
craft, shall be punished with imprisonment, with or without hard
labour, fo r a term not exceeding twelve months, or with fine.
Persons using Witch Medicine with intent to injure.
175 . W hoever, on the advice of a -witch-doctor, or o f his pre- rerans using witch 
i tended knowledge of so-called witchcraft, shall, with intent to to^ure." in n
; injure, use, or cause to be put into operation, such means or pro­
cesses as he believes are calculated to injure any person or property,
! shall be punished b y  imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, 
i for a period not exceeding twelve months, or w ith fine.
; T IT L E  Y I.
Í C H A P T E R  X II .
\ T H E F T S A N D  S IM IL A E  O FFEN CES.
' Inanimate things, fixed or movable, capable o f Icing stolen.
176 . E very  inanimate thing whatever, which is the property of ^ “ “or^novabio’ 
any person, and which either is or m ay be made movable, shall be capable of being 
' capable of being stolen, as soon as it  becomes movable, although i t stolcn' 
be made movable in order to steal it.
Animals capable o f being stolen.
177 ; A l l  tame living creatures, whether tame b}' nature or wild 
b y  nature and tamed, shall be capable of being stolen. ’
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o. 21-1835. 178. A l l  wild living creatures, w ild  by nature, shall, i£ kept in
a state of confinement, be capable of being stolen so long as they
remain in confinement, or are being a.’tually  pursued after escap­
ing therefrom, but no longer. W ild  creatures in the enjoym ent 
of their natu :al liberty  shall not be capable of being stolen when 
living ; nor shall the taking of their dead bodies by or by orders 
of the person- who killed them-before they are reduced into actual 
possession b jr the owner or occupier of the land on ■which they die, 
be deemed theft. E veryth ing produced by, or form ing part of, 
any living creature capable of being stolen, shall be capable o f  
being sto len : Provided always that nothing in this section con­
tained shall in any w ay affect or interfere w ith the provisions of 
isrolsoils75 ”iof ® of 18G9, “ í'o r  the better protection of Bees,” which last- 
issis’ti be in Torce mentioned A ct shall be and remain in force as law throughout 
id Oimo territories. ^ ege (erritorjes : and provided, further, that A ct 12  of 1870 , “ F or
the better preservation of W ild  Ostriches,” as amended by A ct 15  
of 1875 , or “ The W ild  Ostriches A ct of 18 7 5 ,” shall also have 
the effect of law  within these territories: Provided, further, that 
the A ct 24  of 1875 , or “ The Domesticated Ostriches A ct of 
18 7 5 ,” shall have the effect of law within the said territories.
Definition o f Theft.
DciinitioD of theft. 179 . Theft or stealing is the act of fraudu len t^  and without
colour of righ t taking, or fraudulently and without colour of right
converting to the use of any person anything or the use of any­
thing capable of being stolen, w ith  intent to deprive the owner 
thereof or to deprive any person having any special property or 
interest therein of such property or interest. I t  is immaterial 
■whether the thing converted was taken by the thief fo r the purpose 
of the conversion or whether it  was at the time of the conversion 
in the law ful possession of the th ie f : Provided that if  any servant, 
contrary to the orders of his master, takes from his possession any  
food for the purposo of giving the same to any horse or other 
animal belonging to or in the possession of his master, the servant 
so offending shall not b y  reason thereof be deemed guilty o f  
theft.
180. T heft is complete when the offender takes or moves any­
thing capable of being stolen, or causes it to move or to be moved, 
fo r the purpose of fraudulently converting it, although such con­
version be not completed.
181. Theft is committed when the offender cuts, rips, or other­
wise begins to cause to be movable anything part of or growing  
out of or attached to any real property w'ith intent to steal it.
Theft o f Animals.
-Theft of animals. 182 . E very  one commits theft who kills any .liv ing  creature 
capable of being stolen w ith intent to s te a l1 the carcase, skin, 
plumage, or any part of such creature.
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Thoft by Agvnt. n 0.í«-ik».
183 . E very one commits theft who, having received any money, Theft ijy «gout, 
valuable .security, or other thing whatsoever, on terms requiring
him to account fo r or pay the same or the proceeds thereof to any  
■other person,' though not requiring him to deliver over in specie 
the identical money, valuable security, or other thing received, 
fraudulently converts to his own use or fraudulently omits to 
account for the same, or to account, for or pay any part o f the 
proceeds which he was required to account fpr or pay as aforesaid :
Provided that if  it be part of the said terms th at the money or 
• other thing received, or the proceeds thereof, shall form an item  in 
a debtor and creditor account between the person receiving the 
same and the person to whom he is to account for or pay the same, 
and that such last-mentioned person shall refy  only on the personal 
liab ility  of the other as his debtor in respect thereof, the proper 
entry of any part of such proceeds in such account shall be deemed 
a sufficient accounting for the part of the proceeds so entered.
Theft by Person holding Power o f Attorney.
184. E very one commits theft who, being entrusted either solely hp0W1l!”’'‘™ 
•or jo in tty  with any other, person, w ith any power of attorney, for, attorney.
the sale, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of any'p roperty , 
movable or immovable, whether capable of being stolen or not, 
fraudulently sells, mortgages, pledges, or otherwise disposes of the 
same or any part thereof ; or fraudulently couverts the proceeds of 
any sale, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of such property, or 
nny part of such proceeds, to some purpose other than th at for 
which he was entrusted with such power of attorney.
Theft by misappropriating proceeds held under direction.
185 . E very one commits theft who, having received, either solely
or jo in tly  with any other person, any money or valuable security, Lew underdncction. 
or any power of attorney for the sale of any stock or shares w hat­
ever, w ith the direction that such money, or any part thereof, or 
the proceeds or any part of the proceeds of such security or such 
stock or shares shall be applied to any purpose or paid to an jr 
person specified in such direction, in violation of good fa ith  and 
contrary to such direction, fraudulently applies to any other purpose 
or pays to any other person, such proceeds or part thereof : Provided  
that where the person receiving such money, security, or power of 
attorney, and tho person from whom he receives it, deal w ith  eacli 
other on such terras that all money paid to • the form er would, in  
the absence of any such direction, be properly treated as an item in 
a debtor and creditor account between them, this section shall not 
ftpply, unless such direction is in  writing.
Thoft, by Co-owner.
18 6 . Theft m ay be committed by the owner of anything capable Tiicftiwco-owMr, 
of being stolen, against a person having a special property or interest
X X
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— 1 ' 1 herein, or by a person having a special property or interest therein
against the owner thereof, or bv one of several j ' in t  owners, tenants 
iu common, or partners of or in any such thing, against the other 
person interested therein, or t.y the directors, public officers, or 
members of a public company or body corporate against such public 
company or body corporate.
Husband and Wife.
Husband and wife. Jg 7 . ] \ 0  husband shall bo convicted of stealiug, during cohabita­
tion, the property o f his w ife ; and no wife shall be convicted o f 
stealing, during cohabitation, the property of her husband; but 
whilst they are liv ing  apart from each other, either shall be guilty  
of theft i f  he or she fraudulently takes or converts anything which 
is by law the property of the other iu a manner which in any other 
person would amount to theft.
188. E very  one commits theft who, whilst a husband and wife 
are living- together, knowingly (rr) assists either of them in dealing  
fraudulently w ith  anything which is the property of the other, iu a 
manner which would amount to theft i f  they were not m arried ; o r  
(b) receives from either of them anything the property of the other, 
obtained from  that other by such fraudulent dealings as aforesaid.
Obliterating Documents Fraudulently.
mSlt í^rouáifunnv" ISO- E very one who destroys, cancels, conceals, or obliterates any 
' ’ document fo r any fraudulent purpose, shall be punished as if he 
had stolen that document.
Theft outside o f the Territories.
tiic*territories'1*6 ^ 1 ^ -  E very  one who having obtained any property by any act
" which i f  done in  these territories would have amounted to theft, 
brings such property into these territories, shall be guilty of theft.
Theft by False Pretences.
T iieft by false pro- 191. A  false pretence is a representation, either by words or
™ces‘ otherwise, of a m atter of fact either present or past, which represen­
tation is known to the person making it to be false, and which is 
made with a fraudulent intent to induce the person to whom it is 
made to act upon such representation.
102 . E very  one shall be guilty of thoft by false pretences, and 
shall be liable, upon conviction thereof, to the penalties provided 
for the crime of theft, -who by aujr false pretence obtains with intent 
to defraud, either directly or through the medium of any contract 
obtained by such false pretence, anything capable or the use o f 
anything capable of being stolen, or who with intent to defraud oc 
injure any person by a 113' false pretence, causes or induces any 
person to execute, make, accept, endorse, or destroy the whole or 
any part of valuable security, or to impress or affix any^name or 
seal on any paper or parchment, in  order that it m ay afterwards be 
made or converted into or used or dealt with as a valuable security.
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193: E very one who by. any false pretence, causes-or procures Ko'_í!rI8SG' 
nuy tiling-capable of being stolen to be delivered to any other 
person than' himself w ith intent to defraud, obtains, that thing b y  
;t false:.pretence within the meaning of this section, and shall be 
: unishabletwith the penalties provided fo r the crime of theft.
Theft o f Ostrich Feathers, Hides, Skins, Wool, Mohair, §c.
194. A l l  and singular the provisions of the A cts No. 32  of F^ u|íí»ot h ?de?
1883, No. 19  of 1884  and No. 13  of 18 8 5  shall be in force in the pjns. wool, mo- 
Transkeian Territories. ’
Wrongful possession of and Illicit Dealing in Diamonds.
195. A ll  and singular the provisions of every law' which shall, SiuJrof a^ndPiïiidt 
at the time of the taking effect of this Code, be in force in any dealing in diamonds, 
part of this Colony other than Griqualand "West, in regard to the
wrongful possession of and illicit dealing in  diamonds and other 
precious stones, shall be in force in  the Transkeian Territories.
Obtaining Valve or Credit by Fraud.
196. W hoever obtains any money or things, or who in incurring cr^ ta!j“^ v-(1’,€'n
any debt or liability, obtains credit b y  means of any fraud, though ‘
not amounting to a false pretence as hereinbefore defined, m ajr be
punished w ith imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, fo r a 
term which may extend to one year, or fine, or both.
Punishments fo r  certain Thefts.
197. W hoever steals any testamentary instrument, post letter for
bag, post letter, poshd packet, or anyth ing from  such post letter r m e ■
bag, post letter, or postal packet, or who being a  clerk or servant,
or being employed in the capacity or fo r the purpose of a clerk or 
servant, steals anything belonging to or in  the possession of his 
master or employer, or being employed in  the public service of 
H er M ajesty, or in the service of any public department, or public 
bedy, or being employed as a constable, steals anything in his 
possession by virtue of his employment, shall be punished with  
imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, fo r a period which 
may extend to a term of seven years, or fine, or both ; and, in case 
of subsequent conviction, with imprisonment, with or without hard  
labour, which m ay extend to a term  of ten years, or fine, or 
both.
Punishments for-Cattle Thefts.
198. W hoever steals anything from  the person of another, or Punishments for
t i  t i  t t  cattle thefts.from any dwelling-house, or steals any noise, ass, mule, sheep, 
horned cattle, goat, or domesticated ostrich, or the feathers thereof, 
or who w ilfu lly  kills any such animal, with intent to steal the 
[carcase, or any. part thereof may, upon cónvietion, be punished 
‘with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term which 
may extend to five years, or fine, or b o th ; and in case of
xx 2
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Law.
Nu.21—is»;, subsequent conviction, with imprisonment, with or without hard  
labour, for a term ■which may extend to seven years, or 
flogging or whipping, or fine, or any two of such punishments.
Punishment fo r  Thefts '■otherwise not provided f o r .
tiJrt“ou™™ie *11 "'*^ loever steals anything for the stealing of which no
pmvided for.™0 " punishment is hereinbefore provided, shall be punished , with  
imprisonment w ith or -without hard labour, for a term which m ay  
extend to three years, or fine or both, and in case of a subsequent 
conviction w ith  imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a 
term which m ay extend to five years, or fine, with flogging or 
whipping, or anj' two or more of such punishments.
Responsibility fo r  value of Stolen Property under Spoor Law.
Tafuc^ r'stoien m- ^ 1611 ^le spoor 0f  any stolen animals is traced to any
p’crty uiuiec Spoor kraal or locality responsibility in respect of the value of such stolen 
animals shall be determined as is hereinafter provided ; that is to 
sa y :
(A) W hen  such spoor originates and terminates within the 
lim its of a magisterial district or tribal area, then—
1. The head of any kraal (timninimzi) shall be responsible for 
the value and damages of any stolen animals the spoor of 
which is traced to such kraal, when corroborative 
evidence is forthcoming to the satisfaction of the
J Í  /  Resident ‘ Magistrate that the theft in question was
f  /  committed by some person belonging to such kraal.
2. The owner of any stolen animals the spoor of which has
become lost or obliterated, has a right of search for any
traces o f such animal in  any hut, kraal, enclosure or
lands in that neighbourhood; and any person refusing to 
permit such search is responsible for the value of the 
animal stolen, with damages.-
3. W hen  the owner of any stolen animals is on the spoor of 
such animal, it  shall bo law ful fo r such owner to demand 
from  the persons living in the neighbourhood all reason­
able assistance in following up such spoor, aud whoever
or refuses to give such assistance, and b y  such 
or refusal causes the loss or obliteration of such 
spoor, or whoever by w ilful obstruction or malice causes 
the loss or obliteration of such spoor, is liable for the 
value of the animal stolen with damages.
(B) W hen the spoor originates in one magisterial district or 
tribal area and passes into and terminates in another 
magisterial district or tribal area, then—
1. W hen such spoor is traced to any kraal or kraals, the 
owners (abaninimisi) shall be held responsible fo r the 
value of the animal stolen, and upon the order of tho 
Resident Magistrate of the district, shall forthwith pay 
such value into Court for the benefit of the owner.
npn-lectsO
n “gleet
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2. W hen  sncli spoor cannot be traced to any specific kraal or no.jm- iss«.
kraals, hut is lost, or becomes obliterated on any lands, 
then the responsibility for the value of such stolen animal 
shall devolve upon the heads (abaninimisi) of the kraals 
adjacent to and surrounding the spot where such spoor 
has been lost or obliterated ; and for the purpose of com­
pensating the o iraer of such stolen animal, it  shall be 
law ful fo r th e '. Kesident M agistrate so to fix sucli 
responsibility by an assessment not exceeding two head 
of cattle (or their money value), to be by such M agistrate 
levied on each kraal, to make up the whole value, or as 
near as possible the whole value, of the stolen animal or 
animals.
3. W henever a spoor is traced to, or within, the confines of
any locality occupied by any kraal or kraals, or to or 
within any area occupied b y  any community or section 
of a tribe, i f  the persons occupying such kraal or kraals 
or locality, or constituting such community or such 
section of a tribe, without law fu l excuse, neglect or refuse 
to receive to take over and follow  up such spoor, they  
are responsible for the value of the stolen animal whcse 
spoor shall have been so traced, and are to be compelled 
to make good such value to the owner in like manner as 
is provided for w ith  reference to “ lost spoor” cases iu  
the preceding sub-section.
Creating False Spoor.
201. W hoever fraudulently and w ith  intent to in jure another chains false
• snoor
Bhall create any spoor, shall be punished w ith ' fine not exceeding ' 
fifty pounds sterling, and in default o f paym ent w ith imprisonment 
'with or without hard labour for a term  which m ay extend to 
twelve months.
j
| Mode of procedure in Spoor Cases.
202. I t  shall be law ful fo r the Resident M agistrate of any . Motie of Proceill"'e. . .  ,  . . 6  J ra spoor cases.
.district, whenever any claim is made against any person or 
persons in respect of the spoor traced to any kraal or locality,
Upon request of the owner of the animal or animals stolen, or of 
any person authorized by such owner, to inquire summarily and 
'Without pleading, but in the presence of the heads of the kraals 
(Upon whom responsibility is sought to be attached, into the 
^circumstances of the case, and the value of the animal or animals 
|alleged to have been stolen, together w ith the damage which 
|the owner or owners shall have sustained, b y  • the loss, or by  
t h e c o s t  of search or other endeavour to recover the same, 
and m ay give judgm ent in favour o f such owner as hereinbefore 
Provided.
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No.sf-issc. C H A P T E R  X II I .
F R A U D  A N D  B R E A C H  O F T R U ST .
Fraudulent Accounting by Directors.
ecunti!ígUl<ab'r Di- ^ b o e v e r being a director, manager, public officer, or
rcctors. " member of an3- body corporate or public compan_y, with in tent to 
defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates any book, paper, writing, or 
valuable security belonging to the body corporate or public 
company, or makes or concurs in making any false entry, or omits 
or concurs in omitting to enter any material particular in any book 
of account or other document, or being a director, public officer, or 
manager of any bod} 7 corporate or public company, as such receives 
or possesses himself of any of the property of suck body corporate 
or public company, and with intent to defraud omits to make, or 
to cause and direct to be made, a fu ll and true en try  thereof in 
the books and accounts of such body corporate or public company, 
shall be liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment w ith or without 
hard labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend to five years, or fine, or 
both.
Fake Statements by Directors.
False eutcracnts 204. W hoever being a promoter, director, public officer, or 
iv> Hectors. manager of any body corporate or public company, either existing 
or intended to be formed, makes, circulates, or publishes any 
prospectus, statement, or account which he knows to be false in any 
m aterial particular, w ith intent to induce persons, whether 
ascertained or not, to become shareholders, or partners, or with 
intent to deceive or defraud the members, shareholders, or 
creditors, or any of them, whether ascertained or not, of such 
body corporate or public company, or w ith  intent to induce any 
person to entrust or advance any property to such body corporate 
or public company, or to enter iuto any security for the benefit 
thereof, shall be liable to the punishment in the preceding section 
provided.
Falsifying Accounts by Clerks and Sei'vants.
Falsifying accounts 205. W hoever being an officer, clerk, or servant, or employed or
vLte.ïtks ^  acting, in such capacity, and with intent to defraud, destroys,
alters, mutilates, or falsifies any book, paper, writing, valuable 
security, document, or account, which belongs to or is in  the 
possession of his employer, or has been received by him fo r or on 
behalf of his employer, or with intent to defraud makes or
concurs in i making any false en tiy  in, or omits or alters, or
concurs in omitting or altering, any m aterial particular from or 
in  any such' book, - paper,-writing, valuable security, or account as 
aforesaid, shall be punished with imprisonment, .with or w ith ou t 
hard labour, for a. term which may extend to five years, or with 
or without hard labour, or fine or both.
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Public Officers making Fahe Statements and Returns. No'ÍL  !í'Ml'
206. Whoever,- being an officer, collector, or receiver entrusted,
with the receipt, custody, or management of any part of the public ïïínt?«mircim-iis. 
revenues,'knowingly makes or renders any false statement or return  
if any money collected by him or entrusted to his care, or of any  
kilance of money in his hand, or under his control, shall be punished 
with imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, fo r a term  which 
rnay extend to one year, or fine, or both.
Conspiracy to Defraud.
207. W hoever conspires w ith any other person b y  deceit or fl.£<X im<l<T 1,1 ll''^  
falsehood, or other fraudulent means, to defraud the public, or to
affect the public market, price of shares, merchandize, or anything  
■else publicly sold, or who conspires by deceit aud falsehood or 
other fraudulent means, to defraud any person, ascertained or 
unascertained, whether such deceit or falsehood or other fraudulent 
means would or would not amount to a false pretence, as herein­
before defined, shall be punished w ith imprisonment, w ith or w ith ­
out hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to two 3’ears, or to  
fine, or to b o th ; and whoever a fter a previous conviction for 
any offence involving dishonest}', commits an offence under this 
section, m ay be sentenced to a term  of imprisonment, w ith or 
without hard labour, which may extend to five years, or line, or 
both.
Unlawful Gaming and Betting.
208. "Whoever wins or endeavours to w in from  any other person unlawful t-mmuR 
to himself or to any other any money or valuable thing by any ,’lrKl bcltms- 
fraud or unlaw ful device or i l l  practice in playing at or w ith  cards,
dice, tables, or other games, or in bearing a part in the stakes, 
wages, or adventures, or in betting on the size or hands of the 
players, or in wagering on the event of any sport, pastime, or 
exercise, shall be punished with imprisonment, w ith  or without 
hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to six months, or fine 
or both. The offence is complete although the thing won has not 
been paid or delivered.
Criminal Breach o f Trust.
209. W hoever being in any manner entrusted with property or crim in al broach of 
with dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or eon- ‘
verts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes 
of tbat property in violation of any direction of l.aw prescribing 
the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal 
..contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the
■ discharge of such trust, or w ilfu lly' suffers any other person to do 
so, shall be g u ilty  of a  criminal breach of trust, and'upon conviction 
shall be punished w ith imprisonment fo r a term  which m ay extend  
to three years, or with fine, or both.
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'’ l —1 ' Fraudulent Disposition of Property.
shTwIofproperts?'*' 2 10 . W hoever dishonestly or fraudulently removes, converts, or 
delivers to any person, or causes to be transferred to nny person 
"without adequate consideration, any property, intending thereby 
to prevent, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby  
pïeYérït' the 'distribution of that property according to law, oï' 
among his creditors or the creditors of any other person, shall be 
punished with imprisonment fo r a term which m ay extend to two- 
years, or with fine, or w ith  both.
C H A P T E R  X IV .
R O B B E R Y  A N D  E XTO RTIO N .
Definition o f Robbery, raid its Punishment.
ben- mi it" °u£h!" Robbery is theft accompanied with actual violence or
nirnt. s punl" ‘ threats of violence to any person or property, intentionally used to
extort the property stolen, or to prevent or overcome resistance to 
its being stolen, and shall be punished with imprisonment w ith or 
w ithout hard labour fo r a  term  which may extend to seven years, 
or flogging or whipping, or any two of these punishments.
2 12 . Everyone who assaults any person w ith  intent to rob him  
shall be punished as in the last section provided.
2 13 . W hoever w ith menaces demands from  any person, either 
fo r himself or fo r any other person, anything capable of being 
stolen w ith in tent to steal it, shall be punished with imprisonment, 
w ith or without hard labonr, fo r a term  which m ay extend to two  
years or with fine or both.
2 14 . W hoever w ith  intent to extort or gain anything from any  
person: (a) accuses or threatens to accuse either th at person or any  
other person, whether the person accused or threatened with  
accusation is g u ilty  or not, of any offence punishable b y  law ; o r
(b) threatens that any person shall be so accused by any other 
person; (c) or without law ful excuse sends, delivers, utters, or 
directly or indirectly causes to be received by any person any  
document containing any such accusation or threat as aforesaid, 
knowing the contents th ereo f; (d) or by any of the means afore­
said, compels or attempts to compel any person to execute, make, 
accept, endorse, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of any  
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment w ith or 
without hard labour, fo r a term that m ay extend to two years, o r 
w ith fine, or with both such punishments.
Housebreaking.
noiiwibrenkiiip. 215.- W hoever breaks and enters a' building with intent to
commit any offence therein, or breaks out o f such building either 
after committing such offence therein, or after having entered it  to
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commit an offence, shall be ]>uni-hed witli imprisonment, w ith'or iss i ..
without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay e x te n d  ‘ o five years, 
or fine, or both.
Receiving Property stolen or dishonestly obtained.
210:,'W h o ever receives anything obtained b y  any offence st^onTtdfXm-stiy 
l 'Unishable under an y  lav.- in force fo r the time being, knowing oit-faca. 
that thing to have been stolen or dishonestly obtained, or who 
receives in these territories anything obtained elsewhere than in  
these territories by any act which i f  done in these territories would  
have been an offence punishable under this or any other law  in  
force for the tim e being, knowing such things to have been 
stolen or dishonestly obtained, shall be punished for a first 
offence w ith imprisonment, with or without hard labour, fo r a 
term which m ay extend to three years, or fine, or b o th ; and after 
a previous conviction of any offence involving dishonest)', shall be 
punished with imprisonment, w ith or w ithout hard labour, fo r a 
term which m ay extend to five years, or fine, or both.
When receiving is complete.
2 1 7 . 'The' act o f receiving anything stolen or u n law fu l!)'co^ ic”erecclvirl" 1! 
obtained is complete as soon as the offender has, either exclusively
or jo in tly  w ith the th ief or any other person, possession of or 
control over such thing, or aids in concerting or disposing of it.
Corruptly taking Reward.
2 18 . W hoever corruptly takes reward, or bargains for an y  re£°"JlIllly Ukius 
reward, directly or indirectly, on consideration th at ho w ill help ’
any person to recover any thing obtained b y  any offence punishable 
under this or any other law  in force, shall, unless he shall have 
used all due diligence to cause the offender to be brought to tria l 
for the same, be punished w ith imprisonment, with or without 
hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to three years, or fine, 
or both.
C H A P T E R  X V .
F O R G E R Y  A N D  P E R SO N A T IO N .
Definition o f Document.
2 19 . A  document is any substance on which is expressed and m^ tflnitionof auc"" 
described by means o f letters, figures, or marks, any m atter which ‘
is intended to be or m ay be used in a Court of J  ustice, or otherwise, 
as evidence of such matter.
Fake Document defined.
220 . A  false document means dcifned’ docil,nt'ut
(t?) A  document, the whole or some m aterial part of which 1
purports to be made by or on behalf of any person who
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i o.-^jssg . n[)l ma^e or autIi0i'izG the making thereof ; or which,
though made by or by the authority of the person who 
purports to make it, is fa lsely dated as to time or place 
of making, where either is m aterial; or
(b) A  document which is made in the name of an existing  
person, either by that person or by his'authority, with a 
fraudulent intent that the document should pass as being 
made by some person, real iOr fictitious, other than the 
_ person who makes or authorizes it. •
I t  is not necessary that the fraudulent intention should appear 
on the-face of the document, but i t  may be proved by external 
evidence.
Forger)/ defined.
Forgery defined. 221. Forgery is the making of a false document, knowing it to 
be false, w ith  the intention that it shall in an}' w ay be used or 
acted upon as genuine whether within H er M ajesty ’s dominions or 
not. M aking a false document includes altering a genuine 
document in any m aterial part, and adding to it  any false date, 
attestation, or other thing which is material, or making any 
m aterial alteration in it  either by erasure, obliteration, removal, or 
otherwise.
Forgery when complete.
Forgery when com- 222 . A  forgery is complete as soon as the document is made, 
with such knowledge and intent as aforesaid, though the offender 
m ay not have intended that any particular person- should use or 
aot upon it  as genuine, or be induced by the belief that i t  is 
genuine to do or refrain from doing anything. F orgery  is 
complete although the false document may be incomplete, or may 
not purport to be such a document as would be binding in law, if  
it be so made and is such as to indicate that i t  was intended to be 
acted on as genuine.
Punishment fo r  Forgery.
ior 223 . W hoever is convicted of the crime of forgery shall be 
punished with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a 
term which m ay extend to seven years, or fine, or both.
Sending False Telegram.
" senflins fake tele- 224 . W hoever shall without law ful authority or excuse (the
s, im' proof whereof shall be upon the person accused) cause or procm-e
any telegram to be sent or delivered as being sent by the authority  
of any person, knowing that it  is not sent b y  such authority, with 
the intent that such telegram should be acted on as being sent by 
that person’s authority, shall he punished with imprisonment, with  
or without hard labour, fo r a  term which m ay extend to si? 
months, or fine, or both.
pietc.
Punishment
forgery.
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Procuring Execution o f Document by Fdhc Evidence. N“ 24 iaw'
22-5. W hoever, w ith  intention to defraud,procures the execution t3(ni™f“d^iuo»íby 
of any ;-document by an y  person by fa lsely pretending that the flllte «-idpuce. 
contents-thereof are different from  ivhat they rea lly  are, shall be 
punished with imprisonment, -with or without hard labour, fo r a  
t'.rm which m ay extend to two years, or fine, or both.
Using Forged Documents.
226. 'Whoever, knowing a document to be forged, fraudulently Corf?od<1uc’!_ 
uses or'acts upon it or causes or attempts to cause any person to
use or act upon it  as i f  i t  were genuine, shall, upon conviction, be 
liable to the same punishment as if  he had forged that document.
I t  is immaterial whether the document was forged in these 
territories or elsewhere.
Personation.
227. W hoever fa lse ly  and deceitfully personates any one, -with 1’crKonnlion' 
in tent fraudulently to obtain any benefit to himself or any other
person, shall be imprisoned, w ith  or w ithout hard labour, fo r a  
term  which m ay extend to two years, or fine, or both.
C H A P T E R  X V I .
CO IN IN G.
2 28 . Coin is m etal used fo r the time being as money, and Coining 
stamped aud issued b y  authority of some State or Sovereign Power
in order to be so used. Coin stamped and issued by authority of 
the Queen or any Governm ent in the Queen’s dominions, is the 
Queen’s coin.
229 . W hoever counterfeits or know ingly performs any part of 
the process of counterfeiting coin, shall be punished w ith  imprison­
ment, with or without hard labour, fo r a term  which m ay extend 
to ten years, or fine, or both.
230. W hoever
(tt) Makes or begins to make any counterfeit gold, silver, or 
copper co in ; or
(b) Gilds or silvers any counterfeit co in ; or
(c) Gilds, silvers, files, or alters any silver or copper coin,
with intent to make it  resemble or pass for gold or silver 
coin ; or imports, receives, or has in  his possession, any 
counterfeit gold, silver or copper coin, knowing such coin 
to be counterfeit, and with intent to utter it, or whoever 
utters any counterfeit coin, • knowing it  to be counterfeit, 
or has in his possession any stamps, dies or other instru­
ments generally  used fo r the purpose of counterfeiting  
coin.
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(d) W ith  intent to defraud, utters pieces of gold, silver, 
or copper as Queen’s coins, which are coins not Queen’s 
coin, or any medal or piece of metal, or mixed metal 
being of less value than the Queen’s coin, as and fo r  
which it is uttered, 
shall be punished with imprisonment, with or without hard labour, 
for a term  which m ay extend to ten years, or fine, or both.
C H A P T E R  X V I I .
O FFE N C E S R E L A T IN G  TO W E IG H T S A N D  M E A S U R E S .
Standard Weights and Measure*.
standard -weights 231 .  The standard weights and measures required by law to be
om measures. used in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as provided for by A ct 
No. 1 1  of 1858 , shall be the standard weights and measures to be 
used in the territories to which this Code applies, and all the provi­
sions of that A c t as well as of A ct No. 15 of 1870  shall be of force 
and effect in the said territories.
Fraudulent me o f False Instruments fo r  Weighing,
fu/efinaln'mcnuior 232 . W hoever fraudulently uses any instrument for weighing
weighing. which, he knows to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment,
with or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to one 
year or with fine, or both.
Fraudulent use o f False Weight or Measure.
Frauduieut use of 233 . W hoever fraudulently uses any false weight, or measures
false wejpht or mea- , ,  * ■» i j i • i i.i»ure. of length or capacity, or fraudulently uses an3r weignt or anj'
measure of length or capacity as a  different weight or measure 
from  w hat it  is, shall he punished with imprisonment, with or 
without hard labour, fo r a term which may extend to one year or 
with line, or both.
Being in possession o f Fake Weights or Measures.
Being inposscKsion 234 . W hoever is in possession of any instrument for weighing,of fnlse weights or i •>. , ,, ., °  . S
measures. or ox any weight or 0 1  an}7 measure oi length or capacity, wincn
he knows to be false, and intending that the same m ay be fraudu­
len tly  used, shall be punished w ith imprisonment, w ith  or without 
hard labour, for a term which m ay extend to one year, or with, 
fine, or both.
C H A P T E R  X V I I I .
M ISC H IE F  A N D  ARSO N .
Mischief.
Mischief. 235. E very  one wno causes any event by an act which he knew
would probably cause it, being reckless whether such event happened 
or not, shall be deemed to cause it w ilfu lly  for the purposes of this
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■part of this Code. N othing shall be an uffenee under any provi- ko. e-i-issc. 
sion con'ained in this part, unless it is done wiihout legal justifica­
tion or excuse, and without colour of r ig h t : Provided that where 
the offence consists in an in ju ry  to anything in which the offender 
' ’urít hn interest, the existence of such interest, i f  partial, shall not 
p iw en t his act being an offence, i f  done w ith an intention to 
Jefraud.
Arson, and Attempted A rson .
236  "Whoever w ilfu lly  sets fire to any building whatever, or to Arson, and at- 
any erection or structure whatever fixed to the soil, whether such tcmpU:d son‘ 
building, erection or structure is completed or not, or to any stock 
of vegetable produce, or of mineral or vegetable fuel, or to any  
mine, or to any ship or vessel, or to anjr crop, whether, standing or 
cut down, shall be guilt}' of arson, and m ay be punished with  
imprisonment, w ith or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay  
extend to fourteen years, or w ith  or without flogging or whipping, 
or fine, or any two or more of such punishments.
237.- "Whoever w ilfu lly  attempts to set fire to anything mentioned 
in the last preceding section, shall be punished w ith  imprisonment, 
with or without hard labour, for a term  which m ay extend to seven 
years, and with or without fine, or both.
Damage by Explosive Substances.
238. "Whoever w ilfu lly  places or throws any gunpowder or other .Damage by exPu.-
. . .  . ^ . A. t °  . A. sivc Substances.
•explosive substance m , into, upon, under, against, or near any  
building, ship, road, or public place, or thoroughfare, so as to 
•endanger person or property, shall be punished as provided for the 
crime of arson. - ■
Damage to Public Works.
239. W hoever w ilfu lly  breaks down, cuts down, or otherwise Damage to rubiic
damages or destroys any public works, shall be punished with Work8,
imprisonment, w ith  or without hard labour, fo r a period which
may extend to three years, or fine, or both.
Uiihttcfnl K illing of Animals, fyc.
240. W hoever unlaw fully and w ilfu lly  kills, poisons, or wounds, unlawfully killing 
any horse, ass, mule, horned cattle, sheep, ostrich, goat, or other ot a,maals’ 
domesticated animal, shall be punished w ith  fine, and in  default of
payment, w ith imprisonment, with or without hard labour, fo r a 
period which m ay extend to one year.
Damage to Telegraph.
241 . W hoever w ilfu lly  injures or removes anything whatever Damage u> Tcie-
forming part of or used in or about any electric or magnetic 8mpl1'
telegraph or in the working thereof, or prevents or obstructs in any
manner whatever the sending, conveyance, or delivery b y  any  
■such telegraph of any me.-sage or communication, shall be punished 
'with imprisonment, with. or. without hard labour, fo r a period 
which may extend to three years, or fine, or both.
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No. 21_lssG, Dam k j c  to Tolls.
D.irange tj To’.i.s. 242. W hoever unlaw fully and w ilfu lly  throws down, levels» 
or otherwise destroys, in whole or in part, any toll-gate, or any to ll-  
bar or chain, or fence belonging thereto, set up to prevent passengers 
from passing b y  without paying toll, directed by law, shall be 
punished with fine, and in default of payment w ith imprisonment, 
with or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to six 
months.
Other Damage.
other (lama-e. 243 . W hoever w ilfu lly  commits upon any property whatever, 
any w ilfu l damage, or in ju ry , not otherwise provided for, shall be 
punished w.ith line, and in default of payment with imprisonment 
with or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to three 
months.
T IT L E  V I .
C H A P T E R  X IX .
T H R E A T S, C O N SP IR A C Y , A T T E M PT S, A C C E SSO R IE S, &c.
T h r e a t s ,  Con- 244. W hoever w ith intent to intimidate or aunoy any person, 
AcccSorict^ e™1’1' ’ breaks or injures any building or portion thereof, or by the 
discharge of firearms or otherwise alarms or attempts to alarm any 
person in any dwelling, shall be punished with imprisonment, with 
or without hard labour, fo r a term which m ay extend to six 
months, or with fine or both, 
v n^cspinnj; to^ prc- 245 . W hoever conspires with any other person by force or iutmii- 
MUcction of'Lxes01 dation to prevent the levying or collection of any taxes, authorized 
by law, shall be liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, 
for a term which m ay extend to one year, or fine, or both.
inciting or at- 246. W hoever attempts in any case, not hereinbefore by this 
oircnccsf u  comlult Code provided, to commit any offence, or who incites or attempts 
to incite any one to commit an offence punishable by this Code, 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one-half 
of the longest term, to which a person committing the offence 
attempted to be committed, or incited to, may be sentenced under 
this Code: Provided that the power to fine or in default o f 
payment to imprison, shall exist in a ll such casus.
Punishment for 247 . W hoever, in  any case where no express provision is madeaccessories • *' for the punishment of an accessory, is an accessory after the fact,
to any offence punishable under this Code, ho shall be liable to 
imprisonment fo r a  term not exceeding half of the longest term for 
which the offence to which he is accessory is punishable undér this 
Code: Provided that the power to fine, or in default of paym ent 
to imprisonment, shall exist in all such cases.
NATIVE TERRITORIES’ P E N A L  CODE. 2171
T IT L E  V II . Ko- 2l z ls&>-
■ CH.'/P I E R  X X .
JU R ISD IC T IO N  A N D  PR O C E D U R E .
Courts o f Resident Magistrates.
248 . The Courts of Resident Magistrates already established in M«gi“trouf-!.I!<’6ldcnt 
the Transkeian Territories shall be until otherwise provided Courts
of Resident Magistrates, and it shall be law ful fo r the Governor, by  
any proclamation to be b y  liim  from  time to time issued for that 
purpose, to erect, constitute, and establish Courts of Resident 
Magistrates w ithin the, Transkeian Territories, to be held for and  
•within such districts respectively as the said Governor shall think  
fit to create, which Courts shall be holden before such persons as 
shall respectively be appointed to be Resident Magistrates of such 
districts.
Trial bi/ Resident Magistrates.
249. W henever in any of the cases in which jurisdiction is tmtc’1 w S t
hereby given to any Court of Resident M agistrate, the M agistrate {^■'wd fut
shall consider that any person charged w ith  any crime or offence,
whether he has pleaded guilty to the same or not, ought to receive 
a more serious punishment than such M agistrate is competent to 
adjudge, he may, at his discretion, commit the accused person for 
tria l before any Court having jurisdiction to impose such greater 
punishment, or the Special Court hereafter provided for and 
established.
Jurisdiction and Special Court.
250. The Courts of Resident M agistrate shall have jurisdiction Juíiídíctíoa- 
in all cases wherein a person m ay be accused of any crime or
offence, except crimes or offences punishable under the following  
chapters and sections of this Code, v iz .:
(a) Title I I , Chap. V, Offences against the Public Order, 
sections eighty-five to n inety inclusive.
(h) Title I I I ,  Chap. V I I , Offences against the A dm inistra­
tion of Justice, sections one hundred and three and one 
hundred and four.
(c) Title Y , Chap. X , M urder :
Provided, however, that no Resident Magistrate shall, in  
any case, have jurisdiction or authority to pass and 
pronounce upon any offender under this Code, any sentence 
greater or heavier than imprisonment; with or without 
hard labour, fo r any period not exceeding one year, or 
imprisonment w ith  spare diet and with or without hard  
labour for an y  period not exceeding three months, or 
corporal punishment in any. number of lashes not exceed­
ing tw en ty -five : Provided, also, th a t . no offender
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^ 0' ! !z istu' sentenced under this Code to imprisonment w ith hard
■ labour for any period exceeding th r“e months shall be
sentenced 1 0  spare diet, except for offences against 
the discipline of the gaol or other place at which he may 
bp--lawfully confined or employed : Provided, further, 
"that 'iii Tegard to the infliction of spare diet under this 
Code the Courts of Resident Magistrates shall in  their 
sentences observe and conform to such regulations aud 
restrictions as shall from  time to time be deemed necessary 
to prevent injurious consequences and be by the Governor 
prescribed for the guidance of such Court, aud such 
Courts shall in their sentences fix, in accordance with 
such regulations and restrictions, the particular days or 
times during which the offender shall be subject to spare 
diet.
Trial by Special Court.
™  >»y S|>mial 251 .  Unless and until provision shall be made for the establish- 
r ‘ ment in the said territories of a superior Court of Record the offences
excepted in the last section and any offences under this Code the 
tria l of which shall be remitted thereto, shall be tried by a Special 
Court consisting of the Chief Magistrate and two Resident Magis­
trates, having jurisdiction w ithin his Chief Magistracy, who shall 
from  time to time as occasion shall require be thereto summoned 
by such Chief M agistrate, and the judgm ent and sentence of the 
m ajority of such Chief Magistrate and Resident Magistrates shall 
be the judgm ent and sentence of such Court.
Sittings of the 252. Such Special Court shall, from time to time as often as m ay
. pea ou . neoessai'y, be summoned by the Chief M agistrate to assemble
and sit fo r the tria l of offences under this Code, and every order 
convening any sitting of the said Court shall specify the time and 
place of such sitting and the names of the Resident M agistrates 
who shall be thereto summoned: Provided, however, that the 
Chief M agistrate may, after the making thereof, alter or vary  such 
order in respect of the time or place at which such Court shall 
assemble and sit, or in respect of the Resident Magistrates who 
shall be summoned to sit as members of such Court. .
' Adjournments. 253. The Special Com't, when assembled, may adjourn from
time to time as to i t  m ay seem fit. .
Form of procedure 254. U n til otherwise ordered by any rules to be made in 
Kesideut1111 mÍ^ís- pursuance of the provisions of this Code, the form and manner of 
(rates’ courts. procedure in  the Special Court shall be accordiug to the laws and 
rules fo r the time being regulating the practice and procedure in 
the Courts of Resident Magistrates in the Colony of the Cape of 
Good Hope. . •. • . • ■ . • - . - ' ■
/ssuiiigof proems. 255 . Tho process of the said Court for compelling the appearanco 
of any person accused to answer the charge, and of any persons as 
witnesses, m ay be signed and issued b y  any M agistrate by whom
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the accused has been remanded or committed, or b y  the clerk of Xo’ 
any sudi Magistrate, or b y  the clerk of the Chief M agistrate or of 
the Special Court.
256. A ll  charges for offences cognizable by the Special Court -‘reiimj.;n-y En-
shall, in the first ins!ance, be brought before a Resident M agistrale " '
having jurisdiction in the district wherein the offence has been 
committed, and such M agistrate shall
l j  I f  the case be w ithin his jurisdiction, either try  and dis­
pose of the( same to the extent of his jurisdiction, or after 
prelim inary examination rem it it for tria l to the Special 
C o u rt;
(2) I f  the case be not within his jurisiliction, after prelim inary 
examination, rem it i t  for tria l to the Special Court.
257. The Governor m ay from  time to time establish general
rides and orders for regulating the practice and form  of procedure n“Mlea* ro7n? c<mr!« 
in cases pending before the Special Court, in addition to or instead ITitcsuicnt wa"is- 
of the laws regulating the practice and procedure in the Courts o f tlaU'5'
Resident Magistrates in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
Removal o f T rial or S tay o f Proceedings.
25S. W henever any proceedings under this Code shall have been pro^ Leïi'/íiV^
commenced in the Court of any Resident M agistrate, or shall have L '
been remitted to the Special Court in manner provided in this 
Code, and it  shall appear to the A ttorney-G eneral of the Cape of 
Good Hope, that substantial justice may be better attained b y  
staying proceedings or rem oving the ease for tria l to the Supreme 
Court, the Eastern D istricts Court, or any Circuit Court, i t  shall be 
law ful for him to order such, stay of proceedings or such removal 
or both.
Renew o f Sentence by Chief Magistrate.
259. W hen, and as often as any Court of Resident Magistrates t,Jc  h j' 7 Mn"trotc°
shall sentence any person upon conviction to be imprisoned for any ' ’ ” ' *
period exceeding one month, or to pay any fine exceeding five
pounds sterling, or to receive any number of lashes or cuts exceeding 
twelve, such sentence shall be subject to the review of the Chief 
M agistrate of that territory, in  like manner as provided by section 
47 of A ct 20 of 18 5 6  : Provided that every record of the proceedings 
in such ease shall be forwarded to the said Chief Magistrate, instead 
of to the Registrar of the Supreme Court.
Pleadings and Proceedings.
260. The Courts aforesaid shall be respectively Courts of Record, rieadingsandpr«- 
and the pleadings and proceedings of the said Courts in crim inalcccdms*-
cases shall be carried on, and the sentences, decrees, judgments, and 
orders thereof pronounced and declared in open Court and not other­
wise : and the several pleadings and proceedings of the said Courts 
'shall be in the English language, which shall be interpreted into 
such language as is best understood by prisoners not understanding
yy
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No. ui-ieso.
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N;ilive Assesors.
Evidence nnd ex­
amination of lic­
ensed.
E nrolm ent of le g a l 
p ractitioners.
Other m atte rs  of 
proccilure and  pro- 
coy*.
English ; and thr witnesses for and against any accused person or 
persons shall deliver their evidence, viva voce, in the presence of the 
prisoner, and in open Corn-»..
J it ries. .
2GI. Nothing contained in this Code shall have the effect of 
depriving the 'Governor of the power at any time to direct that 
within any district of the said territories, the law  of the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope, relating to the qualification, summoning, 
and functions of persons serving upon petit juries shall be in fbrce.
Native Assessors.
262. In  any case in which any Resident M agistrate shall deem 
i t  desirable, he shall be at liberty to call to his assistance any such 
number of assessors not exceeding five, who shall be chosen b y  him 
from  the principal Chiefs, Councillors, Headmen, and others, whose 
names shall be placed upon a list to be framed by him for that 
purpose, after the taking effect of this A ct, and thereafter annually, 
co aid him in the hearing of any trial w ith  a view to the advantages 
derivable from  their observations, and particularly iu the examina­
tion of witnesses. The opinion of such assessors shall be given 
separately and discussed, -and if any  of the assessors or the 
M agistrate shall desire it, the opinion of the assessors shall be 
recorded in writing, and form  part of the proceedings to be 
forwarded fo r r e r i e w; but the finding of the Court shall be 
vested exclusively in  the Magistrate. In  like manner the Special 
Court hereinbefore provided for shall be at liberty  to call to its 
assistance a like number of assessors to be taken from  any list 
fram ed as aforesaid within the territory  within which the Chief 
M agistrate residing in such Court shall have jurisdiction.
Evidence and Examination o f Accused.
2G3. In  any proceeding under this Code the accused person and 
his wife, or husband, as the case m ay be, may, i f  such person thinks 
fit, be called, sworn, examined, and cross-examined as an ordinary 
witness in the case.
■Enrolment o f Legal Practitioners.
264. No person shall be enrolled to practise in any Court of the 
said territories unless such person shall be an advocate or attorney, 
duly admitted as such by some competent Colonial Court
Other matters o f Procedure and Process.
265. In  all other matters of procedure and process in respect of 
crimes and' offences brought before the Courts of Resident Magis­
trate for tria l, until otherwise ordered, the powers of Resident 
Magistrates, and the rules, orders, and regulations of Courts of 
Resident . M agistrate, respectively, in ,1, the said territories shall, 
mutatis mutandis, and as- fa r  as the- circumstances of the country 
w ill admit; he • the same as those from -tim e to time in existence
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us to tbe Resident M agistrates and Courts of Resident Magistrate' No. 24—1330. 
in the Colony of the (Jape of Good Hope, under the provisions of 
tbe Ordinance No. 40  of 18 2 8 , and A ct i 0  of 1806 , w ith  amend­
ments thereof.
Authority o f Officers o f the Law.
266. E very Justice of the Peace, Field-cornet, police constable, or Authorityotofficers 
other officer of the law  within the said territories, is empowered to of a,cll"T- 
exercise all a n l singular the powers and authorities by law
conferred upon such persons w ithin the Colony of the Cape of 
Good Hope.
Power to make lin k s .
267. Subject to the provisions of this Code the Governor m ay t0 make
at any time make such rules as shall be deemed expedient and ru os"
proper w ith respect to the qualifications, appointment, form of 
summoning, challenging, and service of assessors; and generally 
for the amendment and better regulation of any matters relating  
to the practice, procedure, and process in the tr ia l o f crimes and 
offences in the several Courts established and provided for by this 
Code.
Appeals.
268. In  every case in which judgm ent has been given and AppcMs. 
sentence passed under the provisions of this Code it shall be lawful
for the convicted person or persons to appeal therefrom to the 
Supreme Court, the Eastern Districts Court, or any Circuit Court 
having jurisdiction.
Crimes and Offences not specially provided fo r  in this Code.
269. In  case any person shall be accused of the commission crimes nuaoirouw* 
within the said territories of any A ct which i f  committed in this
Colony would constitute a crime or offence, but not hereinbefore in  
this Code provided for as a crime or offence, such person m ay be 
tried, and i f  convicted, sentenced for the same b y  the aforesaid 
Resident M agistrate or the said Special Court, as the case m ay be, 
as i f  such crime or offence had been committed in this Colony, and 
the laws and punishments applicable to such case shall be those 
which shall, for the time being, be in force in this Colony,
Repeal o f repugnant or inconsistent Laws.
270. So much of any Ordinance, A ct, L aw  or Proclamation nopcni of rojmg-
• having the force of law as m ay be repugnant to or inconsistent or i"consi'|(cr't
w ith  this Code is hereby repealed.
